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functions of mind, it seems now to be admit- | stated the perceptible improvement that has lately taken place in the method of considering those intellectual phenomena, he concludes with the following judicious and eloquent observations:—

ted, that philosophy can be of no use to us, and that the profoundest reasonings lead us back to the creed, and the ignorance, of the vulgar. As to the laws of Association, however, the case is somewhat different. In"The authors who form the most conspicuous stances of the application of such laws are exceptions to this gradual progress, consist chiefly indeed familiar to every one, and there are of men, whose errors may be easily accounted for, few who do not of themselves arrive at some by the prejudices connected with their circumscribed imperfect conception of their general limits habits of observation and inquiry;-of Physioloand application: But that they are sooner human frame, which the knife of the Anatomist gists, accustomed to attend to that part alone of the learned, and may be more steadily and excan lay open; or of Chemists, who enter on the tensively applied, when our observations are analysis of Thought, fresh from the decompositions assisted by the lessons of a judicious instruc- of the laboratory; carrying into the Theory of Mind tor, seems scarcely to admit of doubt; and itself (what Bacon expressly calls) the smoke and though there are no errors of opinion perhaps tarnish of the furnace. Of the value of such purthat may not be corrected without the help I must be allowed to observe, that the most dissuits, none can think more highly than myself; but of metaphysical principles, it cannot be distinguished pre-eminence in them does not necesputed, that an habitual acquaintance with sarily imply a capacity of collected and abstracted those principles leads us more directly to the reflection; or an understanding superior to the presource of such errors, and enables us more judices of early association, and the illusions of readily to explain and correct some of the popular language. I will not go so far as Cicero, most formidable aberrations of the human when he ascribes to those who possess these advantages, a more than ordinary vigour of intellect : understanding. After all, perhaps, the chief Magni est ingenii revocare mentem a sensibus, et value of such speculations will be found to cogitationem a consuetudine abducere.' I would consist in the wholesome exercise which only claim for them, the merit of patient and cauthey afford to the faculties, and the delight tious research; and would exact from their anwhich is produced by the consciousness of tagonists the same qualifications."-pp. 110, 111. intellectual exertion. Upon this subject, we gladly borrow from Mr. Stewart the following admirable quotations :

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"An author well qualified to judge, from his own experience, of whatever conduces to invigorate or to embellish the understanding, has beautifully remarked, that, by turning the soul inward on itself, its forces are concentrated, and are fitted for stronger and bolder flights of science; and that, in such pursuits, whether we take, or whether we lose the game, the Chase is certainly of service.' In this respect, the philosophy of the mind (abstracting entirely from that pre-eminence which belongs to it in consequence of its practical applications) may claim a distinguished rank among those preparatory disciplines, which another writer of equal talents has happily compared to the crops which are raised, not for the sake of the harvest, but to be ploughed in as a dressing to the land.''''

pp. 166, 167.

As

The second great objection that has been made to the doctrines of Dr. Reid, is, that they tend to damp the ardour of philosophical curiosity, by stating as ultimate facts many phenomena which might be resolved into simpler principles; and perplex the science of mind with an unnecessary multitude of internal and unaccountable properties. to the first of these objections, we agree entirely with Mr. Stewart. It is certainly better to damp the ardour of philosophers, by exposing their errors and convincing them of their ignorance, than to gratify it by subscribing to their blunders. It is one step towards a true explanation of any phenomenon, to expose the fallacy of an erroneons one; and though the contemplation of such errors may render us more diffident of our own sucIn following out his observations on the cess, it will probably teach us some lessons scope and spirit of Dr. Reid's philosophy, Mr. that are far from diminishing our chance of Stewart does not present his readers with any obtaining it. But to the charge of multiplygeneral outline or summary of the peculiar ing unnecessarily the original and instinctive doctrines by which it is principally distin- principles of our nature, Mr. Stewart, we guished. This part of the book indeed ap- think, has not made by any means so satispears to be addressed almost exclusively to factory an answer. The greater part of what those who are in some degree initiated in the he says indeed upon this subject, is rather an studies of which it treats, and consists of a apology for Dr. Reid, than a complete justifivindication of Dr. Reid's philosophy from the cation of him. In his classification of the most important objections that had been made active powers, he admits that Dr. Reid has to it by his antagonists. The first is proposed multiplied, without necessity, the number of by the materialist, and is directed against the our original affections; and that, in the other gratuitous assumption of the existence of parts of his doctrine, he has manifested a mind. To this Mr. Stewart answers with leaning to the same extreme. It would have irresistible force, that the philosophy of Dr. been better if he had rested the defence of Reid has in reality no concern with the theo-his author upon those concessions; and upon ries that may be formed as to the causes of our mental operations, but is entirely confined to the investigation of those phenomena which are known to us by internal consciousness, and not by external perception. On the theory of Materialism itself, he makes some admirable observations: and, after having

the general reasoning with which they are very skilfully associated, to prove the superior safety and prudence of a tardiness to generalise and assimilate: For, with all our deference for the talents of the author, we find it impossible to agree with him in those particular instances in which he has endeav

oured to expose the injustice of the accusa- objection to Dr. Reid's philosophy, the alleged tion. After all that Mr. Stewart has said, we | tendency of his doctrines on the subject of can still see no reason for admitting a prin- common sense, to sanction an appeal from the ciple of credulity, or a principle of veracity, decisions of the learned to the voice of the in human nature; nor can we discover any multitude. Mr. Stewart, with great candour, sort of evidence for the existence of an in- admits that the phrase was unluckily chosen; stinctive power of interpreting natural signs. and that it has not always been employed with Dr. Reid's only reason for maintaining that perfect accuracy, either by Dr. Reid or his the belief we commonly give to the testimo- followers: But he maintains, that the greater ny of others is not derived from reasoning part of the truths which Dr. Reid has referred and experience, is, that this credulity is more to this authority, are in reality originally and apparent and excessive in children, than in unaccountably impressed on the human unthose whose experience and reason is mature. derstanding, and are necessarily implied in Now, to this it seems obvious to answer, that the greater part of its operations. These, he the experience of children, though not exten- says, may be better denominated, "Fundasive, is almost always entirely uniform in fa- mental laws of belief;" and he exemplifies vour of the veracity of those about them. them by such propositions as the following: There can scarcely be any temptation to utter "I am the same person to-day that I was serious falsehood to an infant; and even if yesterday.-The material world has a real that should happen, they have seldom such a existence.-The future course of nature will degree of memory or attention as would be resemble the past." We shall have occasion necessary for its detection. In all cases, be- immediately to offer a few observations on sides, it is admitted that children learn the some of those propositions. general rule, before they begin to attend to the exceptions; and it will not be denied that the general rule is, that there is a connection between the assertions of mankind and the realities of which they are speaking. Falsehood is like those irregularities in the construction of a language, which children always overlook for the sake of the general analogy. The principle of veracity is in the same situation. Men speak and assert, in order to accomplish some purpose: But if they did not generally speak truth, their assertions would answer no purpose at all-not even that of deception. To speak falsehood, too, even if we could suppose it to be done without a motive, requires a certain exercise of imagination and of the inventive faculties, which is not without labour: While truth is suggested spontaneously—not by the principle of veracity, but by our consciousness and memory. Even if we were not rational creatures, therefore, but spoke merely as a consequence of our sensations, we would speak truth much oftener than falsehood; but being rational, and addressing ourselves to other beings with a view of influencing their conduct or opinions, it follows, as a matter of necessity, that we must almost always speak truth: Even the principle of credulity would not otherwise be sufficient to render it worth while for us to speak at all.

With regard to the principle by which we are enabled to interpret the natural signs of the passions, and of other connected events, we cannot help entertaining a similar scepticism. There is no evidence, we think, for the existence of such a principle; and all the phenomena may be solved with the help of memory and the association of ideas. The "inductive principle" is very nearly in the same predicament; though the full discussion of the argument that might be maintained upon that subject would occupy more room than we can now spare.

After some very excellent observations on the nature and the functions of instinct, Mr.

art proceeds to consider, as the last great

With these observations Mr. Stewart concludes his defence of Dr. Reid's philosophy: but we cannot help thinking that there was room for a farther vindication, and that some objections may be stated to the system in question, as formidable as any of those which Mr. Stewart has endeavoured to obviate. We shall allude very shortly to those that appear the most obvious and important. Dr. Reid's great achievement was undoubtedly the subversion of the Ideal system, or the confutation of that hypothesis which represents the im mediate objects of the mind in perception, as certain images or pictures of external objects conveyed by the senses to the sensorium. This part of his task, it is now generally admitted that he has performed with exemplary diligence and complete success: But we are by no means so entirely satisfied with the uses he has attempted to make of his victory. After considering the subject with some attention, we must confess that we have not been able to perceive how the destruction of the Ideal theory can be held as a demonstration of the real existence of matter, or a confutation of the most ingenious reasonings which have brought into question the popular faith upon this subject. The theory of images and pictures, in fact, was in its original state more closely connected with the supposition of a real material prototype, than the theory of direct perception; and the sceptical doubts that have since been suggested, appear to us to be by no means exclusively applicable to the former hypothesis. He who believes that certain forms or images are actually transmit ted through the organs of sense to the mind, must believe, at least, in the reality of the organs and the images, and probably in their origin from real external existences. He who is contented with stating that he is conscious of certain sensations and perceptions, by no means assumes the independent existence of matter, and gives a safer account of the phe nomena than the idealist.

Dr. Reid's sole argument for the real exist ence of a material world, is founded on the

irresistible belief of it that is implied in Perception and Memory; a belief, the foundations of which, he seems to think, it would be something more than absurd to call in question. Now the reality of this general persuasion or belief, no one ever attempted to deny. The question is only about its justness or truth. It is conceivable, certainly, in every case, that our belief should be erroneous; and there can be nothing absurd in suggesting reasons for doubting of its conformity with truth. The obstinacy of our belief, in this instance, and its constant recurrence, even after all our endeavours to familiarise ourselves with the objections that have been made to it, are not absolutely without parallel in the history of the human faculties. All children believe that the earth is at rest; and that the sun and fixed stars perform a diurnal revolution round it. They also believe that the place which they occupy on the surface is absolutely the uppermost, and that the inhabitants of the opposite surface must be suspended in an inverted position. Now of this universal, practical, and irresistible belief, all persons of education are easily disabused in speculation, though it influences their ordinary language, and continues, in fact, to be the habitual impression of their minds. In the same way, a Berkleian might admit the constant recurrence of the illusions of sense, although his speculative reason were sufficiently convinced of their fallacy.

The phenomena of Dreaming and of Delirium, however, appear to afford a sort of experimentum crucis, to demonstrate that a real external existence is not necessary to produce sensation and perception in the human mind. Is it utterly absurd and ridiculous to maintain, that all the objects of our thoughts may be "such stuff as dreams are made of?" or that the uniformity of Nature gives us some reason to presume that the perceptions of maniacs and of rational men are manufactured, like their organs, out of the same materials? There is a species of insanity known among medical men by the epithet notional, in which, as well as in delirium tremens, there is frequently no general depravation of the reasoning and judging faculties, but where the disease consists entirely in the patient mistaking the objects of his thought or imagination for real and present existences. The error of his perceptions, in such cases, is only detected by comparing them with the perceptions of other people; and it is evident that he has just the same reason to impute error to them, as they can have individually for imputing it to him. The majority, indeed, necessarily carries the point, as to all practical consequences: But is there any absurdity in alleging that we can have no absolute or infallible assurance of that as to which the internal conviction of an individual must be supported, and may be overruled by the testimony of his fellow-creatures?

Dr. Reid has himself admitted that "we might probably have been so made, as to have all the perceptions and sensations which we now have, without any impression on our

bodily organs at all." But it is surely altogether as reasonable to say, that we might have had all those perceptions, without the aid or intervention of any material existence at all. Those perceptions, too, might still have been accompanied with a belief that would not have been less universal or irresistible for being utterly without a foundation in reality. In short, our perceptions can never afford any complete or irrefragable proof of the real existence of external things; because it is easy to conceive that we might have such perceptions without them. We do not know, therefore, with certainty, that our perceptions are ever produced by external objects; and in the cases to which we have just alluded, we actually find perception and its concomitant belief, where we do know with certainty that it is not produced by any external existence.

It has been said, however, that we have the same evidence for the existence of the material world, as for that of our own thoughts or conceptions;-as we have no reason for believing in the latter, but that we cannot help it; which is equally true of the former. Now, this appears to us to be very inaccurately argued. Whatever we doubt, and whatever we prove, we must plainly begin with consciousness. That alone is certain-all the rest is inference. Does Dr. Reid mean to assert, that our perception of external objects is not a necessary preliminary to any proof of their reality, or that our belief in their reality is not founded upon our consciousness of perceiving them? It is only our perceptions, then, and not the existence of their objects, which we cannot help believing; and it would be nearly as reasonable to say that we must take all our dreams for realities, because we cannot doubt that we dream, as it is to assert that we have the same evidence for the existence of an external world, as for the existence of the sensations by which it is suggested to our minds.

We dare not now venture farther into this subject; yet we cannot abandon it without observing, that the question is entirely a matter of philosophical and abstract speculation, and that by far the most reprehensible passages in Dr. Reid's writings, are those in which he has represented it as otherwise. When we consider, indeed, the exemplary candour, and temper, and modesty, with which this excellent man has conducted the whole of his speculations, we cannot help wondering that he should ever have forgotten himself so far as to descend to the vulgar raillery which he has addressed, instead of argument, to the abettors of the Berkleian hypothesis. The old joke, of the sceptical philosophers running their noses against posts, tumbling into kennels, and being sent to madhouses, is repeated at least ten times in different parts of Dr. Reid's publications, and really seems to have been considered as an objection not less forcible than facetious. Yet Dr. Reid surely could not be ignorant that those who have questioned the reality of a material universe, never affected to have perceptions, ideas, and sensa tions, of a different nature from other people. The debate was merely about the origin of

these sensations; and could not possibly affect the conduct or feelings of the individual. The sceptic, therefore, who has been taught by experience that certain perceptions are connected with unpleasant sensations, will avoid the occasions of them as carefully as those who look upon the object of their perceptions as external realities. Notions and sensations he cannot deny to exist; and this limited faith will regulate his conduct exactly in the same manner as the more extensive creed of his antagonists. We are persuaded that Mr. Stewart would reject the aid of such an argument for the existence of an external world.

The length to which these observations have extended, deters us from prosecuting any farther our remarks on Dr. Reid's philosophy. The other points in which it appears to us that he has left his system vulnerable are, his explanation of our idea of cause and effect, and his speculations on the question of liberty

and necessity. In the former, we cannot help thinking that he has dogmatised, with a degree of confidence which is scarcely justified by the cogency of his arguments; and has endeavoured to draw ridicule on the reasoning of his antagonists, by illustrations that are utterly inapplicable. In the latter, also, he has made something more than a just use of the prejudices of men and the ambiguity of language; and has more than once been guilty, if we be not mistaken, of what, in a less respectable author, we should not have scrupled to call the most palpable sophistry. We are glad that our duty does not require us to enter into the discussion of this very perplexing controversy; though we may be per mitted to remark, that it is somewhat extraordinary to find the dependence of human actions on Motives so positively denied by those very philosophers with whom the doctrine of Causation is of such high authority.

(October, 1806.)

Memoirs of Dr. Joseph Priestley, to the year 1795, written by himself: With a Continuation to the time of his decease, by his Son Joseph Priestley; and Observations on his Writings. By THOMAS COOPER, President Judge of the Fourth District of Pennsylvania, and the Reverend WILLIAM CHRISTIE. 8vo. pp. 481. London: 1805.

In the Second part of his book, Mr. Cooper professes to estimate the Metaphysical writings of Dr. Priestley, and delivers a long and very zealous defence of the doctrines of Materialism, and of the Necessity of human actions. A good deal of learning and a good deal of talent are shown in this production: But we believe that most of our readers will be surprised to find that Mr. Cooper considers both these questions as having been finally set at rest by the disquisitions of his learned friend!

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DR. PRIESTLEY has written more, we believe, and on a greater variety of subjects, than any other English author; and probably believed, as his friend Mr. Cooper appears to do at this moment, that his several publications were destined to make an era in the respective branches of speculation to which they bore reference. We are not exactly of that opinion: But we think Dr. Priestley a person of no common magnitude in the history of English literature; and have perused this miscellaneous volume with more interest than we have usually found in publications 'Indeed," he observes, those questions must of the same description. The memoirs are now be considered as settled; for those who can written with great conciseness and simplicity, resist Collins' philosophical inquiry, the section of and present a very singular picture of that in- Dr. Hartley on the mechanism of the mind, and defatigable activity, that bigotted vanity, that the review of the subject taken by Dr. Priestley precipitation, cheerfulness, and sincerity, and his opponents, are not to be reasoned with. which made the character of this restless maxim of technical law. Interest reipublicæ ut denique sit finis litium, is a It will apply equally to philosopher. The observations annexed by the republic of letters; and the time seems to have Mr. Cooper are the work, we think, of a pow-arrived, when the separate existence of the human erful, presumptuous, and most untractable Soul, the freedom of the Will, and the eternal understanding. They are written in a defy- duration of Future punishment, like the doctrines ing, dogmatical, unaccommodating style: with of the Trinity! and Transubstantiation, may be much force of reasoning, in many places, but regarded as no longer entitled to public discussion.". 1."-p. 335. often with great rashness and arrogance; and occasionally with a cant of philosophism, and a tang of party politics, which communicate an air of vulgarity to the whole work, and irresistibly excite a smile at the expense of this magnanimous despiser of all sorts of prejudice

and bigotry.*

up

*I omit now a very considerable portion of this review, containing a pretty full account of Dr. Priestley's life and conversation, and of his various publications on subjects of theology, natural philosophy, and chemistry; retaining only the following examination of his doctrine of Materialism.

The advocates of Necessity, we know, have long been pretty much of this opinion; and we have no inclination to disturb them at present with any renewal of the controversy: But we really did not know that the advo

cates of Materialism laid claim to the same triumph; and certainly find some difficulty in admitting that all who believe in the existence of mind are unfit to be reasoned with. To us, indeed, it has always appeared that it was much easier to prove the existence of mind, than the existence of matter; and with what

ever contempt Mr. Cooper and his friends may | tain the existence of our perceptions, and to regard us, we must be permitted to say a word deny that of matter altogether. The other or two in defence of the vulgar opinion.

The sum of the argument against the existence of mind, in case any of our readers should be ignorant of it, is shortly as follows. The phenomena of thinking, or perception, are always found connected with a certain mass of organised matter, and have never been known to exist in a separate or detached state. It seems natural, therefore, to consider them as qualities of that substance: Nor is it any objection to say, that the quality of thinking has no sort of resemblance or affinity to any of the other qualities with which we know matter to be endowed. This is equally true of all the primary qualities of matter, when compared with each other. Solidity, for instance, bears no sort of resemblance or affinity to extension; nor is there any other reason for our considering them as qualities of the same substance, but that they are always found in conjunction-that they occupy the same portion of space, and present themselves together, on all occasions, to our observation. Now, this may be said, with equal force, of the quality of thinking. It is always found in conjunction with a certain mass of solid and extended matter-it inhabits the same portion of space, and presents itself invariably along with those other qualities the assemblage of which makes up our idea of organised matter. Whatever substratum can support and unite the qualities of solidity and extension, may therefore support the quality of thinking also; and it is eminently unphilosophical to suppose, that it inheres in a separate substance to which we should give the appellation of Mind All the phenomena of thought, it is said, may be resolved by the assistance of Dr. Hartley, into perception and association. Now, perception is evidently produced by certain mechanical impulses upon the nerves, transmitted to the brain, and can therefore be directly proved to be merely a peculiar species of motion; and association is something very like the vibration of musical cords in juxtaposition, and is strictly within the analogy of material movement.

In answering this argument, we will fairly confess that we have no distinct idea of Substance and that we are perfectly aware that it is impossible to combine three propositions upon the subject, without involving a contradiction. All that we know of substance, are its qualities; yet qualities must belong to something-and of that something to which they belong, and by which they are united, we neither know anything nor can form any conception. We cannot help believing that it exists; but we have no distinct notion as to the mode of its existence.

Admitting this, therefore, in the first place, we may perhaps be permitted to observe, that it seems a little disorderly and unphilosophical, to class perception among the qualities of matter, when it is obvious, that it is by means of perception alone that we get any notion of matter or its qualities; and that it is possible, with perfect consistency, to main

qualities of matter are perceived by us; but perception cannot be perceived: And all we know about it is, that it is that by which we perceive every thing else. It certainly does sound somewhat absurd and unintelligible, therefore, to say, that perception is that quality of matter by which it becomes conscious of its own existence, and acquainted with its other qualities: Since it is plain that this is not a quality, but a knowledge of qualities; and that the percipient must necessarily be distinct from that which is perceived. We must always begin with perception; and the followers of Berkeley will tell us, that we must end there also. At all events, it certainly never entered into the head of any plain man to conceive that the faculty of perception was itself one of the qualities with which that faculty made him acquainted: or that it could possibly belong to a substance, which his earliest intimations and most indestructible impressions taught him to regard as something external and separate.*

This, then, is the first objection to the doctrine of Materialism, - that it makes the faculty of perception a quality of the thing perceived; and converts, in a way that must at first sight appear absurd to all mankind, our knowledge of the qualities of matter into another quality of the same substance. The truth is, however, that it is a gross and unwarrantable abuse of language, to call perception a quality at all. It is an act or an eventa fact or a phenomenon-of which the percipi. ent is conscious: but it cannot be intelligibly conceived as a quality; and, least of all, as a quality of that substance which is known to us as solid and extended. 1st, All the qualities of matter, it has been already stated, are perceived by the senses: but the sensation itself cannot be so perceived; nor is it possible to call it an object of sense, without the grossest perversion of language. 2dly, All the qualities of matter have a direct reference to Space or extension; and are conceived, in some measure, as attributes or qualities of the space within which they exist. When we say that a particular body is solid, we mean merely that a certain portion of space is impenetrable: when we say that it is coloured, we

We are not very partial to the practice of quoting poetry in illustration of metaphysics; but the versal and natural impression of mankind on this following lines seem to express so forcibly the unisubject, that we cannot help offering them to the consideration of the reader.

Am I but what I seem, mere flesh and blood?
A branching channel, and a mazy flood?
The purple stream, that through my vessels glides,
Dull and unconscious flows like common tides.
Are not that thinking I, no more than they.
The pipes, through which the circling juices stray,
This frame, compacted with transcendent skill,
Of moving joints, obedient to my will,
Nurs'd from the fruitful glebe like yonder tree,
Waxes and wastes: I call it MINE, not ME.
The mansion chang'd, the tenant still remains,
New matter still the mould'ring mass sustains;
And, from the fleeting stream repair'd by food,
Distinct, as is the swimmer from the flood."

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