that all others must be erroneous: whereas, in fact, it will often happen, as in the present instance, that both the wider, and the more restricted sense of a term, will be alike sanctioned by use, (the only competent authority,) and that the consequence will be a corresponding variation in the definitions employed; none of which perhaps may be fairly chargeable with error, though none can be framed that will apply to every acceptation of the term.

It is evident that in its primary signification, Rhetoric had reference to public Speaking alone, as its etymology implies: but as most of the rules for speaking are of course applicable equally to Writing, an extension of the term naturally took place; and we find even Aristotle, the earliest systematic writer on the subject whose works have come down to us, including in his Treatise rules for such compositions as were not intended to be publicly recited.* And even as far as relates to Speeches, properly so called, he takes, in the same Treatise, at one time, a wider, and at another, a more restricted view of the subject; including under the term Rhetoric, in the opening of his work, nothing beyond the finding of topics of Persuasion, as far as regards the matter of what is spoken; and afterwards embracing the consideration of Style, Arrangement, and Delivery.

The invention of Printing, by extending the

*Aristot. Rhet. book iii.

Or rather of Paper; for the invention of printing is too obvious not to have speedily followed, in a literary nation, the introduction of a paper sufficiently cheap to make the art available. Indeed the seals of the ancients seem to have been a kind of stamps, with which they in fact printed their names.

sphere of operation of the Writer, has of course contributed to the extension of those terms which, in their primary signification, had reference to Speaking alone. Many objects are now accomplished through the medium of the Press, which formerly came under the exclusive province of the Orator; and the qualifications requisite for success are so much the same in both cases, that we apply the term "Eloquent" as readily to a Writer as to a Speaker; though, etymologically considered, it could only belong to the latter. Indeed "Eloquence" is often attributed even to such compositions, e. g. Historical works, as have in view an object entirely different from any that could be proposed by an Orator; because some part of the rules to be observed in Oratory, or rules analogous to these, are applicable to such compositions. Conformably to this view therefore, some writers have spoken of Rhetoric as the Art of Composition, universally; or, with the exclusion of Poetry alone, as embracing all Prose-composition.

A still wider extension of the province of Rhetoric has been contended for by some of the ancient writers; who, thinking it necessary to include, as belonging to the Art, every thing that could conduce to the attainment of the object proposed, introduced into their systems Treatises on Law, Morals, Politics, &c. on the ground that a knowledge of these subjects was requisite to enable a man to speak well on them: and even insisted on Virtue* as an essential qualification of a perfect Orator; because a good character, which

*See Quinctilian.

can in no way be so surely established as by deserving it, has great weight with the audience.

Aristotle's

predecessors.

These notions are combated by Aristotle; who attributes them either to the ill-cultivated consure of his understanding (лaide vola) of those who maintained them, or to their arrogant and pretending disposition, ahagovɛla; i. e. a desire to extol and magnify the Art they professed. In the present day, the extravagance of such doctrines is so apparent to most readers, that it would not be worth while to take much pains in refuting them. It is worthy of remark however, that the very same erroneous view is, even now, often taken of Logic; * which has been considered by some as a kind of system of universal knowledge, on the ground that Argument may be employed on all subjects, and that no one can argue well on a subject which he does not understand; and which has been complained of by others for not supplying any such universal instruction as its unskilful advocates have placed within its province; such as in fact no one Art or System can possibly afford.

The error is precisely the same in respect of Rhetoric and of Logic; both being instrumental arts; and, as such, applicable to various kinds of subject-matter, which do not properly come under them.

So judicious an author as Quinctilian would not have failed to perceive, had he not been carried away by an inordinate veneration for his own Art, that as the possession of building materials is no part of the art of Architecture, though it is impossible to build without materials, so, the knowledge of the subjects on which

* Elements of Logic, Introd.

the Orator is to speak, constitutes no part of the art of Rhetoric, though it be essential to its successful employment; and that though virtue, and the good reputation it procures, add materially to the Speak-. er's influence, they are no more to be, for that reason, considered as belonging to the Orator, as such, than wealth, rank, or a good person, which manifestly have a tendency to produce the same effect.

In the present day however, the province of Rhetoric, in the widest acceptation that would

وو

Extremes in

tion and extension of

be reckoned admissible, comprehends all the limita "Composition in Prose; in the narrowest sense, it would be limited to "Persuasive

Speaking."

the province of Rhetoric.

present Trea

I propose in the present work to adopt a middle course between these two extreme points; Object of the and to treat of Argumentative Composition, tise. generally, and exclusively; considering Rhetoric (in conformity with the very just and philosophical view of Aristotle) as an off-shoot from Logic.

66

I remarked in treating of that Science, that Reasoning may be considered as applicable to two purposes, which I ventured to designate respectively by the terms Inferring," and “ Proving ; i. e. the ascertainment of the truth by investigation, and the establishment of it to the satisfaction of another: and I there remarked, that Bacon, in his Organon, has laid down rules for the conduct of the former of these processes, and that the latter belongs to the province of Rhetoric and it was added, that Philosophy to infer is to be regarded as the proper office compared. of the Philosopher, or the Judge ;-to prove, of

and Rhetoric

the Advocate. It is not however to be understood

that Philosophical works are to be excluded from the class to which Rhetorical rules are applicable; for the · Philosopher who undertakes, by writing or speaking, to convey his notions to others, assumes, for the time being, the character of Advocate of the doctrines he maintains. The process of investigation must be supposed completed, and certain conclusions arrived at by that process, before he begins to impart his ideas to others in a treatise or lecture; the object of which must of course be to prove the justness of those conclusions. And in doing this, he will not always find it expedient to adhere to the same course of reasoning by which his own discoveries were originally made; other arguments may occur to him afterwards, more clear, or more concise, or better adapted to the understanding of those he addresses. In explaining therefore, and establishing the truth, he may often have occasion for rules of a different kind from those employed in its discovery. Accordingly, when I remarked, in the work above alluded to, that it is a common fault, for those engaged in Philosophical and Theological inquiries, to forget their own peculiar office, and assume that of the Advocate, improperly, this caution is to be understood as applicable to the process of forming their own opinions; not, as excluding them from advocating by all fair arguments, the conclusions at which they have arrived by candid investigation. But if this candid investigation do not take place in the first instance, no pains that they may bestow in searching for arguments, will have any tendency to ensure their attainment of truth. If a man