Serm. I. take Care of our own Life and Health and private Good: and that the fame Objections lie against one of these as against the other. For * First, There is a natural Principle of Benevolence in Man, which is in fome Degree to Society, what Self-love is to the Individual. Suppose a Man of Learning to be writing a grave Book upon Humane Nature, and to fhew in feveral Parts of it that he had an Infight into the Subject he was confidering: Amongst other things, the following one would require to be accounted for; The Appearance of Benevolence orGood-will in Men towards each other in the Inftances of Natural Relation, and others +. Cautious of being deceived with outward Show, he retires within himself to fee exactly, what That is in the Mind of Man from whence this Appearance proceeds; and upon deep Reflection afferts the Principle in the Mind to be only the Love of Power, and Delight in the Exercise of it. Would not every Body think here was a Mistake of one Word for another? That the Philofopher was contemplating and accounting for fome other Humane Actions, fome other Behaviour of Man to Man? And could any one be thoroughly fatisfied, that what is commonly called Benevolence or Good-will was really the Affection meant, but only by being made to understand that this Learned Perfon had a general Hypothefis to which the Appearance of Goodwill could no otherwife be reconciled? That what has this Appearance is often nothing but Ambition; that Delight in Superiority often (fuppofe always) mixes itself with Benevolence, only makes it more fpecious to call it Ambition than Hunger of the two: But in reality that Paffion does no more account for the whole Appearances of Good-will, than this Appetite does? Is there not often the Appearance of Mens wishing dual. And if there be in Mankind any Serm. I. Difpofition to Friendship; if there be any fuch thing as Compaffion, for Compaffion wishing well to others? and is this only the Defire of Power? Is there not often the Appearance of Mens diftinguishing between two or more Perfons, preferring one before another to do good to, in Cafes where Love of Power cannot in the leaft account for the Distinction and Preference? which Preference therefore, what ever it is owing to, most certainly is not owing to the Love of Power and Delight in the Exercise of it; fince this Principle could no otherwise diftinguish between Objects, than as it was a greater Inftance and Exertion of Power to do good to one rather than to another. Again, Suppofe Good-will in the Mind of Man to be nothing but Delight in the exercife of Power: Men might indeed be reftrained by distant and accidental Confiderations; but these Restraints being removed, they would have a Difpofition to, and Delight in Mischief as an Exercife and Proof of Power: And this Difpofition and Delight would arife from or be the fame Principle in the Mind, as a Difpofition to and Delight in Charity. Thus Cruelty, as distinct from Envy and Refentment, is exactly the fame in the Mind of Man as Good-will: That one tends to the Happiness, the other to the Mifery of our Fellow-Creatures, is it seems meerly an accidental Circumftance, which the Mind has not the leaft Regard to. These are the Absurdities which even Men of Capacity run into when they have occafion to belie their Nature, and will perverfely disclaim that Image of God which was originally ftamped upon it; the Traces of which, however faint, are plainly difcernable upon the Mind of Man. † Hobbs of Human Nature, c. 9. §. 17. If any Person can in earnest doubt whether there be such a thing as Good-will in one Man towards another, (for the Question Serm. I. is momentary Love; if there be any fuch thing as the paternal or filial Affections; if there be any Affection in Human Nature, the Object and End of which is the Good of another, this is itself Benevolence, or Queftion is not concerning either the Degree or Extenfivenefs of it, but concerning the Affection itself,) let it be obferved, that Whether Man be thus or otherwife conftituted, What is the inward Frame in this Particular, is a meer Question of Fact or natural Hiftory, not proveable immediately by Reafon. It is therefore to be judged of and determined in the fame way other Facts or Historical Matters are: By appealing to the external Senfes, or inward Perceptions, respectively, as the Matter under Confideration is cognizable by one or the other; By arguing from acknowledged Facts and Actions, inquiring whether these do not fuppofe and prove the Matter in queftion fo far as it is capable of Proof; And laftly, by the Teftimony of Mankind. Now that there is fome Degree of Benevolence amongst Men, may be as ftrongly and plainly proved in all thefe Ways, as it could poffibly be proved, fuppofing there was this Affection in our Nature. And should any one think fit to affert, that Refentment in the Mind of Man was abfolutely nothing but reasonable Concern for our own Safety; the Falfity of this, and what is the real Nature of that Paffion, could be fhewn in no other Ways than those in which it may be fhewn, that there is fuch a thing in fome Degree as real Good-will in Man towards Man. It is fufficient that the Seeds of it be implanted in our Nature by God. There is, it is owned, much left for us to do upon our own Heart and Temper; to cultivate, to improve, to call it forth, to exercise it in a fleady, uniform Manner. This is our Work: This is Virtue and Religion. or the Love of another. Be it ever fo Serm. I. fhort, be it in ever fo low a Degree, or ever fo unhappily confined, it proves the Affertion, and points out what we were defigned for, as really as though it were in a higher Degree and more extenfive. I must however remind you, that though Benevolence and Self-love are different; that though the former tends moft directly to publick Good, and the latter to private: Yet they are fo perfectly coincident, that the greatest Satisfactions to our felves depend upon our having the former in a due Degree; and that the latter is one chief Security of our right Behaviour towards Society. It may be added, that their mutual coinciding, fo that we can fcarce promote one without the other, is equally a Proof that we were made for both. Secondly, This will further appear from observing that the feveral Paffions and Affections, which are diftinct both from Be nevolence *Every Body makes a Diftinction between Self-love, and the feveral particular Paffions, Appetites, and Affections in Humane Nature, and yet they are often confounded again. That they are totally different will be feen by any who Serm. I. nevolence and Self-love, do in general contribute and lead us to publick Good, as really as who will diftinguish between the Paffions and Appetites other, |