fhould he make over to Great Britain the town and harbour of Cadiz, as well as that of Gibraltar, and at the fame time refign his Conquefts in Portugal: it would all be of no effect towards the common fafety of Europe, while the bulk of the Spanish continent, and the riches of America remain in the poffeffion of the Bourbon family.

Boccalini when he weighs the States of Europe in his political balance, after having laid France in one fcale, throws Spain into the other, which wanted but very little of being a counter-poife. The Spaniards upon this, fays he, begun to promise themselves the honour of the, balance, reckoning that if Spain of itself weighed fo well, they could not fail of fuccefs when the feveral parts of the monarchy were lumped in the fame fcale. Their furprife was very great when upon the throwing in of Naples they faw the fcale rife, and was greater ftill when they found that Milan and Flanders had the fame effect. The truth of it is, these parts of the Spanish monarchy are rather for ornament than ftrength. They furnish out Vice-royalties for the Grandees, and posts of honour for the noble families; but in a time of war are incumbrances to the main body of the kingdom, and leave it naked and expofed by the great number of hands they draw from it to their defence. Should we therefore continue in the poffeffion of what we have already made ourfelves mafters, with fuch additions as have been mentioned, we should have little more than the excrefcences of the Spanish monarchy. The ftrength of it will ftill join itfelf to France, and grow the clofer to it by its difunion from the reft. And in this cafe the advantages which muft arife to that people from their intimate alliance

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liance with the remaining part of the Spanish dominions, would in a very few years not only repair all the damages they have fuftained in the prefent war, but fill the kingdom with more riches than it hath yet had in its most flourishing periods.

The French King hath often entered on several expensive projects, on purpose to diffipate the wealth that is continually gathering in his coffers in times of peace. He hath employed immenfe fums on architecture, gardening, water-works, painting, ftatuary, and the like, to distribute his treasures among his people, as well as to humour his pleasures and his ambition; but if he once engroffes the commerce of the Spanish Indies, whatever quantities of gold and filver ftagnate in his private coffers, there will be ftill enough to carry on the circulation among his fubjects. By this means in a short space of time he may heap up greater wealth than all the Princes of Europe joined together; and in the prefent conftitution of the world, wealth and power are but different names for the fame thing. Let us therefore fuppofe that after eight or ten years of peace, he had a mind to infringe any of his treaties, or invade a neighbouring State; to revive the pretenfions of Spain upon Portugal, or attempt the taking thofe places which were granted us for our fecurity; what refiftance, what oppofition can we make to fo formidable an enemy? Should the fame alliance rife against him that is now in war with him, what could we hope for from it, at a time when the States engaged in it will be comparatively weakened, and the enemy who is now able to keep them at a stand, will have received fo many new acceffions of ftrength? But

But I think it is not to be imagined that in fuch a conjuncture as we here fuppofe, the Tame confederates, or any other of equal force, could be prevailed upon to join their arms, and endeavour at the pulling down fo exorbitant a power. Some might be brought into his interefts by money, others drawn over by fear, and thofe that are liable to neither of thefe impreffions, might not think their own interest so much concerned as in the prefent war; or if any appeared in a difpofition to enter into fuch a con-federacy, they might be crufhed feparately before they could concert measures for their mutual defence.

The keeping together of the prefent alliance can be afcribed to nothing else but the clear and evident conviction which every member of it is under, that if it should once break without having had its effect, they can never hope for another opportunity of reuniting, or of prevailing by all the joint efforts of fuch an union. Let us therefore agree on this as a fixt rule, and an inviolable maxim, never to lay down our arms against France, till we have utterly disjoin-ed her from the Spanish monarchy. Let this be the first step. of a public treaty, the basis of a general peace.

Had the prefent war indeed run against us, and all our attacks upon the enemy been vain,, it might look like a degree of frenzy, or a mixture of obftinacy and defpair, to be determinedon fo impracticable an undertaking. But on the contrary, we have already done a great parts of our work, and are come within view of the and that we have been fo long driving at.

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remain victorious in all the feats of war. Flanders we have got into our hands feveral open countries, rich towns, and fortified places. We have driven the enemy out of all his alliances, difpoffeffed him of his strong holds, and ruined his allies in Germany. We have not only recovered what the beginning of the war had taken from us, put poffeffed ourselves of the kingdom of Naples, the dutchy of Milan, and the avenue of France in Italy. The Spanish war hath given us a haven for our ships, and the most populous and wealthy province of that kingdom. In fhort, we have taken all the outlying parts of the Spanish monarchy, and made impreffions upon the very heart of it. We have beaten the French from all their advanced pofts in Europe, and driven them into their laft intrenchments. One vigorous push on all fides, one general affault will force the enemy to cry out for quarter, and surrender themselves at difcretion. Another Blenheim or Ramillies will make the confederates mafters of their own terms, and arbitrators of a peace.

But notwithstanding the advantages already gained are very confiderable if we pursue them, they will be of no effect unless we improve them towards the carrying of our main point.. follow The enemy staggers; if you your blow, allow him rehe falls at your feet; but if you fpite, he will recover his ftrength, and come upon you with greater fury. We have given him feveral repeated wounds that have enfeebled him, and brought him low; but they are fuch as time will heal, unless you take advantage from his prefent weakness to redouble attacks upon him. It was a celebrated your part

part in Cafar's character, and what comes home to our present purpose, that he thought nothing at all was done, while any thing remained undone. In fhort, we have been tugging a great while against the stream, and have almost weathered our point; a stretch or two more will do the work; but if instead of that we flacken our arms, and drop our oars, we fhall be hurried back in a moment to the place from whence we first set out.

After having feen the neceffity of an entire feparation of the kingdoms of France and Spain, our fubject naturally leads us into the confideration of the most proper means for effecting it.

We have a great while flattered ourselves with the profpect of reducing France to our own terms by the want of money among the people, and the exigencies of the public treasury; but have been ftill difappointed by the great fums imported from America, and the many new expedients which the Court had found out for its relief. A long confumptive war is more likely to break the grand alliance, than difable France from maintaining fufficient armies to oppofe it. An arbitrary government will never want money fo long as the people have it; and fo active a people will always have it, whilft they can fend what merchandifes they pleafe to Mexico and Peru. The French fince their alliance with Spain keep thirty fhips in conftant motion be-tween the western ports of France and the fouth feas of America. The King himself is an adventurer in this traffic, and befides the fhare that he receives out of the gains of his fubjects, has immenfe fums that come directly from it into his own hands.

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