Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of TerrorismMIT Press, 30 בספט׳ 2011 - 314 עמודים Applying fresh tools from economics to explain puzzling behaviors of religious radicals: Muslim, Christian, and Jewish; violent and benign. How do radical religious sects run such deadly terrorist organizations? Hezbollah, Hamas, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Taliban all began as religious groups dedicated to piety and charity. Yet once they turned to violence, they became horribly potent, executing campaigns of terrorism deadlier than those of their secular rivals. In Radical, Religious, and Violent, Eli Berman approaches the question using the economics of organizations. He first dispels some myths: radical religious terrorists are not generally motivated by the promise of rewards in the afterlife (including the infamous seventy-two virgins) or even by religious ideas in general. He argues that these terrorists (even suicide terrorists) are best understood as rational altruists seeking to help their own communities. Yet despite the vast pool of potential recruits—young altruists who feel their communities are repressed or endangered—there are less than a dozen highly lethal terrorist organizations in the world capable of sustained and coordinated violence that threatens governments and makes hundreds of millions of civilians hesitate before boarding an airplane. What's special about these organizations, and why are most of their followers religious radicals? Drawing on parallel research on radical religious Jews, Christians, and Muslims, Berman shows that the most lethal terrorist groups have a common characteristic: their leaders have found a way to control defection. Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Taliban, for example, built loyalty and cohesion by means of mutual aid, weeding out “free riders” and producing a cadre of members they could rely on. The secret of their deadly effectiveness lies in their resilience and cohesion when incentives to defect are strong.These insights suggest that provision of basic social services by competent governments adds a critical, nonviolent component to counterterrorism strategies. It undermines the violent potential of radical religious organizations without disturbing free religious practice, being drawn into theological debates with Jihadists, or endangering civilians. |
מתוך הספר
תוצאות 1-5 מתוך 39
... Sect , Subsidy , and Sacrifice Subsidized Sacrifice Madrassas 108 Subsidized Prohibitions and Fertility How Many Radical Islamists ? 116 Recap 118 111 5 The Hamas Model : Why Religious Radicals Are Such Effective Terrorists 121 The ...
... sect to describe these groups in his brilliant foundational text of economics, The Wealth of Nations. An economist or sociologist would use sect interchangeably with religious radical, although sect has taken on a more negative ...
הגעת למגבלת הצפייה עבור ספר זה מדוע?.
הגעת למגבלת הצפייה עבור ספר זה מדוע?.
הגעת למגבלת הצפייה עבור ספר זה מדוע?.
תוכן
1 | |
2 The Defection Constraint | 29 |
The Organizational Secrets of Religions Radicals | 61 |
4 Sect Subsidy and Sacrifice | 95 |
Why Religious Radicals Are Such Effective Terrorists | 121 |
6 Why Suicide Attacks? | 157 |
7 Constructive Counterterrorism | 183 |
8 Religious Radicals and Violence in the Modern World | 211 |
Analytical Appendix | 241 |
Notes | 251 |
References | 273 |
Index | 285 |
מהדורות אחרות - הצג הכל
Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism <span dir=ltr>Eli Berman</span> תצוגה מקדימה מוגבלת - 2011 |
Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism <span dir=ltr>Eli Berman</span> אין תצוגה מקדימה זמינה - 2011 |
Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism <span dir=ltr>Eli Berman</span> אין תצוגה מקדימה זמינה - 2009 |