commerce to as great a degree as possible from the depredations of similar ships belonging to foreign navies. Whether the navy will be able to effectively carry out this task is a question that does not come within the scope of this letter. Owing, however, to this country's losing the bulk of the fastest ocean-going merchant vessels of the world, there is another question raised, and it is one that must be faced. At any time one chooses to take, it will be found that there are certain qualities which the fastest mercantile vessels possess which no sea-going men-of-war have. They have a coal endurance, or, in other words, a radius of action much superior to war vessels, and, what is more important still, they have a speed considerably in excess of what the latter class of vessels have. The advantage that ocean liners have as regards speed is not, perhaps, always realized as fully as it should be, owing to the character of ships' trials belonging to the navy being so different from that of vessels of the mercantile marine, and also because the Admiralty methods of statement as regards ships' speeds are not only confusing, but to a large extent misleading. Fast armed merchant vessels, therefore, are in this position. They have a speed which enables them to escape from every sea-going manof-war, and to overhaul practically every merchant vessel afloat, while their armament, though not sufficient to cope with men-of-war, from which they can escape, is sufficient to destroy merchant vessels, which they can always catch, and their coal endurance is so great that they can steam for long periods and over great distances without calling at any port. It is our vessels of this type that are disappearing. It is true that this country quite holds her own in liners of the second rank as regards speed, vessels such as the Scot and Norman, of the Union Line, the Dunottar Castle and Tantallon Castle, of the Castle Line, the Ophir and Ormuz, of the Orient Line, the Nile and Danube, of the Royal Mail Packet, the Australia, Himalaya and Caledonia, of the P. & O. Line, etc.; but these ships have not a speed sufficient either to escape from cruisers or to overhaul the armed merchant cruisers of foreign countries.

The grave danger of the fastest type of merchant vessels getting more and more into the hands of foreign Powers is obvious. Such ships have their guns lying at their respective ports all ready to mount at a few hours' notice, and it is not pleasant to contemplate the effect of vessels of this kind let loose to prey on our commerce. In the case of the American Civil war the Northern States had an overwhelming naval force at their command, and held the supremacy of the sea. The Confederate States had a few comparatively weak, unarmoured vessels, quite unable to stand up against the ships belonging to the Navy of the North. They had, however, a speed slightly in excess of the ships of the Northern Navy, which enabled them to keep out of their way, and these few ships were able to sweep the commerce of the North of the Seas. Admiral Porter, in giving evidence before the Committee of Congress after the war, stated that if the North had owned a few fast merchant vessels, they would have been twice as efficient as the entire Northern Navy, because none of the ships of that navy were able to catch the Confederate ships,

preying on the commerce of the North. The Secretary of the United States Navy a year or two ago vividly pointed out how a few weak ships, which could not be caught, reduced during the war the registered tonnage of the United States Mercantile Marine from 2,640,000 tons to 1,492,000, from which decline it has never recovered. A modern liner would have destructive powers as regards an enemy's commerce, in excess of a vessel such as the Alabama.

Both vessels are alike in their ability to keep out of the way of hostile men-of-war, but the Alabama type of ship had a speed so slightly in excess of the ordinary merchantman, that to overtake it was a very lengthy process, and by no means certain. The speed of the ordinary merchantman has hardly increased since that date, whereas the speed of the liner is enormously greater than that of the Alabama, and her power of destruction is thus largely augmented.

The facts of the case then are these :-
:-

1. That this country has lost her supremacy in the fastest type of ocean steamship, and that the tendency seems to be for these vessels to get entirely into the hands of foreign countries.

2. That such vessels have qualities which place them almost entirely outside the sphere of action of men-of-war.

3. That for a country in the unique position we are in, such a state of things constitutes a grave danger.

There seem but two ways out of the difficulty: either we must create a fleet of cruisers capable of overtaking the fastest type of mercantile steamships, or we must have the large bulk of the fastest merchant vessels ourselves, i.e., sufficient numbers to sweep off the seas the vessels of a similar type belonging to an enemy or enemies.

The task of building cruisers of sufficient speed for the purpose seems almost hopeless. Time after time, type after type of cruisers has been built, and in almost every case the sea speed has not come up to the expectations of the Admiralty, and the cruisers cannot steam at sea at anything like the speed of the fastest merchant vessels.

The soundest policy would seem to be to rely on armed merchant cruisers of our own to protect us from the depredations of similar vessels belonging to an enemy. As supremacy of the sea means national existence to us, it is an axiom that this country must have a fleet of battleships sufficient to cope with any fleet or fleets of battle ships that may be brought against us.

But however overwhelming our force of battle ships might be, it alone would fail to secure that supremacy which is vital to us. It is necessary to maintain, irrespective of what our ratio of battle ships is to other powers, a force of cruisers sufficient to clear the seas of hostile cruisers, as they possess qualities which place them outside the sphere of action of battle ships. And as cruisers are without the sphere of action of battle ships, so in the same manner are fast armed merchant vessels outside the sphere of action of cruisers, and so it behoves us to have a fleet of merchant-cruisers sufficient, should it be necessary, to sweep off the seas the fleets of armed merchant cruisers which have lately come into existence in other countries.

What is needed to save our high speed merchant vessels is a system of subsidies both more generous and more methodical than those which now exist. For a sum of money which would form an almost inappreciable part of the Navy estimates, we could entirely alter the present unsatisfactory position of affairs. The Admiralty at present pay several of our fastest merchant ships subsidies which vary from £2,500 to £7,500 per annum. In return for these subsidies the ships have to be built according to Admiralty requirements, and the Government have besides the right of pre-emption for these ships. The subsidies are not guaranteed for any fixed time, and the Admiralty can cancel them at any moment, and in some cases have done this. has been seen how the enormous subsidies granted by foreign countries to their fast ships have made it impossible for us to compete successfully, and the subsidies of the nature granted by our Admiralty seem insufficient to induce British shipowners to continue competing.

It

It would not be necessary to grant subsidies anything like as large as are granted by foreign Governments to their fast ships in order to regain our supremacy. There are certain routes where, owing to the extent and nature of the traffic, all the fastest ships naturally run. Conditions being equal, we would have an overwhelming superiority of ships on these routes; but the excessive amount of subsidies paid by foreign countries has at length given them a slight advantage, but it is sufficient to bring about the disastrous results pointed out. If we raised British subsidies to £10,000 or £15,000 per ship, guaranteed them for ten or twelve years, and gave them to all ships built above a certain speed, this would probably be sufficient to save a most valuable class of ships to us. In discussing subventions one word must be said with regard to the new fast line of steamers, which it is proposed to establish between Canada and England, and about which so much is being heard. A line like this can only be brought into existence by means of an enormous subsidy, and the subsidy has to be so large because we are making fast ships run on a route where the conditions of trade make it exceedingly difficult for such a type of ships to exist. It is as if we try and force the water of a stream up hill instead of simply helping it to run better along a natural watercourse, by removing obstructions which have been placed in the way. The enormous bulk of this proposed subsidy goes not simply to obtain fast ships, but to obtain fast ships on a route very unpropitious for such ships running. Whether the advantages derived from improved intercourse between Canada and the mother-country are commensurate with the very large expenditure necessary seems doubtful.

That however does not concern us here. What it is desired to point out is that this proposed subsidy is colonial and not naval, and though it will give us four more fast ships, if nothing else is done, it will only increase the pressure which is squeezing out our other fast ships, and there will be little or no benefit in the end. The only effective plan is to have a regular system of subsidising all our fast ships, and even if it were necessary to pay a slightly larger sum than that mentioned above, it would surely be money well spent. We should be absolutely certain

that the ships we get would have the speed necessary and the only expense the country would undergo would be this small amount per annum on a few ships. Even if it were possible to build cruisers able to overtake the mercantile cruisers of an enemy the cost would be half to three-quarters of a million pounds per ship, with repairs each per annum costing as much or more than the total subsidy of a merchant cruiser, not to speak of the enormous cost of coal, wages of crew, etc., which expenses would go on in time of peace.

Do not let us continue our present short-sighted policy, but, recognizing that our fastest type of ocean steamships are being crushed out, determine before it is too late to subsidise on more liberal terms all steamships built over a certain speed. This policy is not advocated to preserve a decaying branch of a trade, but in order to have a fleet of vessels for auxiliaries to the Navy in time of war, that will be able to carry out certain duties, which the Navy is unable to undertake. This object can be attained more effectively and far more cheaply by increasing the number of our fast mercantile ships than in any other way. The duties are those which a country like this, the centre of a worldwide empire joined together by ocean highways, a country with a commerce on the sea as great as all the world combined, must be able to undertake. Yours, etc., J. GORDON SMITH.

May 16, 1896.

Appendix XVI

SPEECH ON THE EVILS OF THE STREETS OF LONDON

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Friday, July 13, 1900.

MR. SAMUEL SMITH: I venture to bring to the attention of the House a very painful subject, but one of urgent public importance. I ask its indulgence while I lay before it some special evils that are eating into the heart of our national life. The State has spent immense sums in primary education, and the children are much better educated than they were a generation ago; but, I ask the House, what is the education they get on the streets of the Metropolis when they leave school and reach that susceptible age when character is formed? The centre of the Metropolis is given up to a carnival of vice every night, and I doubt whether in the whole civilized world such open and hideous manifestation of vice is to be seen as may be witnessed in Piccadilly, Regent Circus, and the adjacent streets.

Let me read to the House a letter I have received from one much respected, whose name is widely known and honoured. I refer to Bishop Barry, whose church and rectory are in Piccadilly :

I am anxious not to exaggerate: but it is difficult to speak too strongly as to the state of things which is there allowed to exist especially between the hours of 11 p.m. and 2 a.m. The nefarious traffic in vice is carried on unblushingly by those who are well known to the police as prostitutes, or as living on the wages of prostitution. Solicitation, especially of the young, is openly practised, sometimes almost to violence. It is all but impossible to walk down Piccadilly at that time without molestation. Rows of cabs stand along the streets, to be hired for conveyance to immoral houses. At times there is open disorder of hustling, shouting and rowdyism in general, mostly under the influence of strong drink. Formal complaint has to be made before this is sufficiently checked by the police. We feel the condition deeply as a grievance and a scandal. We do not of course expect that sensual vice can be eradicated by action of law. But we do think that the constant and flagrant exhibition of vice in our streets and the presentation of dangerous temptation to the inexperienced ought to be prevented; and in this we only claim for the Metropolis what is already secured in some of our largest provincial cities.

Permit me to read another letter from a friend of mine who works among young men and has exceptional opportunities of knowing the state of London :