for the non-materiality of the mind is, that mere matter cannot think—cannot receive those sensations which generate memory, comparison, and reflection. If matter cannot receive such impressions, what can? That is a prior question to be answered. And further, the inference is, that if matter cannot think and constitute a mind, every animal, down to the Zoophytes and the very animalcula which constitute a vegetable, must have souls. Where lies the greatest difficulty for credulity to surmount? For all animated matter in a state of life in some measure forms a mind, and thinks. The bee in his hive must, in the proportion of his size, think and meditate as much as a man in his house. The error of the spiritualist lies in attributing too much to this capacity for thinking, which is but to the body what sound is to a fiddle or to any other musical instrument-an arrangement for the creation of sensation-harmony-an action of parts upon parts, combining a whole.

The whole mental process takes its rise in sensation, and sensation its rise in the actions or impressions of the human body. This is deducible by every kind of experiment that can be made. There is no portion of mind but may be traced to sensation-there is no portion of sensation but what is the sole property of a living body. Try any passion, or any thought, by this test, and you are convinced, that mind is the internal action of the body, compounded of physical sensations-or those obtained from other bodies, and of moral sensations-or those obtained by comparison of, and a reflection upon, physical sensations. Thought is moral sensation, or that process which leads to the forming of ideas. Memory is mind fixed; thought is mind fluent. Memory is also the duration of mind, sensations recorded on the body. There may be more or less of mind, as of years; but not variance in its quality, as a fixed principle. Higher degrees of mind are to body what flame is to fire, a combustion of sensation; the increased friction of the sensations generating the combustion. Thus we correctly say, a cold mind, a torpid mind, a mind inactive, or not called into action, a sluggish mind, and an idle mind; and the contrary, when the mind is elated by different degrees of heat and action, all of which is more or less of the action of the body. The word mind is altogether gratuitous, and used for the want of a better knowledge, or a better means of expressing the varied actions of the body.

Thus, when we say the mind is material, and consider the mind as any thing distinct from the body, we speak incorrect

ly. It is only by considering the mind as the action of the body, or as the body itself, that we can be correct. And the spiritualists err by considering it a separate and independent thing from the body. They never see mind without a body, and yet they imagine it can exist in that state! They see the extinction of mind with the extinction of the vital action of the body, yet they prate about its immortality! The delusion would be ridiculous, did it not generate so much mischief.

Mind is no more a distinct thing from body, than sound is from a musical instrument. It is relatively the same-an action upon an instrument. The difference is, that the one is a natural instrument, prepared by nobody, by no design; the other an artificial one, prepared by some person, with design. The one has a perpetual action in itself, which it cannot controul; the other is so imperfect as to require a particular external action, whenever it is desirable to exhibit its purpose. The one an instrument generated by a peculiar action within itself; the other an instrument useless, unless when excited by a foreign power.

As upon a musical instrument, we may touch a variety of chords, or play a number of tunes; so, upon the body, we may generate an endless extent of what we call mind, thought, intellect, judgment, &c. These are all but a playing upon different chords of the same instrument; and it is as possible to draw up a gamut for the mind, as for a musical instrument: in fact, every alphabet deserves this appellation and comparison. An ingenious musician has proposed an universal musical language, which proves of itself, that mind is a thing of artificial generation, and not less mortal than the body that it is the action of the body, and upon the body, and not a power distinct. As well might you seek music without an instrument, as mind without a body. We can think of nothing but of what we know, but of matterand after all, our wild notions about gods and souls are mere phantasmal arrangements of matter.

Mind, like every thing we notice, is a succession of action and change. Memory is action and change recordedmind fixed. Thought is a process of mind, or of moral sensations, or of reflection upon physical sensations-not an idea; but a process, which, by comparing, and reflecting upon, the physical sensations, generates an idea-it may be termed mind fluent, as memory is mind fixed.

Intellect is mind exhibited both fluent and fixed, and embraces alike an idea long recorded or newly born. As mind

is a compound of sensations, intellect is a compound of mind. But these terms are all permutable, the one for the other. The essence of them is sensation; and the essence of sensation is well known to be the nervous system, acting in conjunction with the other parts of the body. Nothing can be more clear than this, that the mind is nothing distinct from the body-that thought, memory, speech, the whole mental phenomena, are nothing more than the phenomena of the animal body in its varied actions and passions.

Because I cannot minutely define these phenomena, am I justified in inventing or resorting to phantasmal explanations? Is it more profane to say, I know nothing of God, or soul, or immateriality, or immortality, than to affirm, (what is a positive lie, if fairly examined) that I do know of, these phantoms? If profaneness be wickedness, vice and immorality, it must appertain most to those, who talk most about a knowledge of god, soul, &c. All knowledge is communicable; and a matter of fact is alike comprebensible by all mankind, when fairly set before them. Hence it follows, that if any one individual had any matter-of-fact knowledge about this God or soul, he could make it as plain to all mankind as to himself. But no man bas any such knowledge. It is all fiction, all lying, all delusion: and the wickedness consists, not in exposing such a cheat, as I do, and as I will continue to do, but in maintaining, as a truth, that which has no relation to truth The knowledge which I have I am free and desirous to communicate to every man without a particle of mental reservation; and if all men were honest enough to do the same, all would go on improving. But the establishment of error has made it the interest of the few to perpetuate error among the many, and woe betides him who wishes to rescue the many from this source of profit to the few. Here is my crime-no man can lay more than this to my charge. It is for this alone that I am about to enter upon a sixth year of imprisonment-it is for this alone that a government, which professeth to exist for the protection of property to individuals, has repeatedly devastated that little property which I have accumulated: not to enrich any individuals among themselves, but to deprive me of the means of exposing that error which entails riches upon them, and a perpetual poverty upon the multitude.

All I can do with Mr. A.'s sermon is, first of all, to refute it generally, and then to descend from a general refutation to a refutation of particulars. This I proceed to do.

His first proposition for a natural proof of the immortali

ty of the mind, is that its immaterial nature furnishes a fair proof: and, at page 12, he quotes Dr. Johnson's definition of immateriality in the following manner: "Immateriality," 'Dr. Samuel Johnson has, with his usual perspicuity and force observed,'" seems to imply a natural power of perpetual duration, as a consequence of exemption from all causes of decay." This, though otherwise intended, Mr. A. in his second proposition for a natural proof, explains as follows: "It is a principle which must necessarily be admitted as the basis of all reasoning, that from nothing, nothing can result"! Immateriality cannot decay, because there is nothing to decay!

That mankind should have run into errors about immaterialities and nothings, before fixed matter was discovered to be a condensed compound of fluids, was excusable; but that we should still so corrupt our language as to talk about immaterialities and nothings, is inexcusable. I admire much of what Dr. Johnson has written; but that admiration of what he did right will not justify me in making it an authority for adopting what he did wrong. Were I now to compile, or to assist in compiling, a dictionary of the English, or any other language, I should omit the whole range of words that do not admit a correct and intelligible definition of which the words immateriality and nothing are two. We cannot use these words in correct language:--in whatever case we do use them, otherwise than in such an exposition as this, we talk or write nonsense. The same assertion applies to the word immortality: its use exhibits our ignorance of realities. We have a knowledge of mortality, in reference to changes in identical bodies of fixed matter; but in no instance have we a knowledge of immortality, nor can we, in any case, reason from or to. If, therefore, the words mortality or materiality necessarily imply the existence of antitheses in the words immortality and immateriality, the true inference is, that we use the first words wrongly-that they do not correctly apply to those purposes for which we use them. All the differences among mankind, as to matters of opinion, have their source in defective language; a knowledge of which fact must fill a man with horror at the idea of persecution for matters of opinion, or for being too ignorant to instruct each other in matters of right and w rong. It is possible, it is probable, and it is a consummation most devoutly to be wished, that some future theories, of what we now call mind and matter, will be so irresistibly clear, as to produce that same uniformity of opi

nion which exists with regard to colours. The very fact, that such is not now the case, is a fact in proof, that all buman ideas are yet in a confused state as to matter and mind. I am quite willing to confess my own defects; but I abhor and will resist the tyranuy that forces the defects of others upon me. I am quite willing to confess that we are all wrong, and earnestly to seek that which is right; but I will not bend to the power that forbids me the pursuit of knowledge, or denies me the right of this pursuit.

The word nothing, or immateriality, is an improper word. It has no application, and cannot be used in a clear and intelligible sense. It exhibits a defect in language, and in the ideas which precede it. This understood, a clear refutation of all that is said about the immateriality and immortality of the human soul is also understood*. We speak of a universe --and all that we know is, that it is a universe of matter. All our ideas are ideas of matter. Therefore, the word nothing, if correct, would be A NEGATION OF IDEAS. An absurdity.

Mr. Allin asks his Christian hearers, if the idolator of an idol composed of metal, wood, or stone, were to tell them that he supposed it to hear and to attend to his supplications, whether they would not pity him, on the ground of such idol having no intelligence; but he may be informed, that there are a set of idolators equally to be pitied, whose idols are mere delineations with paper and ink, and equally void of intelligence with those composed of metal, wood, or stone-he may be informed, that such idols are the Christian Gods, and that such idolators are the Christians. The intelligent Pagan no more supposed his divine power to dwell in the metal, wood, or stone, than the Christian supposes his to dwell in a cross and crucifixion, in a statue, painting, or written description. The idol of the Pagan was a mere personification of a power felt, an identity whereon to condense an idea of that power, and far more rationally so than any delineation or identification of the Christian idols. The Pagans never deified their bread and wine, and swallowed it with an idea of swallowing their Gods! If they gave loose to any passion before an idol, in the way of sacrifice, or ceremony, it was always na

*My correspondent R. O. may receive this as an answer to his enquiry about what becomes of the soul at the death of the body. The body has no such a soul as R. O. supposes. This critique is altogether an answer to his query. Mr. Smith of Panzance has made many promises to call at Dorchester Gaol; but he has not called. He is not what is vulgarly called a flat. He lives upon flats.