Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of TerrorismMIT Press, 30 בספט׳ 2011 - 314 עמודים Applying fresh tools from economics to explain puzzling behaviors of religious radicals: Muslim, Christian, and Jewish; violent and benign. How do radical religious sects run such deadly terrorist organizations? Hezbollah, Hamas, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Taliban all began as religious groups dedicated to piety and charity. Yet once they turned to violence, they became horribly potent, executing campaigns of terrorism deadlier than those of their secular rivals. In Radical, Religious, and Violent, Eli Berman approaches the question using the economics of organizations. He first dispels some myths: radical religious terrorists are not generally motivated by the promise of rewards in the afterlife (including the infamous seventy-two virgins) or even by religious ideas in general. He argues that these terrorists (even suicide terrorists) are best understood as rational altruists seeking to help their own communities. Yet despite the vast pool of potential recruits—young altruists who feel their communities are repressed or endangered—there are less than a dozen highly lethal terrorist organizations in the world capable of sustained and coordinated violence that threatens governments and makes hundreds of millions of civilians hesitate before boarding an airplane. What's special about these organizations, and why are most of their followers religious radicals? Drawing on parallel research on radical religious Jews, Christians, and Muslims, Berman shows that the most lethal terrorist groups have a common characteristic: their leaders have found a way to control defection. Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Taliban, for example, built loyalty and cohesion by means of mutual aid, weeding out “free riders” and producing a cadre of members they could rely on. The secret of their deadly effectiveness lies in their resilience and cohesion when incentives to defect are strong.These insights suggest that provision of basic social services by competent governments adds a critical, nonviolent component to counterterrorism strategies. It undermines the violent potential of radical religious organizations without disturbing free religious practice, being drawn into theological debates with Jihadists, or endangering civilians. |
מתוך הספר
תוצאות 1-5 מתוך 68
... Mutual Aid : The Organizational Secrets of Religious Radicals 61 Prohibitions and Sacrifices - the Benign Puzzles 64 Where Are the Dads ? 68 Mutual Aid 75 Prohibitions and Clubs 78 Evidence 81 Fertility 85 Pronatalist Prohibitions ...
... mutual aid. By mutual aid I mean individual members providing goods and services through acts of charity within a community. Unpaid charitable work is common in many communities, religious and secular. It usually ranges from occa ...
... mutual aid organization. The cheaters they worry about are not shirkers, but informants and defectors—a far greater threat. A single shirker in a mutual aid organization can be disruptive and expensive, but a single defector can cause ...
... mutual aid and other community services extremely effectively to members. One of my objectives in this book is to demonstrate that this finding applies to radical religious Muslims as well, providing insight into how radical Islamic ...
... mutual aid. No matter what beliefs motivate a member's sacrifice, the act of sacrifice signals that the member will not shirk, creating the potential for productive mutual aid activity in that community. That potential is often realized ...
תוכן
1 | |
2 The Defection Constraint | 29 |
The Organizational Secrets of Religions Radicals | 61 |
4 Sect Subsidy and Sacrifice | 95 |
Why Religious Radicals Are Such Effective Terrorists | 121 |
6 Why Suicide Attacks? | 157 |
7 Constructive Counterterrorism | 183 |
8 Religious Radicals and Violence in the Modern World | 211 |
Analytical Appendix | 241 |
Notes | 251 |
References | 273 |
Index | 285 |
מהדורות אחרות - הצג הכל
Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism <span dir=ltr>Eli Berman</span> תצוגה מקדימה מוגבלת - 2011 |
Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism <span dir=ltr>Eli Berman</span> אין תצוגה מקדימה זמינה - 2011 |
Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism <span dir=ltr>Eli Berman</span> אין תצוגה מקדימה זמינה - 2009 |