...go forward on any reduction of our strategic arms even by agreement with the other side . . . What I want to do is to see to it that we have strategic...political problems at the same time, for example, on the problems of the Mideast, on other outstanding problems in which the United States and the Soviet Union...

...related issues. President Nixon, for example, said publicly shortly after entering office: "What I want to do is to see to it that we have strategic...progress on outstanding political problems at the same time—for example, on the problem of the Mideast." Such a tactic is ineffective, since its assumption...

...negotiations to control strategic weapons. At a 27 January press conference, Nixon declared that he wanted to have "strategic arms talks in a way and at a time...outstanding political problems at the same time." He mentioned the Middle East, although he really wanted the Soviets to help the United States disengage...

...arms talks or agreements until political settlements were reached. "What I want to do," he explained, "is to see to it that we have strategic arms talks...a time that will promote, if possible, progress on [resolving] outstanding political problems at the same time." On that public occasion he mentioned...

...define his strategic policies. He conveyed the idea of connecting negotiations by saying he wanted "to see to it that we have strategic arms talks in...outstanding political problems at the same time." Nixon also began to distance himself from the idea of strategic superiority. "Parity," as a proper...

...The war which occurred in the Mideast in 1967 was a clear indication of that. What I want to do is see to it that we have strategic arms talks in a way...the same time — for example, on the problem of the Mideast and on other outstanding problems in which the United States and the Soviet Union, acting together,...