Preparatory Confiderations.

I DEEM it unneceflary to prove that mankind flood in need

of a revelation, because I have met with no ferious person who thinks that even under the Chriftian revelation we have too much light, or any affurance which is fuperfluous. I defire moreover that in judging of Christianity it may be remembered, that the question lies between this religion and none for if the Chriftian religion be not credible, no one, with whom we have to do, will fupport the pretenfions of any other.

Suppofe then the world we live in to have had a Creator; fuppofe it to appear, from the predominant aim and tendency of the provifions and contrivances obfervable in the universe, that the Deity, when he formed it, confulted for the happiness of his fenfitive creation; fuppofe the difpofition which dictated this council to continue; fuppofe a part of the creation to have received faculties from their Maker, by which they are capable of rendering a moral obedience to his will, and of voluntari ly purfuing any end for which he has defigned them; suppose the Creator to intend for thefe his rational and accountable agents a fecond state of existence, in which their situation will be regulated by their behaviour in the first state, by which fuppofition (and by no other) the objection to the divine government in not putting a difference between the good and the bad, and the inconfiftency of this confufion with the care and benevolence difcoverable in the works of the Deity, is done away; fuppofe it to be of the utmost importance to the fubjects of this difpenfation to know what is intended for them, that is, fuppofe the knowledge of it to be highly conducive to the happiness of the fpecies, a purpose which fo many provifions of nature are calcu lated to promote: Suppofe, nevertheless, almoft the whole race, either by the imperfection of their faculties, the misfortune of their fituation, or by the lofs of fome prior revelation, to want this knowl edge, and not to be likely without the aid of a new revelation to attain it; under thefe circumstances is it improbable that a reve lation fhould be made? Is it incredible that God fhould interpofe for fuch a purpose? Suppofe him to defign for mankind a future ftate, is it unlikely that he should acquaint them with it?

Now in what way can a revelation be made but by miracles? In none which we are able to conceive. Confequently, in

whatever degree it is probable or not very improbable that a revelation fhould be communicated to mankind at all, in the fame degree is it probable or not very improbable that miracles fhould be wrought. Therefore when miracles are related to have been wrought in the promulgating of a revelation manifeftly wanted, and, if true, of ineftimable value, the improbability which arifes from the miraculous nature of the things related, is not greater than the original improbability that fuch a revelation. fhould be imparted by God.

I wish it however to be correctly understood, in what manner, and to what extent, this argument is alleged. We do not affume the attributes of the Deity, or the exiftence of a future state, in order to prove the reality of miracles. That reality always must be proved by evidence. We affert only that in miracles adduced in fupport of revelation, there is not any fuch antecedent improbability as no teftimony can furmount. And, for the purpose of maintaining this affertion, we contend, that the incredibility of miracles related to have been wrought in atteftation of a meffage from God, conveying intelligence of a future state of rewards and punishments, and teaching mankind how to prepare themselves for that ftate, is not in itself greater than the event, call it either probable or improbable, of the two following propofitions being true, namely, firft, that a future ftate of existence fhould be destined by God for his human creation, and fecondly, that, being so destined, he should acquaint them with it. It is not neceffary for our purpofe that these propofitions be capable of proof, or even that by arguments drawn from the light of nature, they can be made out to be probable. It is enough that we are able to fay concerning them, that they are not fo violently improbable, fo contradictory to what we already believe of the divine power and character, that either the propofitions themfelves, or facts ftrictly connected with the propofitions, (and therefore no farther improbable than they are improbable) ought to be rejected at firft fight, and to be rejected by whatever ftrength or complication of evidence they be attested.

This is the prejudication we would refift. For to this length does a modern objection to miracles go, viz. that no human testimony can in any cafe render them credible. I think the reflection above stated, that, if there be a revelation, there must be miracles; and that, under the circumstances in which the human' fpecies are placed, a revelation is not improbable, or not improbable in any great degree, to be a fair anfwer to the whole objection.

But fince it is an objection which stands in the very threshold of our argument, and, if admitted, is a bar to every proof, and to all future reasoning upon the subject, it may be neceffary, before we proceed farther, to examine the principle upon which it profeffes to be founded: which principle is concifely this, that it is contrary to experience that a miracle fhould be true, but not contrary to experience that teftimony fhould be falfe.

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Now there appears a fmall ambiguity in the term " experience," and in the phrases "contrary to experience," or "contradicting experience," which it may be neceffary to remove in the first place. Strictly speaking, the narrative of a fact is then only contrary to experience, when the fact is related to have exifted at a time and place, at which time and place we being prefent, did not perceive it to exift; as if it should be afferted, that in a particular room, and at a particular hour of a certain day, a man was raised from the dead, in which room, and at the time specified, we being present and looking on, perceived no fuch event to have taken place. Here the affertion is contrary to experience properly fo called; and this a 'contrariety which no evidence can furmount. It matters nothing, whether the fact be of a miraculous nature or not. But although this be the experience, and the contrariety, which Archbp. Tillotson alleged in the quotation with which Mr. Hume opens his effay, it is certainly not that experience, nor that contrariety, which Mr. Hume himself intended to object. And, short of this, I know no intelligible fignification which can be affixed to the term 66 contrary to experience," but one, viz. that of not having ourselves experienced any thing similar to the thing related, or fuch things not being generally experienced by others. I fay not "generally," for to ftate, concerning the fact in queftion, that no fuch thing was ever experienced, or that univerfal experience is against it, is to affume the fubject of the controverly.

Now the improbability which arifes from the want (for this properly is a want, not a contradiction) of experience, is only equal to the probability there is, that if the thing were true, we fhould experience things fimilar to it, or that fuch things would be generally experienced. Suppose it then to be true that miracles were wrought upon the first promulgation of Chriftianity, when nothing but miracles could decide its authority, is it certain that fuch miracles would be repeated fo often, and in fo many places, as to become objects of general experience? Is it a

probability approaching to certainty? Is it a probability of any great ftrength or force? Is it fuch as no evidence can encounter? and yet this probability is the exact converfe, and therefore the exact measure of the improbability which arifes from the want of experience, and which Mr. Hume represents as invincible by human teftimony.

It is not like alleging a new law of nature, or a new experiment in natural philofophy, because, when thefe are related, it is expected that, under the fame circumstances, the fame effect will follow univerfally; and in proportion as this expectation is juftly entertained, the want of a correfponding experi ence negatives the hiftory. But to expect concerning a miracle that it fhould fucceed upon repetition, is to expect that which would make it ceafe 'to be a miracle, which is contrary to its nature as fuch, and would totally deftroy the use and purpose for which it was wrought.

The force of experience as an objection to miracles is founded in the prefumption, either that the courfe of nature is invariable, or that, if it be ever varied, variations will be frequent and general. Has the neceffity of this alternative been demonftrated? Permit us to call the courfe of nature the agency of an intelligent being, and is there any good reafon for judging this state of the cafe to be probable? Ought we not rather to expect, that fuch a being, upon occafions of peculiar importance, may interrupt the order which he had appointed, yet, that fuch occafions should return feldom; that thefe interruptions confequently fhould be confined to the experience of a few; that the want of it, therefore, in many, fhould be matter neither of furprise nor objection?

But as a continuation of the argument from experience it is faid, that, when we advance accounts of miracles, we affign effects without caufes, or we attribute effects to caufes inadequate to the purpofe, or to caufes of the operation of which we have no experience. Of what caufes, we may afk, and of what effects does the objection fpeak? If it be answered that, when we afcribe the cure of the palfy to a touch, of blindnefs to the anointing of the eyes with clay, or the raifing of the dead to a word, we lay ourfelves open to this imputation, we reply that we afcribe no fuch effects to fuch caufes. We perceive no virtue or energy in these things more than in other hings of the fame kind. They are merely figns to connect he miracle with its end. The effect we afcribe fimply to the

volition of the Deity; of whofe existence and power, not to fay of whose presence and agency, we have previous and independent proof. We have therefore all we feek for in the works of rational agents, a fufficient power and an adequate motive. In a word, once believe that there is a God, and miracles are not incredible.

Mr. Hume states the cafe of miracles to be a contest of oppofite improbabilities; that is to fay, a question whether it be more improbable that the miracle fhould be true, or the testimony false; and this I think a fair account of the controversy. But herein I remark a want of argumentative justice, that, in defcribing the improbability of miracles, he fuppreffes all those circumstances of extenuation which refult from our knowledge of the existence, power and difpofition of the Deity, his concern in the creation, the end answered by the miracle, the importance of that end, and its fubferviency to the plan pursued in the works of nature. As Mr. Hume has reprefented the question, miracles are alike incredible to him who is previously affured of the conftant agency of a Divine Being, and to him who believes that no fuch being exifts in the universe. They are equally incredible, whether related to have been wrought upon occafions the moft deferving, and for purposes the most beneficial, or for no affignable end whatever, or for an end confeffedly trifling or pernicious. This furely cannot be a correct statement. In adjusting alfo the other fide of the balance, the strength and weight of teftimony, this author has provided an answer to every poffible accumulation of historical proof, by telling us, that we are not obliged to explain how the story or the evidence arofe. Now I think we are obliged; not, perhaps, to fhew by pofitive accounts how it did, but by a probable hypothefis how it might fo happen. The existence of the teftimony is a phenomenon. The truth of the fact folves the phenomenon. If we reject this folution, we ought to have fome other to rest in; and none even by our adverfaries can be admitted, which is not confiftent with the principles that regulate human affairs and human conduct at prefent, or which makes men then to have been a different kind of beings from what they

are now.

But the fhort confideration which, independently of every other, convinces me that there is no folid foundation in Mr. Hume's conclufion, is the following: When a theorem is propofed to a mathematician, the first thing he does with it is to

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