culty in admitting that it was synonymous to nous, or mind, each of them signifying the principle of reason, or that from which logos in its usual acceptation, viz. that of speech, proceeds; every thing that is uttered being first conceived in the mind, and existing there.

Beside the visible world, which is perceived by the organs of sight, these philosophers supposed that there was also an invisible world, exactly corresponding to it, capable of being perceived and contemplated by the mind only. And the 'only probable key to their meaning is, to suppose that this invisible world of ideas, which furnished a pattern for the visible world, (always existing in the divine mind, and sometimes confounded with it,) was at other times considered as a thing different from the Divine Being himself, whose mind it was.

When they consider this intelligible world as the source and cause from which the visible world was derived, they sometimes speak of it as a person, the maker or demiurgus of the world; but though they supposed that there was another principle higher than this nous, or demiurgus, they seldom or never speak of that as of a person also, so as to have the idea of two intelligent persons at the same time; or if they do, it may be presumed to be only in a mystical or figurative way of speaking. For as, on some occasions, they speak of their nous, as a mere repository of ideas, the place of the intelligible world, or the intelligible world itself, and no proper person; so, on other occasions, they speak of the highest principle of all, what they call the good, not as a person, but a property only, something belonging to every thing that is divine, to the terrestrial as well as the celestial gods, and even to the soul of man itself. There was, however, enough of personification in what the Platonists said of the divine nous or logos, to give a handle to Philo, and the Christian fathers, to make a little more of it, as it was very convenient to their purpose to do.

That the real conceptions of the Platonists were not favourable to the doctrine of two proper divine persons, may be inferred from its being so generally said, that Plato made no more than two principles of things. Thus Diogenes Laertius, in his Life of Plato, says that "he made two principles of all things, God and matter, calling the former mind and cause." And though. Plutarch, in his view of the doc

Δυο δε των πανίων απεφηνεν αρφας, Θεον και ύλην, ὃν και νεν προσαγορεύει, και αντισης L. iii. p. 228. (P.)

trines of Socrates and Plato, which he says are the same, says that they held three principles, God, matter and idea, he makes God and nous to be the same, and idea not to be a person, but an incorporeal substance in the mind of God."*

In the dissertation of Maximus Tyrius, one of the most sensible and pleasing of all the Platonists, the title of which is, "What is God, according to Plato?" there is no account of any distinction between the good and the nous, but only the doctrine of one God, the king and father of all, and of many other inferior gods, the children of the Supreme, reigning with him. The divine intellect, or nous, he considers as a power of the divine mind, and he compares the quickness of its operations to that of sight, while those of the human intellect resemble speech only; or the former, he says, may be compared to the darting of the light of the sun, and the latter to the motion of the sun. "Such," says he, "does the academic angel (i. e. Plato) "exhibit to us the Father, and the author of all things."§ Here is no personification of the nous, or logos, at all; and yet, I doubt not, he delivered the genuine principles of Platonism, divested of mystery and figure.

According to Proclus, the nous, or reason, of man, is a principle exactly similar to that of God. "Our nous," he says, "is separate from the good, and wants something, and therefore desires pleasure, for the perfection of the man; but the divine nous always partakes of the good, and is united to it, and therefore is divine."||

As to the term second God, it is generally applied to nature by the later Platonists, as well as by Plato himself. Thus Plotinus says, "Nature itself is a god, and a second god, shewing himself before the other God is seen." Yet Numenius called the first of the three principles, or gods,

Σωκράτης και Πλαίων (αι γαρ αυται περὶ παντὸς ἑκατέρε δόξαι) τρεις αρχας, τον Θεον, την ύλην, την ιδεαν εςι δε ὁ Θεὸς ὁ νους, ύλη δε το ύποκείμενον πρωτον γενέσει και φθορά, ιδεα δε έσια ασωμαίος, εν τοις νοημασι και ταις φανασιαις τε Θες· ὅδε Θεος νας εςι το xore. De Placitis Philosophorum, L. i. C. iii. Opera, II. p. 878. (P.)

Ολι Θεος εις, πανίων βασιλευς, και πατηρ, και θεοι πολλοι, Θες παίδες, συναρχονίες . Diss. i. p. 6. (P.)

- Τον μεν θείον νεν τῷ όραν, τον δε ανθρωπινον τῷ λεγειν. Ibid. p. 12. (Ρ.)

§ Ο μεν θείος μας κατα την παραβολην τε ήλιο παντα εφορα τον εν τῇ γῇ τοπον αθρόως, ὁ δε ανθρώπινος κατα την πορείαν αυτε άλλοτε αλλα τα μέρη το όλο επιπορευόμενο. Τστον μεν δη ὁ εξ ακαδημιας ἡμιν άγγελος δίδωσι πατέρα και γενητην το συμπαντος. Ibid. (Ρ.) Η Αλλ' ὁ μὲν ἡμέτερος νες τε αγαθε διεζευκται και εςιν ενδεής, και δια τέτο δη τε και της ήδονης δείται προς την τελειοτητα την ανθρωπινην· ὁ δε γε θείος νας αει το αγαπο μετεχει, και συνηνωται προς αυτο, και δια τετο θειος εςιν. In Platonem, L. ii. Ć. iv. p. 92. (P.)

* Και θεος αυτή ἡ φύσις" και θεος δεύτερος, προφαίνων ἑαυτον, L. v. C. iii. p. 522. (P.)

прох

δραν εκείνον. Επ. Κ.

the "Father, the second of them the maker, and the third the work, or the thing made."*

In Plato we find that the supreme God, the good, styled himself the Demiurgus with respect to the celestial and eternal beings, and appointed them to be the makers of all things that were subject to destruction and death. But as the supreme Being must have produced every thing by the exertion of his mind, or nous, and as it were from his storehouse of his ideas, it was natural enough for the later Platonists to fall into the habit of calling this nous the Demiurgus, as it is done by Plotinus, who says, "The nous is the Demiurgus, who makes the soul, and the nous being a cause, he (Plato) calls the Father the good, being something above the nous, and above essence. He also often calls being and nous, idea; so that Plato acknowledged that nous or idea was from the good, and the soul from the nous, and that this account of things is not new, but though formerly given, was not well unfolded; but that the modern accounts are explanatory of them."+

By soul in this place, Plotinus probably understood the soul of the universe, or perhaps soul in general, which he supposed to be, in all cases, of the same nature; and with the Platonists this was always considered as a principle, inferior to nous. Thus Jamblichus says, "Nous is the governor and king of all, being the demiurgic art of the whole. It is always with the gods, without imperfection, and without defect, consisting of itself in one single operation; whereas the soul partakes of nous, but only in part, and multiform, looking to the director of the whole." In this passage, however, it is pretty evident, that the writer did not consider nous as an intelligent person, distinct from the supreme Being, but his own proper wisdom and power, and very different from what the Christian logos came to be.

As the Platonists confounded the nous with the supreme Being, whose nous it was, so they likewise confounded this nous with the ideas belonging to it. Plotinus, after observ

* Cudworth, B. i. Ch. iv. p. 552. (P.)

† Δημιεργος γαρ ὁ νες αυτῷ· τετον δε φησι την ψυχήν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ κρατηρι εκείνο το αιτία δε να οντος πατερα φησι τ' αγαθόν, και το επέκεινα να και επέκεινα εσίας πολλαχο δε το ον και τον vev, την ιδεαν λεγει ώςε Πλατωνα ειδεναι εκ μεν τ' αγαθε τον vev, την ιδεαν εκ δε το ve, την ψυχην και είναι τες λόγες τεσδε, μη καινες μηδε νυν αλλα παλαι μεν ειρήθαι μη αναπεπταμένως τες δε νυν λόγες εξηγητας εκείνων γεγονεναι. En. v. L. i. C. viii. p. 489. (P.)

θεους

† Νες τοινυν ἡγεμων και βασιλευς των όντων, τέχνη δημιουργική τε παντος, τοις μεν ὡσαύτως αει παρεςι, τελεως και ανενδεως, κατα μιαν ενεργειαν εσίωσαν εν ἑαυτῇ καθαρώς ή δε ψυχή να τε μετέχει μερις 8 και πολυειδες, εις την τε όλα τε προςασίαν αναποβλέποντος. Sect. i. C. viii. p. 12. (P.)

ing that the mind, or nous, perceives the ideas that are in it, considers whether these ideas be the nous itself, or something different from it; and concludes with saying, that " they may be considered in both lights, distinguishable only in the conception of them; so that the nous and the things perceived by it may be the same, as really existing, for it does not perceive altogether in another, but in itself, on account of its having the thing perceived, in itself. Or there is no reason why the thing perceived may not be the nous, considered in a state of fixity, unity and quiet."* In another place, speaking of the mind and its conceptions, he says, The nous is at the same time all things, but not altogether: but each has its separate power; for all nous comprehends ideas as a genus, and as the whole comprehends the parts."+ According to this view of things, it should seem that the nous was considered as the same thing with the whole stock of its conceptions or ideas, and had no proper intellectual power belonging to it.

In another place he expresses this more decisively, saying, that nous and idea are the same thing, and even that idea is the whole nous, and that nous is the same thing with all the ideas, just as knowledge is the same with all the theorems.‡ It must be observed, however, that in the last clause he used the term sin, or forms of things, and not idea, as if the latter was that which contained the former; and yet, as Diogenes Laertius observes, they are used promiscuously by the Platonists.

When the Platonists speak of the inferiority of the nous to God, they seem to do it as if they were merely fixing a scale of metaphysical principles, and not to have had an idea of their being two intelligent persons. And though they occasionally personify each of them, yet it is separately, and never, as far as I have observed, both together. This was reserved for the Christian Platonists. To make this more evident, I shall produce a few extracts from Proclus respecting the inferiority of the nous.

"The nous," says he, " is God, on account of the intellectual and intelligible light, which is more ancient than

* Επειτα εδεν κωλύει, ὅσαν τῳ λεγομένῳ εν είναι αμφῳ, διαιρεμενα δε τη νοήσει· ειπερ μόνον ὡς ον, το μεν νοητον, το δε ναν. Ο γαρ καθορα & φησιν εν έτερῳ παντως αλλ' εν αυτή, τω εν αυτῷ το νοητον ἔχειν· ἡ το μεν νοητῳ εδεν κωλύει και νουν είναι εν ςασει, και ενοτητι, nai nouxia. En. iv. L. ix. C. i. p. 356. (P.)

† Ούτως ουν και πολυ μαλλον, ο νους εςιν ὁμου παντα· και αν ουχ όμου ότι έκαςον δυνα μις ιδια· ὁ δὲ πας νους, περιέχει ώσπερ γενος ειδη και ώσπερ ὅλον μέρη. En. v. L. ix. C. vi. p. 560. (P.)

† Ουκ έτερα τε να έκαςη ιδέα, αλλ' έκαση νας ἕκασιν δε είδος νος έκαςος, ὡς ἡ ὅλη επίσημη τα p. 561. (P.)

και ὅλως μεν ὁ νες τα παντα είδη,

παντα θεωρήματα Ibid. C. viii.

nous.

Here nous is personified; but then the light, which is represented as superior to it, is not so. In the followingpassages the first principle is personified, but not the subordinate one. "Whatever is God," he says, " is above essence, and life and nous." "Nous is the work and the first production of the gods."‡ "Unity is God of itself, nous most godlike, soul divine, body like God."§

The passage which looks the most like the personification of both the first and second principles, is the following; but then the whole has the air of figure, so that the literal meaning is by no means clear: "The Demiurgus, and Father of the universe, has the third place among the intellectual kings."||

In this scale of principles, it was usual to consider that which is prior in rank, as the Father, container and nourisher of that which is posterior. Though, therefore, the nous be the Son with respect to the God, it is the Father with respect to the soul, and the nourisher of it, as Plotinus expressly says. And yet, the nous was only the image of the good.**

When we find such confusion in the ideas of these Platonists about their nous, and the ideas belonging to it, we cannot be surprised at their likewise confounding the nous with the supreme Being, whose nous it was; sometimes calling the world the offspring of God, and sometimes the offspring of the idea of God, as in the following passage of Julian: "This universe being the offspring of the idea of the first and the greatest good, being in its stable essence from eternity, received also power among the intellectual gods.”††

Και νες αρα Θεος, δια το φως το νοερον, και το νοητον, το και αυτε το να πρεσβύτερον. In Platonem, L. ii. C. iv. p. 91.

Both the terms voɛp and von occur in the writings of the Platonists, and, in some cases, it is not easy to make any difference in translating them, though the former should be rendered intellectual, and the latter intelligible, or perceived by the mind. However, Proclus says, "they may be considered as the same, on account of the fulness of the light which belongs to the latter." Και το νοητον αμα και νοερο δια την εις αυτό καθήκεσαν το φωτος αποπληρωσιν. Ibid. C. i. p. 91. (Ρ.)

+ Δηλον δη ότι πάντων εςιν επεκεινα των ειρημένων, απας Θεός, εσίας, και ζωής, και ve. Instit. C. cxv. p. 463, (P.)

- Και γαρ ὁ νες δημιεργημα, και γεννημα των θεών εςι το πρώτισον. In Platonem, L. i. C. xxi. p. 55. (P.)

§ Και ἡ μεν ένας, αυτόθεν Θεος ὁ δε νους, θειοτατον· ἡ δε ψυχή, θεια· το δε σώμα, Jeong. Instit. C. cxxix. p. 470. (P.)

Η Ο μεν τοινυν δημιεργος, και πατηρ τωδε το παντος, την τρίτην ταξιν λαχων εν τοις vospois Bacihevos. Proclus in Platonem, L. vi. C. vi. p. 355. (P.)

Η Ουσα [ψυχη] απο τα νοερα εςι και εν λογισμοις ὁ νες αυτής και ἡ τελείωσις απ' αυτό παλιν στον πατρος εκθρεπσαντος- -Νας εν επι μαλλον θειοτέραν ποιεί και το Πατηρ είναι και τῳ παρείναι. En. v. L. i. C. ii. p. 484. (Ρ.)

**

Είκονα δε εκείνο λεγομεν τον νεν. Ibid. C. vii. p. 488. (P.)

†† Αυτος δε ὁ συμπας, άτε δη το πρωτο και μέγιςο της ιδέας τε αγαθε γεγονως εκγονός, ύποςας αυτε περι την μονιμον εσίαν εξ αιδις, και την εν τοις νοεροις θεοις παρεδέξατο sav. Orat. iv. Opera, I. p. 133. (P.