there is one in which he peculiarly and clearly excels all his cotemporaries in both houses, that is, in reply. He receives the attacks of his opponents frequently like an electric shock; and after haranguing for an hour rather dully, he rises a second time, and levels his adversary in a few words, either in a flow of keen satire, or the most sound and pointed argument. His lordship's voice is extremely disagreeable, his elocution still worse, and his manner execrably awkward. He is frequently tedious and unintelligible, abounds in useless repetitions, and scarcely ever places his emphasis with propriety, much less with grace." This is a curious portrait, overdrawn in some points and too harsh in its general tone, but in the main correct. Lord North's administration stripped Britain of her American colonies; but it was not till the surrender of General Burgoyne, at Saratoga, that the minister's eyes were opened to the impolicy of the measures he had so long been pursuing towards the colonists. In the session of 1777, Lord North made some conciliatory efforts in the house of commons. He moved for " a bill for declaring the intentions of the parliament of Great Britain concerning the exercise of the right of imposing taxes within his majesty's colonies, provinces, and plantations in North America;" and a bill "to enable his majesty to appoint commissioners, with sufficient powers to treat, consult, and agree upon the means of quieting the disorders now subsisting in certain of the colonies, plantations, and provinces of North America." His lordship said, that it was intended to appoint five commissioners, and enable them to treat with the congress, as if it were a legal body, with any of the provincial assemblies upon their present constitution, or with any individuals in military or civil command. They were to have a power of suspending hostilities, granting pardons, and restoring all or any of the colonies to the form of their ancient constitution. Should the Americans now claim independence, they should not be required to renounce it, until the treaty had been ratified by the parliament of Great Britain; and if the Americans refused a moderate contribution towards the common defence of the empire when reunited, they should be warned that in that case they were not to look for support from it. The minister affirmed that all these concessions were consistent with his former opinions, and said that if the question were asked, why they had not been sooner proposed, he should reply, that the moment of victory, for which he had anxiously waited, seemed to him the only proper season for offering terms of concession. But though the result of the war had proved unfavourable, he would no longer delay the desirable and necessary work of reconciliation."

"Miller.-"Never, perhaps, was the inexpressible absurdity of the ministerial system more apparent than at the present moment. The powers now granted were precisely of the nature of those with which it was the object of the motion made by the duke of Grafton, in the spring of 1775, to invest the former commissioners, Lord and General Howe. Had that motion been adopted, the contest might unquestionably have been, with the utmost facility, amicably and honourably terminated; but the general aspect of affairs since that period was totally changed. From the declaration of independence which America had once made, she could never be expected to recede. The strength of Great Britain had been tried, and found unequal to the contest. The measures adopted by the English government, particularly in the employment of German mercenaries and Indian savages, had inflamed the resentment of America to the highest pitch. Her recent successes had rendered it to the last degree improbable that she would ever again consent to recognise, in any shape, or under any modification, the authority of Britain. A treaty of peace, commerce, and alliance, was all that a

North continued in office until 1781, when, after the famous attempt at a coalition ministry, Pitt triumphed over both Fox and North. In 1790 he succeeded his father as Earl of Guildford. He took no active part in politics after this, and died on the 5th of August, 1792.

Lord North was an amiable man in private life; but his administration, in the words of Dr Bisset, "teemed with calamitous events, beyond any of the same duration to be found in our annals. The war with America lost us thirteen great and powerful colonies. Year after year, our blood and treasure were expended to no purpose; myriads of men were sacrificed; and hundreds of millions were lavished, without obtaining any valuable object. Temporary gleams of partial success were followed by the permanent gloom of general disaster. Yet the chief minister possessed very considerable talents and fair intentions, though mingled with defects, and acting in such emergencies as precluded beneficial exertions and consequences."

Stuart, Marquess of Bute.

BORN A. D. 1713.-DIED A. d. 1792.

THIS nobleman, who, more by his private influence with the sovereign than by the force of his talents or the exercise of official power, so greatly influenced the political transactions of the former part of George the Third's reign, was born in 1713, and succeeded his father in the marquisate of Bute, in the ninth year of his age. In 1738 he married the only daughter of Lady Mary Wortley Montague.

In 1749, after an accidental interview with Frederick, prince of Wales, he was appointed lord of the bed-chamber to that prince, and soon acquired the entire confidence and friendship both of the prince and princess. We have already noticed the extraordinary influence which his lordship obtained over the mind of George III. while yet a boy. This influence was strengthened rather than diminished by the accession of that prince to the throne, and was maintained by his lordship throughout life. The first change in ministry after the new sovereign's accession was dictated and arranged by the favourite, who, on the 25th of March, 1761, became one of the secretaries of state in room of the earl of Holdernesse. Soon after, the same influence put an end to the brilliant and popular administration of Pitt, and on the 29th of May, 1762, Lord Bute was appointed first lord of the treasury.

His lordship's appointment could be little satisfactory to the country, nor indeed to any party in the state. He was instantly assailed with great violence by the political organs of the day, and especially by Wilkes in The North Briton,' the first number of which was published on the 5th of June. In his second number Wilkes laconically says: "I cannot conceal the joy I feel as a North Briton, and I heartily congratulate my dear countrymen on our having at length accomplished the great, long sought, and universally national object of all our wishes,

just and sound policy, in the present circumstances, could hope, or would endeavour to accomplish."-Belsham.

the planting a Scotsman at the head of the English treasury. I was indeed before very well-pleased with the conduct of the two other gentlemen at that board, who are likewise natives of our country (Elliot and Oswald,) but then they were obliged to serve under a noble duke of a peculiar cast, whose views were most evidently neither to enrich himself nor to aggrandize us. My joy and exultation are now complete, for I have lived to see my countryman, the earl of Bute, adorned with the most noble order of the Garter-which hath been given to us with so sparing a hand, and only for the most brilliant national services-and presiding over the finances of this kingdom. This is the post which the prime minister hath generally kept for himself, and is of the first importance in this country. It must ever be so in times of war, and above all in this wide-extended but glorious war, when nearly the sum of twenty millions will be this year raised on the subject ;-though, I thank heaven, but a fortieth part of it will be paid by us."

Bute's earliest efforts were directed towards a general peace. So strenuously did he pursue this object that it has been suspected he was bribed by the French cabinet. Fox, however, consented to take the lead in the commons in support of the peace. It was opposed by Pitt, and keen debates ensued.

But

The first article which the opponents of the peace attacked was that for the regulation of the cod-fishery. "At a time," they said, "when Great Britain had not half so much right as at present to prescribe terms to her enemies, she only consented to give up one small island— that of St Pierre-as a shelter to the French fishing boats, and with indispensable restrictions. If these were deemed expedient in the cession of one island, they were doubly necessary in the cession of two. nothing could justify the absolute unconditional surrender of St Pierre and Miquelon, which would enable France to recover her marine, and by degrees to acquire the best part of a fishery from which she ought to have been entirely excluded." In reply to this, it was argued: "That France would never have agreed to a total dereliction of the fishery; that the cession, on her part, of the isles of Cape Breton and St John to England was more than an equivalent to the sheltering places of St Pierre and Miquelon, which she was not allowed to fortify, nor to keep any troops in, except such a number as were barely necessary to enforce the police."

The restitution of the conquests made by the arms of Britain, particularly of those in the West Indies, was the object of the severest and most vehement censure. "The authors of such an infamous and improvident treaty," said the opponents of administration, "seem to have lost sight of that great fundamental principle, that France is chiefly if not solely to be dreaded by us in the light of a maritime and commercial power. By the impolitic concessions made to her in the fishery, and by restoring all her valuable West India islands, we have put into her hands the means of repairing her prodigious losses, and of becoming once more formidable at sea. The fishery trained up an innumerable multitude of young seamen; and the West India trade employed them when they were trained. France," they observed, "had long since gained a decided superiority over us in this lucrative branch of commerce, and supplied almost all Europe with the rich commodities which are produced only in that part of the world. By this commerce she

enriched her merchants, and augmented her finances; whilst, from a want of sugar-land, which had been long known and severely felt by England, we at once lost the foreign trade, and suffered all the inconveniences of a monopoly at home." The concessions made to Spain, in the same part of the world, were represented as equally unjustifiable. "Florida," they maintained, "was no compensation for the Havannah. The Havannah was an important conquest. From the moment it was taken, all the Spanish treasures and riches in America lay at our mercy. Spain had purchased the security of all these, and the restoration of Cuba also, with the cession of Florida only. It was no equivalent. There had been a bargain; but the terms were inadequate. They were inadequate in every point, where the principle of reciprocity was affected to be introduced." They represented the privilege obtained from Spain, in favour of our logwood-cutters, as too uncertain and precarious to be considered among the list of equivalents. Goree on the coast of Africa had been surrendered without the least apparent necessity; in the East Indies, though the treaty mentioned an engagement for mutual restitution of conquests, the restitution was all on one side. We had conquered every thing, but retained nothing. In Europe, France had only one conquest to restore, Minorca; and for this island, we had given her the East Indies, the West Indies, and Africa.

The advocates for the peace defended these concessions on the following grounds: "The original object of the war," said they," was the security of our colonies on the continent of America. The danger to which

these colonies were exposed, and the inmense waste of blood and treasure which ensued to Great Britain, left no sort of doubt that it was not only our best, but our only policy, to guard against all possibility of the return of such evils. Experience had shown us, that while France possesses any single place in America whence she may molest our settlements, they can never enjoy repose; and of course that we are never secure from being plunged again into those calamities from which we have at length and with so much difficulty emerged. To remove France from our neighbourhood in America, or to contract her power within the narrowest limits possible, was therefore the most capital advantage we could obtain, and was worth purchasing by almost any concession.” Having, for these reasons, made large demands in North America, it was necessary to relax in other parts. France would never be brought to any very considerable cession in the West Indies: but her power and increase there could never become formidable, because the existence of her settlements depended upon ours in North America, whence they must be supplied with provisions. They did not deny the importance of the Havannah; but they insisted upon the value of the objects which had been obtained in return for it. The whole country of Florida, with fort St Augustine and the bay of Pensacola, was far from being a contemptible acquisition. It extended the British dominions along the coast to the mouth of the Mississippi; it removed an asylum for the slaves of the English colonies, who were continually making their escape to St Augustine; it afforded a large extent of improveable territory, a strong frontier, and a good port in the bay of Mexico, both for the convenience of trade, and the annoyance of the Spaniards in any future contest. The liberty and security which the king of Spain engaged to afford to the English logwood-cutters was another material considera

tion; and though the fortifications on the coast were to be demolished, it did not appear by what other means a claim of such a peculiar nature could be adjusted. "We never," said they, "set up any pretensions to the territory, nor even directly to the produce; but only a privilege of cutting and taking away this wood by indulgence. That privilege is now confirmed. What more, consistently with reason and justice, could we demand? The right of erecting fortifications would imply an absolute and exclusive dominion over the territory itself, to which we have not even the shadow of a claim. Had Great Britain fought for herself alone, and restricted her efforts to her own element, she might have assumed a more peremptory tone in dictating the terms of the treaty; and if they were not acquiesced in, she might have resolved to keep all hei conquests, and to prosecute hostilities to the full accomplishment of her wishes. But she was saddled with the protection of her allies; and on their account, involved in a double continental war, the expense of which overbalanced all the advantages she could derive from the success of her arms. France and Spain had declared that without the restitution of the islands and the Havannah, peace could be of no service to them; that they would rather hazard the continuance of the war -which, in the long run, must exhaust the finances and credit of England-and, in the meantime, would redouble their efforts to conquer Portugal, which it would not be in the power of the British auxiliaries to prevent." With respect to the other cessions, they thought the rock of Goree of very little consequence, while Great Britain retained the possession of Senegal. The article which related to the East Indies was perfectly agreeable to the wishes of the directors of the English company; and did not afford all those advantages to France which might be imagined at first view. "If," said they, "we examine this matter closely, we shall find, that our late enemies have not gained much by having their factories and settlements restored to them: first, because the fortifications, erected at a vast expense in all those settlements, have been totally destroyed, and it cannot be expected, in the present situation of the French company, that they can, in the course of many years, if at all, rebuild them in the same manner. Besides, they are restrained by an express article from even making the attempt in the province of Bengal, and the kingdom of Orissa, or from keeping the least military force in either. Secondly, they have also agreed to acknowledge the reigning Subas of the chief provinces in the peninsula as the lawful sovereigns; and these princes are all in our interest, as either owing the acquisition, or depending for the preservation of their power on our arms; by which means our company is become, in effect, arbiter of that great and opulent coast, from the Ganges to Cape Comorin, and from the same Cape to the mouth of the Indus. What important sacrifices, then, have we made in the East Indies? And, while the points yielded by Great Britain in all other parts of the globe are so fully justifiable on the principles of sound and liberal policy, the most wilful perverseness will not dare to deny that in Europe the balance is considerably in her favour, the island of Minorca having been given her in exchange for Belleisle, besides obliging France to demolish the works belonging to the harbour of Dunkirk.'

The premier carried his point by an overwhelming majority. In fact the nation itself was generally desirous of peace. Nor was the treaty in