Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence ServicesGrove Weidenfeld, 1991 - 634 עמודים One of the events most crucial to the war in the Persian Gulf occurred nearly ten years before it began, when Israel destroyed Iraq's most advanced weapon, the nuclear reactor at Al-Tuweitha, acting on information obtained by Israeli intelligence. Israel's Secret Wars is the first documented, comprehensive history of all three of Israel's intelligence services, from their origins in the 1930s, through Israel's five wars, up to the present, including the Ostrovsky affair. Highly readable and exhaustively researched, it contains the most accurate information available about a shadowy and controversial subject in which myth all too often obscures reality. Using heretofore undisclosed contemporary reports, memoranda, and private diaries, Israel's Secret Wars describes for the first time in print the beginnings of the Israeli-U.S. intelligence relationship; the Israeli-French espionage connection during the Algerian War, which underlay their military alliance in the Suez crisis; the fateful message from a high-level Arab agent that initiated the Yom Kippur war; and many more previously unexamined operations and episodes. Placing every event in its historical context, Black and Morris disentangle the often stormy links between spymasters and politicians in such affairs as the Entebbe raid, Irangate, the Pollard spy scandal, and the Palestinian intifada. Israel's Secret Wars promises to become the standard work on Israeli intelligence for years to come. |
מתוך הספר
תוצאות 1-3 מתוך 62
... believed that the plans for Unit 131 were ' hasty and adventurous , and were lacking in judgement and political sense ' . There was ' no coordi- nation ' between the Mossad and Aman concerning the Egyptian operation , Harel was to ...
... believed that a more liberal approach to the minority would send a positive message to the Arab states about the possibility of Arab - Jewish coexistence inside the country . Politically , it was no easy matter : from the opposition ...
... believed that Sadat had reached a crossroads and could choose either peace or war . The Israeli - Egyptian Second Sinai Disengage- ment Agreement of September 1975 was scheduled to expire in October 1978 , and Aman was convinced that ...
מהדורות אחרות - הצג הכל
Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services <span dir=ltr>Ian Black</span> אין תצוגה מקדימה זמינה - 1991 |