Peter, alfo, 1 John, iii. 9. belief whatever, be inconfiftent with the subject's being a child of God-But this much is certain, they would be totally deftitute of brotherly love; and would be juft as the fcriptures defcribe wicked men, hateful and hating each other. 3. If the holy affections of Chriftians are perfect, and entire-remain in him who is born of God, fo that he cannot fin, it must be that he is never without it--never wholly deftitute of it, after it is implanted in him.-If he be ever wholly without it, and fin with the whole heart, as wicked men do, how can it with truth and juftice be faid, that God's feed remains in him,and that he cannot fin. 5. To fuppofe the moral imperfection of Chriftians to confift in the inconftancy of their holy exercifes, feems not confiftent with the reprefentation the fcriptures give of the struggle and warfare, which Chriftians have within themfelves. The apostle speaks of fleshly lufts warring against the foul, 1 Pet. ii. 11. And Paul, fpeaking of Chriftians, fays, Gal. v. 17. "The fresh lufteth against ly free from fin, no good reafon, it is conceived, can be given, why any one, who is born of God, fhould be without the full affurance of hope. Perfect love to God and to our fellow-men is fo entirely distinct, in its nature, from any thing ever found in the natural heart, and fo totally oppofite to it, that it cannot be mistaken. We may as well fuppofe, that a perfon inftantaneously reftored from perfect blindness, to full and clear vifion, fhould feel uncertain whether he fee the fun; as, that one reftored from perfect moral blindnefs, to perfect spiritual light, fhould feel uncertain whether, or not, he beheld the glory of God. Yet the apostle reprefents the full affurance of hope to be the fruit of diligent application to duty."the fpirit, and the spirit against Heb. vi. 11. And the affurance "the flesh: And thefe are conof our calling and election is spoken of, 1 Pet. i. 10. as the effect of diligence. These paffages imply, that the affurance of hope, and of our calling and election, does not accompany the first gracious exercifes, which take place in the heart of one, who is born of God; but that it is the fruit, only of a fucceffion, and an increafing ftrength and purity" law, that when I would do good, of holy affections. 66 trary the one to the other; fo "that ye cannot do the things "that ye would." And that this contrariety of luftings or defires in the fame mind, does not confift in the perfect oppofition of different and fucceffive affections to each other, appears from what the fame apoftle fays of himfel, Rom. vii. 21. "I find then a But "evil is prefent with me." in their kind, we fee not how the apoftle could fay with propriety, as ver. 19. "For the good that "I would I do not; but the evil "that I would not, that I do." We cannot be faid to do that we would not, when the whole heart is in what we do Nor can we be faid not to do the good we would, when this good is perfectly chofen. The holy fcriptures reprefent the struggle in Christians from different and oppofite principles or luftings as a warfare between enemies. And yet it is clear, there is -there can be no ftruggle or warfare of enemies, unlefs both are alive, and on the field, and exerting themselves at the fame time. To fuppofe the luftings of the fpirit, and of the flesh, in Chriftians, both perfect in kind, only exifting at different times, would really give no eflentially different idea of a warfare within the Chriftian, than there was in Adam, by being firft holy, then a finner. Nothing appears, on fuppofition that the moral imperfection of Chriftians confifts in the inconftancy of their holy exercises, but that they may live perfectly free from fin, for as long a period as our first parents did-And then, too, live in the exercise of perfect wickednefs, as long as they did, before they were renewed to holinefs. Yet the fall and recovery of our first parents is neither an example, nor a just reprefentation of the ftruggle of oppofite biaffes in the hearts of Chriftians. hand, does the exercise of perfect wickedness in him who has fallen, forbid the hope, that the subject may again be renewed to repentance. Should it be objected, by the advocates for the impleaded hypothefis, that their fentiments do not admit that Chriftians will ever fall from grace; because they maintain, there are gracious cov enant engagements, on God's part, that where love has once been implanted in the heart, though its exercises be followed by those which are perfectly finful, it fhall again revive and spring up :-This, however, would imply no other difference between them and those who hold that Christians may fall from grace, than that the former fuppofe a certainty that the subject will be renewed to repentance; but the latter do not. The falling away in both cafes, is materially and effentially the fame, viz. a perfon's ceafing to exercise the leaft degree of love to God, and having nothing but wickedness in his heart, though he have once been brought to spiritual lifethough he have heretofore felt the fenfation of pure, divine love. What more than this is neceffary to a real, effectual falling from grace, it may be difficult to apprehend. And if the holy fcriptures decide, that one, who falls from grace, can never again be renewed to repentance; they equally decide, that a Chriftian never is, at any period after his converfion, wholly without any 6. The fentiment under con- degree of the love of God in his fideration implies, both the doc-heart-never fees the time, when trine of perfection in this life, and his feelings and exercises are only that of falling from grace. The thofe of the unregenerate finner. doctrine of perfection, as held by This is afferted on the ground, its advocates, implies no certainty that the covenant of grace afcerthat a fucceffion of holy exercifes tains the final falvation of every fhall be continued for any particu- one, who is brought to believe in lar period : Nor, on the other Chrift. To fay that there is a divine eftablishment, that holy exercises fhall fucceed fuch as are wholly finful, in a heart, which has heretofore felt the power of divine grace and love, contradicts the affertion of the Apostle, that, if fuch an one fall away, it is impoffible to renew him to repentance. Should it be faid, that the fal ling away fpoken of by the Apoftle, does not mean a ceffation for a little, or a given time, of holy exercifes, in the heart of the Christian; but a final as well as a total apoftacy from Christianity; it may be replied, that fuch a conftruction renders the Apostle's impertinent.-This would be to make him fay that, one who final is never renewed again to repen- If it be that the phrases used in the 4th and 5th verfes of the 6th Heb. are descriptive of the Chriftian, the words immediately following fully decide that, if fuch an one fall away, he cannot be renewed again to repentance. But if the expreffions, being enlightened, tafting the heavenly gift, made partakers of the Holy Ghoft, tafting the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, are not defcriptive of the Chriftian character, and of Chriftian experience, where shall we find any in the holy scriptures, which are? How manifeft is it, that being in darkness, and being in the light are phrases abundantly used, in fcrip-affertion, both unmeaning and ture, to diftinguish between the ftate and character of the unregenrate and the Chriftian? Accord-ly falls away, and never does repent, ingly, in this fame Epiftle, chap. 10. 32. the writer addreffes the Hebrew Chriftians, as those who had been enlightened. Similar observations might be made on the other expreffions juft quoted. But the Apostle's own words feem to be decifive in the cafe. He fays, if fuch fall away, it is impoffible to renew them again unto repentance. This naturally fuppofes that thofe, who had been the fubjects of the influences and experiences before described, had once been renewed unto repentance ;-Had not this been the cafe, there would have been a manifeft impropriety in speaking of their being again renewed. Having once been renewed, if they fell away, they never could be renewed again. Why does not this imply, fhould the time ever come, when there is a total failure of love in the heart of a Chriftian, and this followed by exercifes of perfect, unmixed finfulness, that holy love will never again be begotten in his heart?ficult even to be conceived. It is Thefe obfervations may serve to fhow, that the moral imperfection of Christians does not confiit in the inconftancy of their holy exercifes. We may inquire, in the next place, whether it be supposeable, there should be two entirely diftin&t and oppofite exercifes of will, in the Chriftian, at one and the fame time, the one perfectly holy, and the other totally finful; and, that this fhould conftitute the moral imperfection of Christians, in the present state. That there may be different, and even oppofite exercises of will, in the fame perfon, at different times, is readily admitted. But that there fhould be exercises of will perfectly distinct from each other, and in perfect and direct oppofition the one to the other at the fame time, not only wants the evidence of experience, but is dif one confcioufnefs which perceives and | fection of Chriftians confifts, neifeels every thing that takes place ther in the inconftancy of their hoin one and the fame mind, wheth-ly affections, nor in affections of er it be of the intellectual or vol- a perfectly diflint and oppofite nature untary kind. Whatever be the exercifed at the fame time; it renature or quality of affections in mains, that it must consist in morany individual, they are the affec- al imperfection in their holy exercises tions of one and the fame will. themfelves-That the most holy One confcioufnefs to every thing, affections they ever exercife, in which takes place. in it, runs this life, have in them fome mixthrough the whole of each par- ture of moral evil, of fin. This ticular, diftinct mind. Two per- is the fame as to fay, that perfectly distinct and opposite exer- fect, unmixed benevolence is nevcifes of will at the fame time, to- er felt by any one on this fide the gether with two diftinct and fep- grave. Here we may justly aparate perceptions of confcioufnefs peal to the experience of Chrifof them, imply two minds as en- tians; and, afk if they ever feel tirely diftinct from each other, as to themselves that they love the thofe of any two different perfons, glorious God and Saviour as much What makes two perfons, but as they ought to, and with a perfect different trains of moral exercifes, and finless love? Or, whether they between which there is no mutual are ever confcious of this perfect consciousness--mutual perception? friendship and finless love, and at It must be two minds in which are the fame time, the fame moment confound exercises at the fame time, fcicus of perfect, unmixed enmity and thefe of a nature perfectly against God? oppofite to each other, between which there is no common confcioufnef-no mutual perception. But if there be a common confciousness, a mutual perception running through all the exercifes, which co-exist in the mind of an individual; there is no place left for fuch a diftinction between its different feelings and perceptions, as will warrant us to confider, and treat of them, as affections, both entirely oppofite, and perfectly distinct from each other. There may be different qualities in the prefent exercifes of the will: But that two directly oppofite exercifes of one and the fame will fhould co-exift, and thefe, too, of a perfectly different nature; and, there be no blending, no mutual perception of feelings between them; is as inconceivable. as that one mind fhould be two: All the difficulty, it is apprehended, which attends the opinion, that the moral imperfection of Chriftians confifts in the morally imperfect nature of their moft holy affections, is, that it is hard to conceive there should be any love to God, where he is not loved in the fame perfection, as by the fpirits of juft men made perfect, i. e. with a strength and fervor of love, which exhaust the whole natural capacity for love. own, But is it at all inconceivable that, an affection, which gives the divine character and glory a preference to ourselves, and to any perfonal intereft of our fhould, yet, have fome tincture, fome remains of felfishness in it? Is there any inconfiftency in fuppofing, that men may love God more than themselves, and yet not fo much more as they ought? Do If it be that the moral imper-we not often experience preferen ces, in our affections, which are, nevertheless, imperfect? Do we not often make choices, when, at the fame time, fome degree of reluctance is felt in choofing? Are there never any drawbacks upon the enjoyment of what we have chofen? And, yet, would there be, if the choice were pure and unmixed, and, in proportion to the nature of the object, exhaufted the whole ftrength of the elective faculty? When we have been angry with any one, do our affections proceed, in an inftant, from the height of paffion, to perfect cordiality and reconciliation? Or, have we the sensation, both of the height of passion, and perfect reconciliation, at the fame time? Or yet further; do the height of paffion, and perfect reconciliation take place by turns, and vibrate, 'till anger totally fubfide? The experience we have in this, and in fimilar cafes, muft be the rule by which we judge. nature according to the different qualities of the general object prefented to it; or, there must be as many fucceffive affections toward the general object, as there are different qualities in it. If there be not as great a mixture of perception in the affection toward the complex object prefented, as there is of different qualities in the object itself; it will follow, either that there must be as many fucceffive affections as there are different qualities in the object; or, there must be fome qualities in the object perceived by the understanding, toward which the mind does not act at all; or feel any manner of affection. But if we admit that there are some objects exifting in the understanding, toward which no affection of the will is exercifed, we shall neither know where to stop, nor how many objects are prefented, toward which the moral part in us never acts. The objects prefented As to the poffibility, in the by the understanding, are of the nature of things, of fuch a mix-nature of motives to action. And ture of affection, the following things may be observed, viz. why any motives to action should be presented to the moral faculty, toward which the will never acts, either one way or the other, we are not able to comprehend, To suppose there are as many different acts of will in fucceffion to each other, as there are different fimple ideas in a complex object existing at one and the fame time in the understanding, will imply, either that the will never acts toward fome of the objects That there is no exercife of will without an object-That the objects toward which the will is exercifed--the ideas, are often, even generally complex. That the mind is fufceptible of complex ideas, i. e. of a number and variety of simple ideas, at one and the fame time, is fufficiently evinced by experience. Several ideas, and thofe of different kinds, coexist in the mind, and are perceiv-prefented by the understanding, ed at once without any fucceffion. It is the province of the will to feel and act toward the objects prefented to the mind by the understanding. If differing objects are prefented at one and the fame time, the affection toward thefe objects must be, either of a mixed or that the fucceffion of acts of the will are much, yea very much more rapid, than the fucceffion of ideas in the understanding. But why this fhould be fo, we know not; nor do we derive any evidence, from experience, of the fact. But if this be really the |