and then uses his powers of wealth and dignity to compete for profit with the people who are below him; how can the people compete with him? Therefore, he increases the number of his servants, keeps more cattle, extends his land and houses, accumulates all kinds of property, and saves the surplus. He pursues those things without an end, in order to oppress the people. Day after day, and month after month, the people are robbed by him, then they fall into great poverty. While the rich have luxury and superabundance, the poor are in grievous distress. If the public should not save the poor from distress and grievance, the people could have no pleasure in life. When the people have no pleasure in life, they do not escape even death; how can they escape from crime? This is the reason why punishments are numerous and criminals increase. Therefore, the families of salaried officials should get only their salaries, and should not compete with the people in gainful occupations. Thus profits may be equally distributed to the people, and each family of them may have sufficient. This is the natural law of Heaven, and the principle of antiquity as well. The emperor should imitate it in his laws, and the officials should practise it in their conduct. In conclusion, he quotes this interesting passage from the Canon of Changes: "Bearing on the back and riding in the carriage causes robbers to come." He explains that "riding in the carriage" refers to the position of the higher class, "bearing on the back" to the business of the lower class. If one occupies the position of an official, and takes up the business of the common people, calamity must ensue.1 These statements of Tung Chung-shu have had great influence on Confucian socialism. 3. Laws of Different Dynasties The exclusion of officials from all gain has been carried into actual law by many dynasties. During the Tsin 1 History of Han, ch. lvi. dynasty, after Wu Ti reunited the whole empire (831, or 280 A. D.), he decreed that the princes and dukes should regard their feudal estates as their families, and that they should not have lands and houses in the imperial capital as private property. The only two things each should have were the residence within the city and the pasture near the suburb. Then he made the following limitation: In the capital, the princes, the dukes, and the marquises were allowed to have one residence. If their residence was not in the city, but out of it, it was allowed to remain there. Near the capital, those who had a great feudal estate were allowed to have one thousand five hundred acres of suburban land; those of second estate, one thousand acres ; and those of small estate, seven hundred acres. There was also a limitation upon the ownership of land by officials. The amount of land was in accordance with their rank. To the first rank five thousand acres were given; to the second, four thousand five hundred acres ; to the third, four thousand acres; to the fourth, three thousand five hundred acres; to the fifth, three thousand acres; to the sixth, two thousand five hundred acres; to the seventh, two thousand acres; to the eighth, fifteen hundred acres; and to the ninth, the last, one thousand acres. Moreover, their descendants had the hereditary right to hold the land, and the limit of time was also according to their rank. The longest hereditary right came down through nine generations, and the shortest through three generations.1 During the Tang dynasty, in 1175 (624 A. D.), a law was enacted that all the families which had received salaries were not allowed to compete for gain with the people.2 According to the Law Code of the Ts'ing Dynasty, all the officials are not allowed to buy land and houses in those 1 History of Tsin, ch. xxvi. 'Old History of Tang, ch. xlviii. places where they hold their office. The transgressor shall be beaten with a small stick fifty times. He shall be deprived of his office, and his land or house shall be confiscated.1 If officials lend money at interest, or hold property on mortgage, although conforming to the legal rate of interest, they shall be punished with eighty blows with the long stick. If they take interest beyond the legal rate, such interest shall be considered as a bribe, and they shall be punished accordingly.2 If the officials buy salt from the government and sell it to the people for the sake of making profit, they shall be punished with one hundred blows of the long stick and banished to another part of the same province for three years. Their salt shall be confiscated. All these laws keep the officials from competing with the people. III. CONCLUSION Hu Yin (died 1702, or 1151 A. D.) gives a criticism of this exclusion of officials. He says: This exclusion is a good institution, inspiring moderation in the officials. In ancient times the government employed men who were fitted to their position. Then they held their office without change, sometimes for life, and sometimes even to their descendants. Their salary was permanently given. . . . At that time, if they competed with the people for profit, they should have been blamed. In modern times, as the men are not carefully employed, their rise and downfall are uncertain. In the morning they may enjoy the grain of the imperial garner, but in the evening they may be obliged to eat at home. Since they may have parents, wives and children, if they are not superior men who can be self-contented in a poor position, how can they live without taking up gainful occupations? For 3 Ch. xiii. 1 Ch. ix. 2 Ch. xiv. example, Lu Huai-shên [died 1267, or 716 A. D.] was a minister of the Tang dynasty. But when he died, he had only a servant who sold himself for the expense of his funeral. What can the other officials whose position is lower than that of minister do? According to reason, when the officials take their office, land should be given to them in accordance with their rank. During their employment, they have salaries in return for their work; even if they are dismissed, they have land by which to make their living. Only in the case of some great disgrace which cannot be excused will their land be taken back by the government. In this way the exclusion of the officials from gain may be practised, and the spirit of moderation will prevail.1 The argument of Hu Yin is very reasonable, and it holds true in modern times, because feudalism has died out. But this principle of excluding officials from gainful occupation has a great influence on Chinese economic life. In China's history there are very few officials who accumulated a great fortune in any way they could. Modesty and purity were the general spirit of the officials. As they did not compete with the common people for profits, the people had much more chance to compete among themselves, and enjoyed full freedom of economic activity without being in unfavorable competition with those who had added power. Very recently, public sentiment is beginning to depart from this principle. Owing to the international struggle with foreign countries, China unfortunately needs more men for the economic war. Formerly, it was not suitable for the officials to compete with the people at home, but to-day, everyone should compete with the foreigners abroad. In fact, in old times this principle was established for the object of equal distribution, and in the present day it is going to be renewed for the object of large production. 1 General Research, ch. ii. CHAPTER XXIX GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY prices. whole. I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN economic society there are two sets of interests, those of producers and those of consumers. But nothing more markedly affects the interest of both sides at once than Therefore, price is a great problem for society as a According to the Confucian theory, the government should level prices by the adjustment of demand and supply, in order to guarantee the cost of the producer and satisfy the wants of the consumer. Its chief aim is to destroy all monopoly, so that the independent or small producer can be protected on the one side, and the consumer on the other. It prevents the middleman from making large profits, and gives the seller and buyer full gain. Originally this theory was purely for the benefit of the people and brought no gain to the budget of the government. In later times this theory became a financial scheme by which the government made a large profit. However, if this scheme is carried through successfully, it is a benefit to society, because it takes away profit from the great merchant only and lightens the taxation of everyone. On the principle that the ruling class should be excluded from the economic field, the conservative Confucians always opposed this scheme, because they said that the government should not compete with the people for profit. But we should distinguish two divisions in the budget of a government,-one part for the ruler himself, and the other for the state as a |