of experience in the proof of a miracle. I, however, admit of no such opposition, and think it easy to show that there is none. Had Hume been asked why he believed the course of nature to be absolutely uniform, he must have answered, that he believed it on the ground of experience. And then, if asked how he knew what that experience had been, he must have replied, by testimony, for there is no other possible way. And thus it would appear that, while he seems to oppose the evidence of experience to that of testimony, he is only opposing the evidence of testimony to that of testimony. And what would the testimony on the side of Hume amount to, in such a case? Why, absolutely nothing, because it is merely negative. Let a thousand men swear, in a court of justice, that they did not see a murder committed, and it will not diminish in the least the force of the testimony of one man who swears that he did see it, unless the thousand pretend to have been on the spot, and to have had opportunity to witness it. In this case, the experience of the thousand men would be properly said to be contrary to that of the one. But in no such sense can experience be said to be contrary to the testimony for miracles. If any number of men, if the whole race,—with the exception of those who had an opportunity to see, and who did see, a miracle, should testify that they did not see it, that would not invalidate, in the least, the testimony of those who did see it. We should judge of that testimony on its own proper merits.

Thus stands the argument, if, with Hume, we place our belief in the uniformity of nature on the ground of experience. But is this really the ground of that belief? I think not. Nor can I agree with Stewart

and other metaphysicians, who place "the expectation of the continued uniformity of the laws of nature" among what they call the fundamental laws of belief, which we believe in necessarily and without reference to experience. This is not the place for the full discussion of this point. I merely observe that, so far is this from being to the mind a law of belief, to the exclusion of supernatural agency, that narrations of such agency have been received in all ages upon the slightest evidence; and that, if this were the law, then no man ought to believe, or could believe, in the resurrection of the dead, or a future judgment, or in the destruction or change of the present order of nature in any way whatever. The difficulty lies in an incautious and narrow statement of the true law. The true law of belief is, that the same causes will, in the same circumstances, produce the same effects. This is the law; and when applied to the permanence or uniformity of the course of nature, it will stand thus: The present course of nature will be uniform and permanent unless other causes than those now in operation shall intervene to interrupt or destroy it. The probability of the intervention of such causes is a point on which every man must decide for himself. To me it seems probable-to you, perhaps, improbable; but there is nothing in the nature of the case to prevent it from being proved like any other fact.

Having thus put this question upon its true basis, it will be necessary to say very little of the particular fallacies and consequences connected with the argument of Hume. I will simply add, that,

1. This argument proceeds on a principle which would make it unreasonable to believe a miracle on

the testimony of the senses. There is precisely the same reason for opposing the evidence of experience to that of the senses, as for opposing it to that of testimony. If the argument would overthrow a full proof from testimony, the senses certainly could give nothing more.

2. Hume uses the term experience in two senses. Personal experience is the knowledge we have acquired by our own senses. General experience is that knowledge of facts which has been acquired by the race. If, therefore, Hume says a miracle is contrary to his personal experience, that proves nothing; but if he says it is opposed to universal experience, that, as has already been said, is begging the question.

3. He opposes the evidence of experience to that of testimony, evidently with the intention of opposing to testimony the high authority that belongs to personal experience; whereas, in the sense in which he must use the term "experience," since, as has been said, we can know what general experience is only by testimony, he is only opposing testimony to testimony.

4. If the argument of Hume be correct, then no evidence would be sufficient to prove a new fact in natural science, since it would be as much contrary to universal experience as a miracle.

And, finally, Hume has himself renounced the principle of his own argument. He seems, after having written the essay, to have had a perception of some of the absurd consequences to which it must lead, and therefore adds, in a note, "I own there may possibly be miracles of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony." This single admission destroys at once the whole force of his argument. As an example, he says, Suppose all authors, in all languages,

and other metaphysicians, who place "the expectation of the continued uniformity of the laws of nature" among what they call the fundamental laws of belief, which we believe in necessarily and without reference to experience. This is not the place for the full discussion of this point. I merely observe that, so far is this from being to the mind a law of belief, to the exclusion of supernatural agency, that narrations of such agency have been received in all ages upon the slightest evidence; and that, if this were the law, then no man ought to believe, or could believe, in the resurrection of the dead, or a future judgment, or in the destruction or change of the present order of nature in any way whatever. The difficulty lies in an incautious and narrow statement of the true law. The true law of belief is, that the same causes will, in the same circumstances, produce the same effects. This is the law; and when applied to the permanence or uniformity of the course of nature, it will stand thus: The present course of nature will be uniform and permanent unless other causes than those now in operation shall intervene to interrupt or destroy it. The probability of the intervention of such causes is a point on which every man must decide for himself. To me it seems probable-to you, perhaps, improbable; but there is nothing in the nature of the case to prevent it from being proved like any other fact.

Having thus put this question upon its true basis, it will be necessary to say very little of the particular fallacies and consequences connected with the argument of Hume. I will simply add, that,

1. This argument proceeds on a principle which would make it unreasonable to believe a miracle on

the testimony of the senses. There is precisely the same reason for opposing the evidence of experience to that of the senses, as for opposing it to that of testimony. If the argument would overthrow a full proof from testimony, the senses certainly could give nothing more.

2. Hume uses the term experience in two senses. Personal experience is the knowledge we have acquired by our own senses. General experience is that knowledge of facts which has been acquired by the race. If, therefore, Hume says a miracle is contrary to his personal experience, that proves nothing; but if he says it is opposed to universal experience, that, as has already been said, is begging the question.

3. He opposes the evidence of experience to that of testimony, evidently with the intention of opposing to testimony the high authority that belongs to personal experience; whereas, in the sense in which he must use the term "experience," since, as has been said, we can know what general experience is only by testimony, he is only opposing testimony to testimony.

4. If the argument of Hume be correct, then no evidence would be sufficient to prove a new fact in natural science, since it would be as much contrary to universal experience as a miracle.

And, finally, Hume has himself renounced the principle of his own argument. He seems, after having written the essay, to have had a perception of some of the absurd consequences to which it must lead, and therefore adds, in a note, "I own there may possibly be miracles of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony." This single admission destroys at once the whole force of his argument. As an example, he says, "Suppose all authors, in all languages,