PREFACE. THE HE Author of the following Effay has endear voured to draw into one continued fcheme the whole ftate of the prefent war, and the methods that appear to him the most proper for bringing it to a happy conclufion. After having confidered that the French are the con/tant and most dangerous enemies to the British nation, and that the danger from them is now greater than ever, and will fill increase till their prefent Union with Spain be broken, he fets forth the several advantages which thisUnion has already givenFrance, and taken from Great-Britain, in relation to the Weft-Indies, the woollen manufacture, the trade of the Levans, and the naval power of the two nations, He Thews how thefe Advantages will still rife higher after a peace, notwithstanding our prefent con quefts, with new additions, should be confirmed to us, as well because the monarchy of Spain would not be weakened by fuch conceffions, as because no Guarantee could be found fufficient to fecure them to us. For which reafons he lays it down as a fixt Rule, that no peace is to be made without an entire difunion of the French and Spanish Monarchies. That this may be brought about, he endeavours to prove from the progrefs we have already made toward it, and the fucceffes we have purchased in the prefent war, which are very confiderable if well pursued, but of no effect if we acquiefce in them. In order to complete this difunion in which we have gone fo far, he would not have us rely upon exhausting the French Treafury, Attempts on the Spanish Indies, Indies, Defcents on France, but chiefly upon outnumbering them in troops, France being already drained of her beft fupplies, and the confederates mafters of much greater forces for multitude and frength, both in men and horse, and provided with Generals of greater fame and abilities. He then confiders the wrong measures we have hitherto taken in making too fmall levies after a fuccefsful campaign, in regulating their number by that of the enemies forces, and hiring them of our confederates; fhewing at the fame time the inconveniencies we fuffer from fuch hired troops, and feveral advantages we might receive from employing those of our own nation. He further recommends this augmentation of our forces, to prevent the keeping up a fanding body of them in times of peace, to enable us to make an impreffion on the enemy in the prefent pofture of the war, and to fecure ourselves against a Prince, who is now at the head of a powerful army, and has not yet declared himself. In the last place, he answers by feveral confiderations thofe two popular objections, That we furnish more towards the war than the rest of the Allies, and, That we are not able to contribute more than we do already. These are the moft material heads of the following lay, in which there are many other fubordinate reflexions that naturally grow out of fo copious a fubject. November 1707. THE THE PRESENT STATE of the WAR, AND The Neceffity of an Augmentation confidered. HE French are certainly the moft impla T cable, and the most dangerous enemies of the British nation. Their form of government, their religion, their jealoufy of the British power, as well as their prosecutions of commerce, and purfuits of univerfal Monarchy, will fix them for ever in their animofities and averfions towards us, and make them catch at all opportunities of fubverting our conftitution, destroying our religion, ruining our trade, and finking the figure which we make among the nations of Europe: Not to mention the parVOL. III. L ticular |