Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of TerrorismMIT Press, 30 בספט׳ 2011 - 314 עמודים Applying fresh tools from economics to explain puzzling behaviors of religious radicals: Muslim, Christian, and Jewish; violent and benign. How do radical religious sects run such deadly terrorist organizations? Hezbollah, Hamas, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Taliban all began as religious groups dedicated to piety and charity. Yet once they turned to violence, they became horribly potent, executing campaigns of terrorism deadlier than those of their secular rivals. In Radical, Religious, and Violent, Eli Berman approaches the question using the economics of organizations. He first dispels some myths: radical religious terrorists are not generally motivated by the promise of rewards in the afterlife (including the infamous seventy-two virgins) or even by religious ideas in general. He argues that these terrorists (even suicide terrorists) are best understood as rational altruists seeking to help their own communities. Yet despite the vast pool of potential recruits—young altruists who feel their communities are repressed or endangered—there are less than a dozen highly lethal terrorist organizations in the world capable of sustained and coordinated violence that threatens governments and makes hundreds of millions of civilians hesitate before boarding an airplane. What's special about these organizations, and why are most of their followers religious radicals? Drawing on parallel research on radical religious Jews, Christians, and Muslims, Berman shows that the most lethal terrorist groups have a common characteristic: their leaders have found a way to control defection. Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Taliban, for example, built loyalty and cohesion by means of mutual aid, weeding out “free riders” and producing a cadre of members they could rely on. The secret of their deadly effectiveness lies in their resilience and cohesion when incentives to defect are strong.These insights suggest that provision of basic social services by competent governments adds a critical, nonviolent component to counterterrorism strategies. It undermines the violent potential of radical religious organizations without disturbing free religious practice, being drawn into theological debates with Jihadists, or endangering civilians. |
מתוך הספר
תוצאות 1-5 מתוך 33
... economists can aspire to explore. The late Zvi Griliches, one of my dissertation advisors at Harvard, greeted my initial decision to study the economics of ultra-Orthodox Jews with his usual excited curiosity and perceptive questions ...
... economists call “free riders”—is painful but critical, because shirking is the Achilles' heel of mutual aid organizations. Members who draw services when in need but do not volunteer to help when they are capable will leave barns half ...
... economist) would. Some of these groups are pacifists and distance themselves from politics. The vast majority of the communal activity that these radical religious communities perform is benign, if not downright noble. Two centuries ago ...
... economist Laurence Iannaccone explained how religious sacrifices contribute to cohesive communities by improving social ... economists call the “club” model17—to explore the educational choices that religious radicals make for their ...
... economists of faith, often object to this way of thinking about religion and religious radicals. First, it seems dismissive of faith and theology, emphasizing instead the social and economic aspects of life in religious communities ...
תוכן
1 | |
2 The Defection Constraint | 29 |
The Organizational Secrets of Religions Radicals | 61 |
4 Sect Subsidy and Sacrifice | 95 |
Why Religious Radicals Are Such Effective Terrorists | 121 |
6 Why Suicide Attacks? | 157 |
7 Constructive Counterterrorism | 183 |
8 Religious Radicals and Violence in the Modern World | 211 |
Analytical Appendix | 241 |
Notes | 251 |
References | 273 |
Index | 285 |
מהדורות אחרות - הצג הכל
Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism <span dir=ltr>Eli Berman</span> תצוגה מקדימה מוגבלת - 2011 |
Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism <span dir=ltr>Eli Berman</span> אין תצוגה מקדימה זמינה - 2011 |
Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism <span dir=ltr>Eli Berman</span> אין תצוגה מקדימה זמינה - 2009 |