of any material imagery. We do not wish, suggests or recals to us the ordinary causes however, to dwell upon an argument, which or proper objects of these emotions, it is evicertainly is not applicable to all parts of the dent that our fancy is kindled by a sudden question; and, admitting that, on many oc- flash of recollection; and that the effect is casions, the feelings which we experience produced by means of a certain poetical creafrom beauty, are sensibly different from the tion that is instantly conjured up in the mind. primary emotions in which we think they | It is this active and heated state of the imaoriginate, we shall endeavour in a very few gination, and this divided and busy occupawords, to give an explanation of this differ- tion of the mind, that constitute the great ence, which seems to be perfectly consist- peculiarity of the emotions we experience ent with the theory we have undertaken to from the perception of beauty. illustrate. Finally, and this is perhaps the most imIn the first place, it should make some dif- portant consideration of the whole, it should ference on the primary affections to which be recollected, that, along with the shadow or we have alluded, that, in the cases alluded to, suggestion of associated emotions, there is they are reflected from material objects, and always present a real and direct perception, not directly excited by their natural causes. which not only gives a force and liveliness to The light of the moon has a very different all the images which it suggests, but seems complexion from that of the sun;-though it to impart to them some share of its own is in substance the sun's light: and glimpses reality. That there is an illusion of this kind of interesting, or even of familiar objects, in the case, is sufficiently demonstrated by caught unexpectedly from a mirror placed at the fact, that we invariably ascribe the intera distance from these objects, will affect us, est, which we think has been proved to arise ke sudden allusions in poetry, very differ- wholly from these associations, to the object ently from the natural perception of those ob- itself, as one of its actual and inherent qualijects in their ordinary relations. In the next ties; and consider its beauty as no less a propplace, the emotion, when suggested in the erty belonging to it, than any of its physical shape of beauty, comes upon us, for the most attributes. The associated interest, therepart, disencumbered of all those accompani- fore, is beyond all doubt confounded with the ments which frequently give it a peculiar and present perception of the object itself; and a less satisfactory character, when it arises from livelier and more instant impression is accorddirect intercourse with its living objects. The ingly made upon the mind, than if the intercompassion, for example, that is suggested by esting conceptions had been merely excited beauty of a gentle and winning description, is in the memory by the usual operation of renot attended with any of that disgust and un-flection or voluntary meditation. Something easiness which frequently accompany the analogous to this is familiarly known to occur spectacle of real distress; nor with that im-in other cases. When we merely think of an portunate suggestion of the duty of relieving absent friend, our emotions are incomparably it, from which it is almost inseparable. Nor less lively than when the recollection of him does the temporary delight which we receive is suddenly suggested by the unexpected from beauty of a gay and animating charac- sight of his picture, of the house where he ter, call upon us for any such expenditure of dwelt, or the spot on which we last parted pirits, or active demonstrations of sympathy, from him-and all these objects seem for the as are sometimes demanded by the turbu- moment to wear the colours of our own assolence of real joy. In the third place, the ciated affections. When Captain Cook's comemotion of beauty, being partly founded upon panions found, in the remotest corner of the illusion, is far more transitory in its own na-habitable globe, a broken spoon with the word tore, and is both more apt to fluctuate and vary in its character, and more capable of being dismissed at pleasure, than any of the primary affections, whose shadow and representative it is. In the fourth place, the perception of beauty implies a certain exercise of the imagination that is not required in the case of direct emotion, and is sufficient, of itself, both to give a new character to every emotion that is suggested by the intervention of such an exercise, and to account for our classing all the various emotions that are so suggested under the same denomination of beauty. When we are injured, we feel indignation when we are wounded, we feel pain-when we see suffering, we feel compassion-and when we witness any splendid act of heroism or generosity, we feel admiration-without any effort of the imagination, or the intervention of any picture or vision in the mind. But when we feel indignation or pity, or admiration, in consequence of seeing some piece of inanimate matter that merely London stamped upon it-and burst into tears at the sight!-they proved how differently we may be moved by emotions thus connected with the real presence of an actual perception, than by the mere recollection of the objects on which those emotions depend. Every one of them had probably thought of London every day since he left it; and many of them might have been talking of it with tranquillity, but a moment before this more effectual appeal was made to their sensibility. If we add to all this, that there is necessarily something of vagueness and variableness in the emotions most generally excited by the perception of beauty, and that the mind wanders with the eye, over the different objects which may supply these emotions, with a degree of unsteadiness, and half voluntary half involuntary fluctuation, we may come to understand how the effect not only should be essentially different from that of the simple presentment of any one interesting conception, but should acquire a peculiarity which entitles it to a different denomination. Most human comfort, ingenuity, and fortune. A of the associations of which we have been last | these, indeed, obviously resolve themselv speaking, as being founded on the analogies into the great object of sympathy-huma or fanciful resemblances that are felt to exist enjoyment. Convenience and comfort is b between physical objects and qualities, and another name for a lower, but very indispe the interesting affections of mind, are intrin- sable ingredient of that emotion. Skill ́a sically of this vague and wavering descrip- ingenuity readily present themselves as mea tion-and when we look at a fine landscape, by which enjoyment may be promoted; a or any other scene of complicated beauty, a high fortune, and opulence, and splendo great variety of such images are suddenly pass, at least at a distance, for its certa presented to the fancy, and as suddenly suc- causes and attendants. The beauty of fitne ceeded by others, as the eye ranges over the and adaptation of parts, even in the works different features of which it is composed, and nature, is derived from the same fountainfeeds upon the charms which it discloses. partly by means of its obvious analogy Now, the direct perception, in all such cases, works of human skill, and partly by sugge not only perpetually accompanies the asso- tions of that Creative power and wisdom, ciated emotions, but is inextricably con- which all human destiny is subjected. T founded with them in our feelings, and is feelings, therefore, associated with all tho even recognised upon reflection as the cause, qualities, though scarcely rising to the heig not merely of their unusual strength, but of of emotion, are obviously in a certain degr the several peculiarities by which we have pleasing or interesting; and when several shown that they are distinguished. It is not them happen to be united in one object, m wonderful, therefore, either that emotions so accumulate to a very great degree of beaut circumstanced should not be classed along It is needless, we think, to pursue these gen with similar affections, excited under different ral propositions through all the details circumstances, or that the perception of pre- which they so obviously lead. We shall co sent existence, thus mixed up, and indissolu- fine ourselves, therefore, to a very few remar bly confounded with interesting conceptions, upon the beauty of architecture-and chief should between them produce a sensation of as an illustration of our general position. so distinct a nature as naturally to be distinguished by a peculiar name-or that the beauty which results from this combination should, in ordinary language, be ascribed to the objects themselves-the presence and perception of which is a necessary condition of its existence. building; 2d, Of security and stability, with view to the nature of the materials; 3d, the skill and power requisite to mould su materials into forms so commodious; 4th, magnificence, and splendour, and expens 5th, Of antiquity; and, 6thly, Of Roman a Grecian greatness. His observations are su med up in the following short sentence. There are few things, about which men virtù are more apt to rave, than the merits the Grecian architecture; and most of the who affect an uncommon purity and delica of taste, talk of the intrinsic beauty of its p portions as a thing not to be disputed, exce by barbarian ignorance and stupidity. M What we have now said is enough, we be- Alison, we think, was the first who gave lieve, to give an attentive reader that general full and convincing refutation of this mys conception of the theory before us, which is rious dogma; and, while he admits, in t all that we can hope to give in the narrow most ample terms, the actual beauty of t limits to which we are confined. It may be objects in question, has shown, we think, observed, however, that we have spoken only the clearest manner, that it arises entire of those sorts of beauty which we think capa- from the combination of the following as: ble of being resolved into some passion, or ciations:-Ist, The association of utility, co emotion, or pretty lively sentiment of our na-venience, or fitness for the purposes of t ture; and though these are undoubtedly the highest and most decided kinds of beauty, it is certain that there are many things called beautiful which cannot claim so lofty a connection. It is necessary, therefore, to observe, that, though every thing that excites any feeling worthy to be called an emotion, by its beauty or sublimity, will be found to be related to the natural objects of human passions or affections, there are many things which are pleasing or agreeable enough to be called beautiful, in consequence of their relation merely to human convenience and comfort;many others that please by suggesting ideas of human skill and ingenuity-and many that obtain the name of beautiful, by being associated with human fortune, vanity, or splendour. After what has been already said, it will not be necessary either to exemplify or explain these subordinate phenomena. It is enough merely to suggest, that they all please upon the same great principle of sympathy with human feelings; and are explained by the simple and indisputable fact, that we are pleased with the direct contemplation of "The proportions,” he observes, "of the orders, it is to be remembered, are disti subjects of beauty, from the ornaments w which they are embellished, from the mag ficence with which they are executed, fr the purposes of elegance they are intended serve, or the scenes of grandeur they are d tined to adorn. It is in such scenes, howev and with such additions, that we are ace tomed to observe them; and, while we f the effect of all these accidental associatio we are seldom willing to examine what the causes of the complex emotion we f and readily attribute to the nature of the chitecture itself, the whole pleasure which enjoy. But, besides these, there are ot associations we have with these forms, still more powerfully serve to command our admiration; for they are the GRECIAN orders; they derive their origin from those times, and were the omament of those countries which are most hallowed in our imaginations; and it is difficult for us to see them, even in their modern copies, without feeling them operate upon our minds as relics of those polished nations where they first arose, and of that greater people by whom they were afterwards borrowed." Agreeing as he does with Mr. Alison, and all modern inquirers, that the whole beauty of objects consists, in the far greater number of instances, in the associations to which we have alluded, he still maintains, that some few visible objects affect us with a sense of beauty in consequence of the pleasurable impression they make upon the sense-and that our perception of beauty is, in these instances, a mere organic sensation. Now, we have already stated, that it would be something quite unexampled in the history either of mind or of language, if certain physical and bodily sensations should thus be confounded with moral and social feelings with which they had no connection, and pass familiarly under one and the same name. Beauty consists confessedly, in almost all cases, in the suggestion of moral or social emotions, mixed This analysis is to us perfectly satisfactory. But, indeed, we cannot conceive any more complete refutation of the notion of an intrinsic and inherent beauty in the proportions of the Grecian architecture, than the fact of the admitted beauty of such very opposite proportions in the Gothic. Opposite as they are, however, the great elements of beauty are the same in this style as in the other-up and modified by a present sensation or the impressions of religious awe and of chivalrous recollections, coming here in place of the classical associations which constitute so great a share of the interest of the former. It is well observed too by Mr. Alison, that the great durability and costliness of the productions of this art, have had the effect, in almost all regions of the world, of rendering their Fashion permanent, after it had once attained such a degree of perfection as to fulfil its substantial purposes. perception; and it is this suggestion, and this identification with a present object, that constitutes its essence, and gives a common character to the whole class of feelings it produces, sufficient to justify their being designated by a common appellation. If the word beauty, in short, must mean something, and if this be very clearly what it means, in all the remarkable instances of its occurrence, it is difficult to conceive, that it should occa sionally mean something quite different, and denote a mere sensual or physical gratification, unaccompanied by the suggestion of any moral emotion whatever. According to Mr. Knight, however, and, indeed, to many other writers, this is the case with regard to the beauty of colours; which depends altogether, they say, upon the delight which the eye naturally takes in their contemplation-this delight being just as primitive and sensual as that which the palate receives from the contact of agreeable flavours. "Buildings," he observes, "may last, and are intended to last for centuries. The life of man is very inadequate to the duration of such productions; and the present period of the world, though old with respect to those arts which are employed upon perishable subjects, is yet young in relation to an art, which is employed upon so durable materials as those of architecture. Instead of a few years, therefore, centuries must probably pass before such productions demand to be renewed; and, long before that period is elapsed, the It must be admitted, we think, in the first sacredness of antiquity is acquired by the place, that such an allegation is in itself exsubject itself, and a new motive given for the tremely improbable, and contrary to all analpreservation of similar forms. In every coun-ogy, and all experience of the structure of try, accordingly, the same effect has taken place: and the same causes which have thus served to produce among us, for so many years, an uniformity of taste with regard to the style of Grecian architecture, have produced also among the nations of the East, for a much longer course of time, a similar uniformity of taste with regard to their ornamental style of architecture; and have perpetuated among them the same forms which were in use among their forefathers, before the Grecian orders were invented." It is not necessary, we think, to carry these illustrations any farther: as the theory they are intended to explain, is now, we believe, universally adopted, though with some limitations, which we see no reason to retain. Those suggested by Mr. Alison, we have already endeavoured to dispose of in the few remarks we have made upon his publication; and it only remains to say a word or two more upon Mr. Knight's doctrine as to the primitive and independent beauty of colours, upon which we have already hazarded some remarks. language, or of the laws of thought. It is farther to be considered, too, that if the pleasures of the senses are ever to be considered as beautiful, those pleasures which are the most lively and important would be the most likely to usurp this denomination, and to take rank with the higher gratifications that result from the perception of beauty. Now, it admits of no dispute, that the mere organic pleasures of the eye (if indeed they have any existence) are far inferior to those of the palate, the touch, and indeed almost all the other senses-none of which, however, are in any case confounded with the sense of beauty. In the next place, it should follow, that if what affords organic pleasure to the eye be properly called beautiful, what offends or gives pain to it, should be called ugly. Now, excessive or dazzling light is offensive to the eye-but, considered by itself, it is never called ugly, but only painful or disagreeable. The moderate excitement of light, on the other hand, or the soothing of certain bright but temperate colours, when considered in this primary aspect, are not called beautiful, but only agreeable or refreshing. So far as the direct offence or comfort of the organ, in short, is referred to, the language which we use relates strictly to physical or bodily sensation, and is not confounded with that which relates to mental emotion; and we really see no ground for supposing that there is any exception to this rule. It is very remarkable, indeed, that the sense whose organic gratification is here supposed to constitute the primary feeling of beauty, should be one, in the first place, whose direct organic gratifications are of very little force or intensity; and, in the next place, one whose office it is, almost exclusively, to make us acquainted with the existence and properties of those external objects which are naturally interesting to our inward feelings and affections. This peculiarity makes it (at the very least) extremely probable, that ideas of emotion should be associated with the perceptions of this sense; but extremely improbable, that its naked and unassociated sensations should in any case be classed with such emotions. If the name of beauty were given to what directly gratifies any sense, such as that of tasting or smelling, which does not make us acquainted with the nature or relations of outward objects, there would be less room for such an explanation. But when it is the business of a particular sense or organ to introduce to our knowledge those objects which are naturally connected with ideas of emotion, it is easy to understand how its perceptions should be associated with these emotions, and an interest and importance thus extended to them, that belong to the intimations of no other bodily organ. But, for those very reasons, we should be prepared to suspect, that all the interest they possess is derived from this association; and to distrust the accuracy of any observations that might lead us to conclude that its mere organic impulses ever produced any thing akin to those associated emotions, or entitled to pass under their name. This caution will appear still more reasonable, when it is considered, that all the other qualities of visible objects, except only their colours, are now admitted to be perfectly indifferent in themselves, and to possess no other beauty than they may derive from their associations with our ordinary affections. There are no forms, for example, even in Mr. Knight's opinion, that have any intrinsic beauty, or any power of pleasing or affecting us, except through their associations, or affinities to mental affections, either as expressive of fitness and utility, or as types and symbols of certain moral or intellectual qualities, in which the sources of our interest are obvious. Yet the form of an object is as conspicuous an ingredient of its beauty as its colour; and a property, too, which seems at first view to be as intrinsic ally and independently pleasing. Why, then, should we persist in holding that colours, or combinations of colours, please from being naturally agreeable to the organ of sight, when it is admitted that other visible qualities, which seem to possess the same power of pleasing, are found, upon examination, to owe it entirely to the principle of association? The only reason that can be assigned, or that actually exists for this distinction, is, that it has been supposed more difficult to account for the beauty of colours, upon the principles which have accounted for other beauties, or to specify the particular associations by virtue of which they could acquire this quality. Now, it appears to us that there is no such difficulty; and that there is no reason whatever for holding that one colour, or combination of colours, is more pleasing than another, except upon the same grounds of association which recommend particular forms, motions, or proportions. It appears to us, that the organic pleasures of the eye are extremely few and insignificant. It is hurt, no doubt, by an excessive glare of light; and it is in some degree gratified, perhaps, by a moderate degree of it. But it is only by the quantity or intensity of the light, we think, that it is so affected. The colour of it, we take it, is, in all cases, absolutely indifferent. But it is the colour only that is called beautiful or otherwise; and these qualities we think it very plainly derives from the common fountain of association. In the first place, we would ask, whether there is any colour that is beautiful in all situations? and, in the next place, whether there is any colour that is not beautiful in some situation? With regard to the first, take the colours that are most commonly referred to as intrinsically beautiful-bright and soft green-clear blue-bright pink, or vermilion. The first is unquestionably beautiful in vernal woods and summer meadows; and, we humbly conceive, is beautiful, because it is the natural sign and concomitant of those scenes and seasons of enjoyment. Blue, again, is beautiful in the vernal sky;—and, as we believe, for the sake of the pleasures of which such skies are prolific; and pink is beautiful on the cheeks of a young woman or the leaves of a rose, for reasons too obvious to be stated. We have associations enough, therefore, to recommend all those colours, in the situations in which they are beautiful: But, strong as these associations are, they are unable to make them universally beautiful-or beautiful, indeed, in any other situations. Green would not be beautiful in the sky-nor blue on the cheek-nor vermilion on the grass. It may be said, indeed, that, though they are always recognised as beautiful in themselves, their obvious unfitness in such situations counteracts the effect of their beauty, and make an opposite impression, as of something monstrous and unnatural; and that, accordingly, they are all beautiful in indifferent situations, where there is no such antagonist principle in furniture, dress, and ornaments. Now the fact, in the first place, is not so ;-these bright colours being but seldom and sparingly admitted in ornaments or works of art; and no man, for example, choosing to have a blue house, or a green ceiling, or a pink coat. But, in the second place, if the facts were admitted, we think it obvious, that the general beauty of those colours would be sufficiently accounted for by the very interesting and powerful associations under which all of them are so frequently presented by the hand of Nature. The interest we take in female beauty,-in vernal delights,-in unclouded skies,-is far too lively and too constantly recurring, not to stamp a kindred interest upon the colours that are naturally associated with such objects; and to make us regard with some affection and delight those hues that remind us of them, although we should only meet them upon a fan, or a dressing-box, the lining of a curtain, or the back of a screen. Finally, we beg leave to observe, that all bright and clear colours are naturally typical of cheerfulness and purity of mind, and are hailed as emblems of moral qualities, to which no one can be indifferent. used without reference to the practical difficulties of the art, which must go for nothing in the present question, really mean little more than the true and natural appearance of coloured objects, seen through the same tinted or partially obscure medium that commonly constitutes the atmosphere: and for the actual optical effects of which but few artists know how to make the proper allowance. In nature, we know of no discordant or offensive colouring, except what may be referred to some accident or disaster that spoils the moral or sentimental expression of the scene, and disturbs the associations upon which all its beauty, whether of forms or of hues, seems to us very plainly dependent. We are perfectly aware, that ingenious persons have been disposed to dogmatize and to speculate very confidently upon these subjects; and have had the benefit of seeing various learned treaWith regard to ugly colours again, we really tises upon the natural gamut of colours, and are not aware of any to which that epithet the inherent congruity of those that are called can be safely applied. Dull and dingy hues complementary, with reference to the prisare usually mentioned as in themselves thematic spectrum. But we confess we have no least pleasing. Yet these are the prevailing faith in any of those fancies; and believe, tints in many beautiful landscapes, and many that, if all these colours were fairly arranged admired pictures. They are also the most on a plain board, according to the most rigid common colours that are chosen for dress rules of this supposed harmony, nobody, but (male dress at least),-for building,-for fur- the author of the theory, would perceive the niture,-where the consideration of beauty is smallest beauty in the exhibition, or be the the only motive for the choice. In fact, the least offended by reversing their collocation. shaded parts of all coloured objects pass into tints of this description:-nor can we at present recollect any one colour, which we could specify as in itself disagreeable, without running counter to the feelings and the practice of the great mass of mankind. If the fact, however, were otherwise, and if certain muddy and dull colours were universally allowed to be disagreeable, we should think there could be no difficulty in referring these, too, to natural associations. Darkness, and all that approaches it, is naturally associated with ideas of melancholy,-of helplessness, and danger; -and the gloomy hues that remind us of it, or seem to draw upon it, must share in the same associations. Lurid skies, too, it should be observed, and turbid waters, and unfruitful swamps, and dreary morasses, are the natural and most common wearers of these dismal liveries. It is from these that we first become acquainted with them; and it is needless, therefore, to say, that such objects are necessarily associated with ideas of discomfort, and sadness, and danger; and that the colours that remind us of them, can scarcely fail to recal some of the same disagreeable sensations. Enough, however, and more than enough, has been said about the supposed primitive and independant beauty of separate colours. It is chiefly upon the intrinsic beauty of their mixture or combinations that Mr. Knight and his adherents have insisted;-and it is no doubt quite true, that, among painters and connoisseurs, we hear a great deal about the harmony and composition of tints, and the charms and difficulties of a judicious colouring. In all this, however, we cannot help suspecting that there is no little pedantry, and no little jargon; and that these phrases, when We do not mean, however, to dispute, that the laws of colouring, insisted on by learned artists, will produce a more pleasing effect upon trained judges of the art, than a neglect of these laws; because we have little doubt that these combinations of colour are recommended by certain associations, which render them generally pleasing to persons so trained and educated;-all that we maintain is, that there are no combinations that are originally and universally pleasing or displeasing to the eye, independent of such associations; and it seems to us an irresistible proof of this, that these laws of harmonious colouring are perpetually and deliberately violated by great multitudes of persons, who not only have the perfect use of their sight, but are actually bestowing great pains and expense in providing for its gratification, in the very act of this violation. The Dutch trader, who paints over the outside of his country-house with as many bright colours as are to be found in his tulipbed, and garnishes his green shutters with blue facings, and his purple roof with lilac ridges, not only sees as well as the studied colourist, who shudders at the exhibition, but actually receives as much pleasure, and as strong an impression of beauty, from the finished lusthaus, as the artist does from one of his best pictures. It is impossible, then, that these combinations of colours can be naturally or intrinsically offensive to the organ of sight; and their beauty or ugliness must depend upon the associations which different individuals may have happened to form with regard to them. We contend, however, for nothing more; and are quite willing to allow that the associations which recommend his staring tawdriness to the burgomaster, are such as |