challenge us to explain why even this last supposition should be regarded as less probable than any other; since the letters of which the Iliad is composed, if shaken together at random, must fall in some form or other; and though the chances are millions of millions to one against that, or any other determinate order, there are precisely as many chances against one, as against another, whether more or less regular: and in like manner, astonished as we should be, and convinced of the intervention of artifice, if we saw any one draw out all the cards in a pack in regular sequences, it is demonstrable that the chances are not more against that order, than against any one determinate order we might choose to fix upon; against that one, for instance, in which the cards are at this moment actually lying in any individual pack. The multitude of the chances, therefore, he would say, against any series of events, does not constitute it improbable; since the like happens to every one every day; e. g. a man walking through London streets on his business, meets accidentally hundreds of others passing to and fro on theirs; and he would not say at the close of the day that any thing improbable had occurred to him; yet it would almost baffle calculation to compute the Chances against his meeting precisely those very persons, in the order, and at the times and places of his meeting each. The paradox thus seemingly established, though few might be practically misled by it, many would be at a loss to solve. The truth is, that any supposition is justly called improbable, not from the number of chances against it, considered independently, but from the number of chances against it compared with those which lie against some other supposition: we call the drawing of a prize in the lottery improbable, though there be but five to one against it, because there are more chances of a blark; on the other hand, if any one were cast on a desert island under circumstances which warranted his believing that the chances were a hundred to one against any one's having been there before him, yet if he found on the sand pebbles so arranged as to form distinctly the letters of a man's name, he would not only conclude it probable, but absolutely certain, that some human being had been there; because there would be millions of chances against those forms having been produced by the fortuitous action of the waves. Yet if again I should find some tree on the island such that the chances appeared to me five to one against its having grown there spontaneously, still, if, as before, I conceived the chances a hundred to one against any man's having planted it there, I should at once reckon this last as the more unlikely supposition. So also, in the instance above given, any unmeaning form into which a number of letters might fall, would not be called improbable, countless as the chances are against that particular order, because there are just as many against each one of all other unmeaning forms; but if the letters formed a coherent poem, it would then be called incalculably improbable that this form should have been fortuitous, though the chances against it remain the very same; because there must be much fewer chances against the supposition of its having been the work of design. The probability in short, of any supposition, is estimated from a comparison with each of its alternatives. The inclination of the balance cannot be ascertained from knowing the weights in one scale, unless we know what is in the opposite scale. The foregoing observations however, as was above remarked, are not confined to Arguments from Testimony, but apply to all cases in which the degree of probability is estimated from a calculation of chances. § 5. Before I dismiss the consideration of Signs, it may be worth while to notice another case of combined Progressive Argument different from the one lately men- approach. tioned, yet in some degree resembling it. The combination just spoken of is where several Testimonies or other Signs, singly perhaps of little weight, produce jointly, and by their coincidence, a degree of probability far exceeding the sum of their several forces, taken separately; in the case I am now about to notice, the combined force of the series of Arguments results from the order in which they are considered, and from their progressive tendency to establish a certain conclusion. E. g. one part of the law of nature called the "visinertiæ,” is established by the Argument alluded to; viz. that a body set in motion will eternally continue in motion with uniform velocity in a right line, so far as it is not acted upon by any causes which retard or stop, accelerate or divert, its course. Now, as in every case which can come under our observation, some such causes do intervene, the assumed supposition, is practically impossible, and we have no opportunity of verifying the law by direct experiment; but we may gradually approach indefinitely near to the case supposed: and on the result of such experiments our conclusion is founded. We find that when a body is projected along a rough surface, its motion is speedily retarded and soon stopped; if along a smoother surface, it continues longer in motion; if upon ice, longer still; and the like with regard to wheels, &c. in proportion as we gradually lessen the friction of the machinery; if we remove the resistance of the air, by setting a wheel or pendulum in motion under an air-pump, the motion is still longer continued. Finding then that the effect of the original impulse is more and more protracted, in proportion as we more and more remove the impediments to motion from friction and resistance of the air, we reasonably conclude that if this could be completely done, (which is out of our power,) the motion would never cease, since what appear to be the only causes of its cessation, would be absent.* Again, in arguing for the existence and moral attributes of the Deity from the authority of men's opinions, great use may be made of a like progressive course of Argument, though it has been often overlooked. Some have argued for the being of a God from the universal, or at least, general, consent of mankind; and some have appealed to the opinions of the wisest and most cultivated portion, respecting both the existence and the moral excellence of the Deity. It cannot be denied that there is a presumptive force in each of these Arguments; but it may be answered that it is conceivable, an opinion common to almost all the species, may possibly be an error resulting from a constitutional infirmity of the human intellect; that if we are to acquiesce in the belief of the majority, we shall be led to Polytheism; such being the creed of the greater part:—and that though more * See the argument in Butler's Analogy to prove the advantage which Virtue, if perfect, might be expected to obtain weight may reasonably be attached to the opinions of the wisest and best-instructed, still, as we know that such men are not exempt from error, we cannot be perfectly safe in adopting the belief they hold, unless we are convinced that they hold it in consequence of their being the wisest and best instructed; so far forth as they are such. Now this is precisely the point which may be established by the above-mentioned progressive Argument. Nations of Atheists, if there are any such, are confessedly among the rudest and most ignorant savages: those who represent their God or Gods as malevolent, capricious, or subject to human passions and vices, are invariably to be found (in the present day at least) among those who are brutal and uncivilized; and among the most civilized nations of the ancients, who professed a similar creed, the more enlightened members of society seem either to have rejected altogether, or to have explained away, the popular belief. The Mahometan nations, again, of the present day, who are certainly more advanced in civilization than their Pagan neighbours, maintain the unity and the moral excellence of the Deity; but the nations of Christendom, whose notions of the Divine goodness are more exalted, are undeniably the most civilized part of the world, and possess, generally speaking, the most cultivated and improved intellectual powers. Now if we would ascertain, and appeal to, the sentiments of Man as a rational Being, we must surely look to those which not only prevail most among the most rational and cultivated, but towards which also a progressive tendency is found in men in proportion to their degrees of rationality and cultivation. It would be most extravagant to supthat man's advance towards a more improved and pose |