I consider Julian as a Platonist from the admiration which he expresses of Plato's principles, and his frequent quoting of him; and he is as distinguished a Platonist as the rest by the inextricable confusion of his ideas on these subjects, as may be perceived in the following passage, in which it is not easy to say in what light he considered the intelligible world; but he seems to have thought it to be a kind of magazine of ideas, or patterns of things. And yet he represents the good as producing the world, as well as those ideas, and as making the world an image, not of them, but of himself. Speaking of the visible world, he says, that "it is preserved by nothing immediately but a fifth body, the head of which is the solar ray, but as it were in the second gradation by the intelligible world, and in the highest place by the king of all, about whom all things are; he whom, whether it be lawful to call one that is above nous, or the idea of things that exist, which I call the whole intelligible, or the one, because the one seems to be oldest of all, or what Plato was used to call the good; for this is the simple cause to all things that are, of beauty, perfection, unity and immense power. Remaining in itself according to its primary operative essence, he produced the sun, the greatest god, from himself, out of the middle of intellectual things and demiurgic causes, in all respects like to himself."*

As the visible world is sometimes considered as the child of God, so the intelligible world, which supplied a pattern for it, is also sometimes considered in the same light, and called a child of the supreme Being; and the following description of this child, and its properties, by Plotinus, who certainly thought himself well acquainted with it, is mysterious enough: "As a person looking up to the heavens, and seeing the brightness of the stars, inquires who is their maker, so a person who looks into the intelligible world will admire the maker of it, and inquire who established it, who generated such a child, this beautiful child, the nous, a child produced from himself. This cannot be the nous itself, or the child, but before the nous and the child. The nous and the

Οικ ύπ' αλλά μεν φρονεμένος, η προσεχώς μεν ύπο τε πεμπίες σωματος ο το κεφαλιο έσιν ακτις ήλιο, βαθμό δε ώσπερ δευτερῳ τῷ νοητῷ κόσμῳ· πρεσβυτέρως δε ετι δια των παν των βασιλέα, περὶ ἐν παντα εςιν. Ούτω τανυν, είτε το επικείνα το να καλειν αυτόν θεμις, είτε ιδέαν των οντων, ὁ δη φημι το νοητον συμπαν, είτε έν, επειδη παντων το ἔν δοκει ὡς πρεσβύτατον είτε ὁ Πλατων ειωθεν ονομάζειν το αγαθον αυτή δη εν ή μονοειδης των άλων αιτια πασι τοις εσιν εξηγεμενη, καλλές τε, και τελειότητα, ένώσεως τε και δυνατ μεως αμήχανα κατα την εν αυτή μένεσα πρωτεργον εσίαν, μεσον εκ μέσων των νοερών και δημιοργικών αιτίων ἥλιον θεον μεγιστον ανεφηνεν ἐξ ἑαυτε, πάντα ὁμοίον ἑαυτῷ. Orat. iv. Opera, I. p. 132. (P.)

child must be after him, requiring to be understood and nourished, which is nearest to that which wants nothing, not even to be understood. It has perfect truth and intelligence, for it has them in the first place, being before all, neither wanting any thing, nor having any thing; for otherwise it would not be the good.

The latter part of this description would more naturally lead the mind to the idea of a principle or property, than to that of a person; but this is still more the case in the following passage from Jamblichus, who, in an account of the principles of Hermes, or those Egyptian doctrines which were probably the source of all the knowledge (or, to speak more properly, of all the mistakes) of Plato, describes the supreme Being, or the good; and yet the greater part of the passage gives us the idea of two different gods, one of which was derived from the other. But then the god and king that he speaks of as the inferior, was, perhaps, no other than the sun, as his Latin translator has supposed, and therefore it gives us no distinct idea of the personification of the divine nous or logos.

"Before all things," he says, "that really are, and the principles of all things, there is one God, prior to the first god and king, immoveable, remaining in his own immoveable unity, not mixed with any thing intelligible, or any thing else, but the pattern of that God who is his own father, his own child, and the only father of the essentially good. For it is prior and greater, and the fountain of all, and the source of all the first intellectual ideas. From this one God shone forth the God who is self-sufficient, for he is the principal, and the God of gods, unity from one, before all essence, and the principle of essence, for from him comes essence and entity. He is therefore called the principle of what is intelligible. These are the oldest principles of all things, which Hermes places before the ethereal, the empyreal and celestial gods."+

* Ως δε ὁ αναβλεψας εις τον ερανόν και το των αςρων φεγγος ίδων, τον ποιησανία ενθυμειναι και ζηλει· οὕτω χρη και τον νοη7ον κόσμον ὃς εθεασαίο και εκείδε και εθαύμαζε τον κακεινα ποιητην. Τις αρα ὁ τοιυίον ὑποςησας ζητειν, η πε, η πως, ὁ τοιεῖον παιδα γεννησας, νεν, κόρον καλον, και παρ' αυτε γενομενον κορον πανίως τοιετε νες εκείνος ελε κορος, αλλά και προ να και κορυ μελα γαρ αυτον, νους, και κορος, δεηθενία και κεκορεσθαι, και νενοηκεναι, ο πλησιον μεν εςι του ανενδεους, και τον νοειν ουδεν δεομενου· πληρωσιν δε αληθινην και νοησιν εχει, ότι πρωίως έχει το δε προ αυίων, ούτε δειλαί, ούτε έχει η, ουκ' αν το αγαθον ην. En. iii. L. viii. C. x. p. 353. (P.)

+ Προ των οντως αυτων, και των όλων αρχών εςι Θεός εις πρωτον, και του πρωτου θεου και βασιλεως, ακινη», εν μονοίητε του ἑαυτου ενοτητα μενων ουτε γαρ νοητον αυτῳ επιπλεκεται, ούτε αλλοι παραδειγμα δε ιδρυίας του αυτοπατορος, αυλογονου, και μονοπατορα Θεού, του ονίως αγαθους μείζον γαρ τι και πρωΐον, και πηγή των πανίων, και πυθμην των νοουμενων πρωτων ειδων ονίων. Απο δε του ἑνος, τουλου ὁ αυταρκης Θεος ἑαυτον εξελαμψε διο και

We shall the less wonder at this confusion of ideas, if we attend to another of the Platonic maxims, viz. That being and energy are the same things. This was before cited from Julian, and I now find the same in Plotinus, who says expressly, that " energy is the same thing with being."* Accordingly, he calls the soul "one simple energy, and as its nature is to live, it therefore cannot perish." This is evidently making the soul to be nothing more than the principle or property of life; but then this is an extraordinary argument for its immortality, as it comes to nothing more than saying that life and death are opposite things. But it is not my business in this place to attend to the many absurdities of the Platonists about the soul, and therefore I shall return to my proper subject.

In most of the preceding passages the good is described as synonymous to the supreme Being, and of course a proper person; but it is generally mentioned in the neuter gender, and is described in such a manner as gives us the idea of a principle, property, or power, capable of being communicated to other beings, and even to the soul. "There is,' says Jamblichus, "a good which transcends essence, that which is essentially good, I mean the most ancient and valuable essence, and in itself incorporeal, the peculiar property of the gods, which, in all kinds of them, preserves their peculiar distribution and order, which is never separated from them, and is the same in them all." He also says that "souls which govern bodies have not the essence of the good, nor the first cause of good, which is prior to essence, but a certain portion and acquisition from it."‡

Proclus generally speaks of the good in the neuter gender, as if it was a principle, and no person; and that they were mere metaphysical considerations which led him to place. this good at the head of the universe, is evident from his reasoning on the subject. "The good," he says, “is above

αυλοπαίωρ, και αυταρκης αρχη γαρ οὗτος, και Θεος Θεων· μονας εκ του ένος, προουσια και αρχη της ουσίας απ' αυτού γαρ ουσιοίης και ἡ ουσια· διο και νοηταρκης προσαγορευεται. Αυλαι μεν ουν εισιν αρχαι πρεσβυλαίαι πανίων, ὡς Έρμης προ των αιθεριων και εμπυρίων θεων προβατίει, και των επουρανίων. «Sect. viii. C. ii. p. 158. (Ρ.)

• Εςι δε και το ον ενέργεια. En. v. L. ix. C. viii. p. 561. (P.)

+ Ψύχη δε μια και απλη ενέργεια ουσα, εν τω ζην φυσις, ου τοινυν ταυΐη φθαρησείαι. En. iv. L. vii. C. xii. p. 466. (P.)

* Εςι δή ουν τ' αγαθόν, το τε επέκεινα της ουσίας, και κατ' ουσίαν ὑπαρχον εκείνην λέγω την ουσίαν την πρεσβ Παλην και τιμιωίαίην, και καθ' αυτην ουσίαν ασωματων θεών ιδιωμα εξαιρεῖον, και καλα πανία τα γένη τα περι αυτους ονία, τηρουν μεν ουν αυτων την οικείαν δια νομήν και ταξιν, και ουκ αποσπωμενον ταυλης, το αυτό δ' όμως εν όλοις ὡσανίως ὑπαρχον. Ψυχαις δε ταις αρχουσαις σωμάτων, ουσία μεν αγαθού ουκ ετι παρεσιν, ουδ' αιλία του αγαθού πρότερα ουσα και της ουσίας, εποχή δε τις απ' αυτου και εξις παραγίνεται. Sect. i. C. v. p. 8. (P.)

every thing, because all desire good." But from the idea of a metaphysical principle, we easily pass to that of a cause, and from a cause to a being or person. "The good," (ayador,) "is the principle and first cause," and the first cause he makes synonymous to God. "God and the good (ayadov,) are the same. For that beyond which nothing is, and which all desire, is God.”‡

he says,

It was by metaphysical reasoning that the Platonists made the good to be synonymous to the one, all numbers consist ing of unity repeated, and therefore proceeding from it, and being resolvable into it, as they said that all things proceed from, and return to, their respective causes; a maxim which occurs perpetually in Proclus. "The one and the good,” (ayadov,) he says, are the same."§

66

Though every thing was by the Platonists called apn, or αρχή, principle, with respect to that which immediately followed it, yet in the strict sense they applied this term to the first and highest principle only. "Nothing," says Proclus, superior to the apyn; for if essence was before the one, essence must be the one, but it is not so." He also makes life synonymous to the first principle, for he arranges all kinds of beings in the following order, life, nous, soul, and body. ¶

As the supreme Being, or cause, must, according to these sublime Platonists, be superior to every thing, it is amusing enough to see how they were puzzled in making him superior to essence, which also they strangely enough make synonymous to nous.' ** If God must be superior to essence, and be the cause of essence, they were well aware that he must then have made himself, since he must have essence as the foundation of his other properties. This, therefore, seems to have been admitted by the Platonists, and their reasoning on this subject is truly not a little curious. Plotinus says, that "essence is not a cause with respect to God, but God with respect to essence, for he made it for himself, and having made it, placed it without himself, he not wanting essence, since he made it; for, considered as being, he did

Ει γαρ πανία τα ονία του αγαθου εφιείαι, δήλον ότι το πρωίως αγαθον επίκεινά έξι Twy ovlay. Instit. C. viii. p. 418. (P.)

† Πανίων των ονίων αρχη και αίτια πρωΐίςη το αγαθόν εςι. Ibid. C. xii. p. 420. (Ρ.) 1. Και γαρ τ' αγαθον και Θεῷ ταυτον αν γαρ μηδεν εσιν επίκεινα, και ου πανία εφιείας, Toulo. Ibid. C. exiii. p. 462. (P.)

§ Tavlov

yap

iv nai ayaton. Ibid. C. xx. p. 425. C. xxv. p. 428. (P.)

Η Της γαρ αρχής ουδεν είναι κρειττον εςιν αναγκαίον ει δε ή ουσία προ του ἑνὸς, πεπονθος είται την ουσίαν το ἕν, αλλ' οὐκ ἦ ουσία το ἐν. In Platonem, L. i. C. iv. p. 84 (Ρ.)

Η μεν ουκ προοδος των όντων, αυτή, δια ζωής, και νου, και ψυχής, εις την σωματικής TeλeoTyoaoa purw. Ibid. E. ii. C. vi. p. 131. (P.)

** Και γαρ ο νους ουσία. Ibid. L. ii. C. iv. p. 93. (P.)

not make being. But it will be said he must then have been before he was, if he made himself, being his own maker; but we must say, that he is not to be considered as a thing made, but as a maker."* On this a question is started, whether God could have made himself otherwise than he did. But it is answered, that "God being will itself, there could be no will prior to his existence." Proclus says, that "what subsists of itself, being one, is at the same time the cause and the caused."+

The notion of God having made himself, or being his own father, and his own son, is well exposed by the author of the Recognitions, as implying that he must have existed before he did. §

This doctrine of the superiority of the Divine essence to every thing else, led these Platonists to some curious distinctions with respect to the place of God; and as they imagined that his being contained in any thing would imply some kind of inferiority, they therefore made him the container. "The gods," says Jamblichus," are not subject to any part of the universe, nor is any part free from them; but, being superior, they are not so in it as to be contained by it, but they contain all things, and terrestrial things have their essence in the divine fulness."|| To illustrate this, he says, that "as light contains the things which are enlightened by it, so the power of the gods contains the things which partake of it."¶

Ουδε εςιν αυτῳ αρχή ή εσια αυτο" αλλ' αυτος αρχη της εσιας ων, εκ αυτῳ εποίησε την εσίαν αλλα ποιησας ταυτην εξω ειασεν ἑαυτο· άτε εδεν το είναι δεόμενος, ὃς εποίησεν αυτό· ου τοινυν εδε καθ ̓ ὁ εςι ποιει το εςι. Τι εν ου συμβαίνει, είποι τις αν, πριν η γενεσθαι γεγονεναι ει γαρ ποιει ἑαυτον, το μεν ἑαυτε επω εςι. Το δ' αν ποιειν, εςιν ηδη προ ἑαυτε, το ποιέμενε οντος αυτό προς ὁ δη λεκτεον, ὡς ὅλως ου τακτεον κατα τον ποιεμενον, αλλά κατα τον ποιενται En. vi. L. viii. C. xix. xx. p. 754. (P.)

+ ΕΔΥΝΑΤΟ εν αλλοτι ποιειν ἑαυτον η ὁ εποίησε δε το προ βελήσεως αρα πρωτον apan Beλnois autos. Plotinus, Eu. vi. L. viii. C. xxi. p. 755. (P.)

* Εν γαρ ον άμα και αιτιον εςι και αιτιατον. Instit. xlvi. p. 436. (P.)

"Sine principio ergo dicimus Deum, ineffabili providentia demonstrante : qui non à seipso factus est, nec à seipso genitus: est enim sine principio et ingenitus: ingeniti autem appellatio, non quid sit, nobis intelligere dat, sed quod non est factus. Autopatoran verò et Autogeneton, hoc est, ipsum sibi patrem, ipsumque sibi filium, qui vocaverunt illud quod est ingenitum, contumeliam facere conati sunt, dubiis deservientes rationibus. Indigere enim nativitate illud quod erat prius quam nasceretur, parvulorum more intelligentes, putaverunt; et illud quod fuerat pro eo quod fuerit ponentes, quasi per seipsum factum, dicere, insania insanierunt; et plantationibus comparare illud quod est ingenitum ut dæmoniosi, ausi sunt.". L.iii. Sect. iii. p. 519. (P.)

| Ουτε γαρ οι θεοι κρατώνται εν τισι το κοσμο μερεσιν, ετε τα περι γην αμοίρα αυτών καθεςηκεν· ἀλλ' ὁι μεν κρειττονες εν αυτῷ ὡς ὑπὸ μηδεν ( περιέχονται, και περιέχεσι παντα εν αυτοίς τα δ' επί γης εν τοις πληρώμασι των θεων εχονται το είναι. Sect. i. C. ix. p. 15, (P.)

* Ώσπερ εν το φως περιέχει τα φωτιζομενα, ούτωσι και των θεων ἡ δυναμις τα μεταλαμβάνοντα αυτης έξωθεν περιείληφε. Ibid. p. 17. (Ρ.)