A TREATISE A DESIRE of knowledge is natural to the mind of man: and nothing discovers the true quality and difpofition of the mind more than the particular kind of knowledge it is most fond of. Thus we fee that low and little minds are most delighted with the knowledge of trifles; as in children: an indolent mind, with that which ferves only for amufement, or the entertainment of the fancy; a curious mind is beft pleafed with facts: a judicious penetrating mind, with demonstrations and mathematical fcience; a worldly mind efleems no knowledge like that of the world. B but but a wife and pious man, before all other kinds of knowledge, prefers that of God and his own foul. But fome kind of knowledge or other the mind is continually craving after: and by confidering what that is, its prevailing turn and temper may eafily be known... This defire of knowledge, like other affections planted in our nature, will be very apt to lead us wrong, if it be not well regulated. When it is directed to improper objects, or pursued in a wrong manner, it degenerates into a vain and criminal curiofity. A fatal inftance of this in our first parents we have upon facred record; the unhappy effects of which are but too visible in all.' -- SELF-KNOWLEDGE is the subject of the enfuing Treatife. A fubject, which the more I think of, the more important and extensive it appears. Sɔ important, that every branch of it seems abfolutely neceffary to the right government of the life and temper; and fo extenfive, that the nearer view we take of its feveral branches, more are still opening to the view, as nearly connected with it as the other. Like what we find in microfcopical obfervations on natural objects; the better the glaffes, and the nearer the fcrutiny, the more wonders we explore; and the more furprifing discoveries we make of certain properties, parts, or or affections belonging to them, which were never before thought of. For, in order to a true felf-knowledge, the human mind, with its various powers and operations, must be narrowly infpected; all its fecret bendings and doublings difplayed; otherwise our self acquaintance will be but very partial and defective; and the heart after all will deceive us. So that, in treating this fubject, there is no small danger, either of doing injury to it, by flight and fuperficial inqueft on the one hand, or of running into a research too minute and philofophical for common ufe on the other. The two extremes I fhall keep in my eye, and endeavour to fteer a middle courfe between them. Know thyself, is one of the most useful and comprehenfive precepts in the whole moral fyftem: And it is well known in how great a veneration this maxim was held by the ancients; and in how high esteem the duty of felf-examination, as neceffary to it. Thales, the Milefian, is said to be the first author of it (a); who ufed to fay, that, for a man to know himself, is the hardest thing in the world (b). It was afterwards adopted by Chylon the Lacedemonian; and is one of those three precepts which Pliny affirms to have been (a) He was a prince of the philofophers, and flourished about A. M. 3330; and was contemporary with Jofiah king of Judah. (b) See Stanley's Life of Thales. confecrated confecrated at Delphos in golden letters. It was afterwards greatly admired, and frequently ufed by others (c); till at length it acquired the thority of a divine oracle; and was fuppofed to have been given originally by Apollo himself. Of which general opinion Cicero gives us this reafon; "because it hath fuch a weight of fenfe "and wisdom in it, as appears too great to be at"tributed to any man (d)." And this opinion, of its coming originally from Apollo himself, perhaps was the reafon that it was written in (c) Refpue quod non es: tollat fua munera Cerdo. Tecuin habita: noris quam fit tibi curta fupellex. Perf. Sat. 4 nec te quæfiveris extra. Id. Sat. 1. te confule, dic tibi quis fis. Juv. Sat. 11. Teipfum concute. Hor. lib. 1. Sat. 3. Bellum eft enim fua vitia noffe. Cic. Epift. ad Atticum, lib. z Illud (yvwo σavlov) noli putare ad arrogantiam minuendam folùm effe dictum, verùm etiam ut bona noftra norimus. Id. Epift. ad Mar. 2, Fratrem, lib. 3. Epift. 6. Id enim maximè quemque decet quod eft cujufque fuum maximè. Quifque igitur nofcat Ingenium acremque fe et bonorum et vitiorum fuorum Judicem præbeat. Id De Offic. In randum eft igitur, in rerum naturam, et penitus; quid ea poftulat pervidendum; aliter enim noimet ipfos noffe non poffumus. Id de Finibus, lib. 5. (d) Hæc enim (i. e. Philofophia) nos cùm cæteras res omnes tum quod eft difficilimum, docuit; ut [NOSMET IPSOS] nofceremus. Cujus Præcepti tanta vis, tanta fententia eft, ut ea non Homini cuipiam, fed Delphico Deo tribueretur. cero De Legib. lib. 1. ር፡ Quod præceptum quia majus erat quam ut ab Homini videretur, idcirco affignatum eft Deo: Jubet igitur nos Pythius Apollo, noftere [NOSMET IPSOs.] Idem de Finibus, lib. 5. cap. 16. golden |