The next example is of forcible motion prolonged:

The waves behind impel the waves before,

Wide-rolling, foaming high, and tumbling on the shore.-Pope.

The last is of rapid motion prolonged:

The huge round stone, resulting with a bound,
Thunders impetuous down, and smokes along the ground.

Broome.

A period consisting mostly of long syllables, that is, of syllables pronounced slow, produces an emotion which bears a faint resemblance to that excited by gravity and solemnity. Hence the beauty of the following verse.

Olli sedato respondit corde Latinus.-Virgil

This enumeration might be extended to a much greater length; but the examples which have been given, may serve as a foundation for the reader's further enquiries.

I have had occasion to observe that to complete the resemblance between sound and sense, artful pronunciation contributes in no small degree. Pronunciation may therefore be considered as a branch of the present subject; and with some observations upon it this chapter shall be concluded.

To give a just idea of pronunciation, it must be distinguished from singing. The latter process is carried on by notes, requiring each of them a different aperture of the windpipe: the notes properly belonging to the former, are expressed by different apertures of the mouth, without varying the aperture of the windpipe. In reading, as in singing, there is a key-note. Above this note the voice is frequently elevated, to make the

G

sound correspond to the elevation of the subject. But the mind, in an elevated state, is disposed to action; and therefore in order to rest, it must be brought down to the key-note. Hence the term cadence.

The only rule which can be given for directing the pronunciation, is to sound the words in such a manner as to imitate the things which they signify. In pronouncing words denoting something elevated, the voice ought to be raised above its ordinary tone. To imitate a stern and impetuous passion, the words ought to be pronounced rough and loud. A sweet and gentle passion, on the contrary, ought to be imitated by a soft and melodious tone of voice. In general, words of the greatest importance ought to be marked with peculiar emphasis. Another circumstance which contributes to the resemblance between sense and sound, is the slowness or the rapidity of pronunciation. A period should be pronounced slow, when it expresses what is solemn or deliberate; and quick, when it expresses what is lively or impetuous.

This rule might be branched into many particular observations: but these do not properly belong to the present undertaking, because no language furnishes words to denote the different degrees of high and low, loud and soft, quick and slow. Before these circumstances can be made the subject of regular instruction, notes must be invented resembling those employed in -music. We have reason to believe that in Greece every tragedy was accompanied with such notes, to ascertain the pronunciation; but hitherto the moderns have not thought of this refinement. Cicero indeed, without the help of notes, professes to give rules for

ascertaining the various tones of voice which are proper in expressing the different passions; and it must be acknowledged that in this attempt he has exhausted the whole power of language. At the same time, it is evident that these rules avail little in point of instruction: the very words which he employs are not intelligible, except to those who are previously acquainted with the subject.

CHAP. XI.

OF FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE IN GENERAL.

FIGURES of speech always denote some departure from the simplicity of expression; they enunciate, after a particular manner, the idea which we intend to convey, and that with the addition of some circumstance designed to render the impression more strong and vivid. When I say, "A good man enjoys comfort in the midst of adversity," I express my thoughts in the simplest manner possible. But when I say, "To the upright there ariseth light in darkness," the same sentiment is expressed in a figurative style: a new circumstance is introduced; light is substituted for comfort, and darkness is used to suggest the idea of adversity.

The use of figurative language has been visited with heavy censure by a very distinguished philosopher. "Since wit and fancy," says Locke, " finds easier

entertainment in the world than dry truth and real knowledge, figurative speeches, and allusion in language, will hardly be admitted as an imperfection or abuse of it. I confess, in discourses where we seek rather pleasure and delight than information and improvement, such ornaments as are borrowed from them, can scarce pass for faults. But yet, if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetorick, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheat: and therefore however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or person that makes use of them. What, and how various they are, will be superfluous here to take notice; the books of ́rhetorick, which abound in the world, will instruct those who want to be informed: only I cannot but observe, how little the preservation and improvement of truth and knowledge is the care and concern of mankind; since the arts of fallacy are endow'd and preferred. "Tis evident how much men love to deceive, and be deceived, since rhetorick, that powerful instrument of error and deceit, has its established professors, is publickly taught, and has always been had in great reputation: and I doubt not, but it will be thought great boldness, if not brutality in me to have

said thus much against it. Eloquence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it, to suffer it self ever to be spoken against. And 'tis in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving, wherein men find pleasure to be deceived."*—This is a degree of severity more than philosophical. The passage seems to involve one obvious fallacy; namely, that eloquence must always be exerted in a bad cause: for if rhetoric is a powerful instrument of error and deceit, it must also be a powerful instrument of truth and justice. From the writings of the excellent author himself, figurative language is by no means excluded; and in this very passage we find him making a skilful use of comparison, one of the figures of rhetoric.

Though figures imply a deviation from what may be reckoned the most simple form of speech, we are not thence to infer that they imply any thing uncommon or unnatural. This is so far from being the case, that, on many occasions, they are both the most natural, and the most common method of uttering our sentiments. It is impossible to compose any discourse without making frequent use of them; and there are indeed few sentences of any length which do not include some expression that may be termed figurative. Figures are therefore to be accounted part of that language which nature dictates to mankind: they are not the invention of the schools, nor the mere product of study; on the contrary, the most illiterate speak in figures, as often perhaps as the most learned. When

• Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, book iii. chap. x. p. 428. edit. Lond. 1706, fol.