the paffion. Co-existence fuggests the quali ties, the circumftances, the acceffories, and the concomitants of thofe objects which are closely connected with the paffion; and the more of these we have in our view, the ftronger and livelier is our conception of those objects. All the objects almost which the relation of cause and effect can fuggeft, contribute either more immediately or more remotely to the production of the paffion itself; and therefore are strongly connected with it. Accordingly, in most of the examples which have been produced, the ideas suggested by objects strictly connected with the paffions, are fuch as are suggested by means of these two principles of affociation.

Ir is a natural inference from the obfervations which have been already made, that the paffions, far from difpofing us to follow order in the train of our ideas, render us incapable of preferving order. The inference is fo obvious, that it is not necessary to spend time in confirming it. Abruptnefs, incohe *rence, fluctuation of thought, are the confequences of paffion; and these are the rcverfe of order. But it is worth while to observe, that a paffion even inverts the natural order of our ideas. As the imagination passes

from

from one idea to another connected with it, fo a paffion once excited does not confine itself to its first object, but readily extends itfelf to other objects connected with that; love or hatred to any perfon, feldom fails to produce fome degree of love or hatred to fuch as are connected with him. It has been shown by philofophers, that the imagination passes most readily from a lefs confiderable to a more confiderable object; but that a paffion, on the contrary, paffes with greatest cafe from the more to the lefs confiderable object (0): and what we would now observe is, that a paffion prevailing in the mind, caufes the imagination to proceed in this latter direction. Indeed if it did not, the paffion itself could not be extended to the inferior and fubordinate objects; for it cannot be directed to them tillwe have formed ideas of them. When the mind is cool, and not under the influence of any paffion, the idea of a fon or of a fervant fuggefts the idea of the father or the mafter, more naturally and more certainly than the idea of the father or the mafter would fuggeft that of the fon or the fervant. On the contrary, love, hatred, refentment, towards a father or a master, very readily extend them

(•) Treatife of Human Nature, Vol. II. Part ii. Sect. 2.

felves to the fon or the fervant, though we might feel the fame paffions towards these latter, without conceiving any degree of them towards the former. At the fame time the paffion towards the fuperior, gives the imagi¬ nation an irresistible propenfity to run into the conception of the inferior or dependent; eager to extend itself, it forces upon us the idea without which it could not be extended,

SECT. IV,

Reflections on the Principles of Affociation, Ideas fuggefted either by Senfations, or by other Ideas,

F

ROM the account which has been al

ready given of the principles of affociation, it is easy to collect, That there is a broad foundation laid in the nature of the human imagination, for great extent and variety of genius. There are many relations of ideas, which fit them for being affociated; •almost every perception bears fome of these relations to many different ideas; habit and the paffions multiply and vary the inftru-. ments of affociation: by thefe means there are innumerable handles by which the imagi

*

nation may
feize fuch ideas as it has occafion
for. Genius has, in fome men, great force
and compass: but a vigorous construction of
the affociating principles is fufficient to account
for it, however great it be; for if they be vi
gorous, any one perception may introduce a
great multitude of others, and that by means
of many different relations. The principles
of affociation likewife being fo various, can-
not but admit many diftinct combinations and
modifications, by which genius will be mould
ed into a great diverfity of forms, In order
therefore to prepare the way for a discovery.
of the varieties of genius, it will be proper to
make fome reflections on the principles of
affociation, which have been feparately illuf-
trated.

THE prefent perception which introduces others, by means of the relations that they. bear to it, may be either a fenfation of an object, or only an idea of it. In whichever, of these ways the object be perceived, it has the very fame relations to others; and therefore in both cafes it has a tendency to suggest the very fame ideas. But it will not always, fuggest them with the fame force or certaintyin these two cafes,

THAT

THAT a perception may introduce others, it is neceffary that itself take fome hold of the mind, and be attended to; and the stronger a perception is, it takes the firmer hold of the mind, and excites the clofer attention. The

actual sensation of an object is always much ftronger than any conception of it, which memory or imagination can exhibit. On this account, a sensation of an object will often introduce ideas which the mere conception of that object would not have force to fuggeft; it gives a stronger impulfe to the mind, and renders lefs intimate relations to the prefent object, fufficient for bringing these ideas into view. Merely to think of darkness, does not lead us fo readily or fo neceffarily to the conception of its oppofite, light, as our being actually involved in darkness. The fight of a fhip perishing in a ftorm, not only raises ftronger emotions, but likewise introduces a much greater variety of ideas into the mind, than barely reading or hearing of a shipwreck: in the latter cafe, it fometimes makes fo little impreffion upon us, as not to give rife to any train of ideas. The mention or the accidental recollection of a place where we have spent a confiderable part of our lives,

will