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ESSAY XV.

THE NATURE OF THE DIVINE OMNIPOTENCE.

AMONGST the latent sources of infidelity in the human mind, there is none, I believe, of more extensive influence, than that which arises from a false notion of the Divine Omnipotence. Taking the term in a vague and unlimited sense, many persons are altogether at a loss to account for the phenomena which on all sides meet our view.

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Why," they say, "should a Being, possessed of power sufficient to spread perfect and unmingled happiness through every department of his creation, have failed to do so? Would any good man refuse to render all around him happy, if he could? Could any impeachment of our character be more just or more severe, than that we had it in our power, without pains or cost, to relieve distress, or cheer the hearts of others, and that we withheld the boon, for no other reason than that it was our will to do so? And how can Omnipotence, if by that is meant power unqualified and unbounded, stand clear of such a charge? The Being in whom that attribute re

sides, could, the very terms imply, raise every sentient nature to a happiness unlimited as his own. Does he do so? No. Where then is his benevolence? Or how is it apparent that the Judge of all the earth does right?" "

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Before this sweeping error all that can be urged to vindicate the ways of God falls prostrate. Under its influence the mind naturally questions every argument which it is possible to offer. Do you point to the rain that descends, and to the fruitful seasons that fill our hearts with food and gladness? These are no calls of gratitude to him whose gloomy doubts reply: "Why is the rain so often withheld when it is wanting? And why does not overflowing plenty more than satisfy the utmost wishes of every living creature?" In the same manner, every proof you urge of the divine benevolence is evaded or resisted by this notion of unlimited omnipotence. In each instance in which the appeal is made to God's most amiable attributes, his mercy, his pity, his readiness to forgive, all is poisoned by the suggestion: "Why are there sins to be forgiven, sufferings to be pitied, or evils to be delivered from? Why, in a word, did a Being who was able to decree universal happiness and unmingled good fail to exercise that

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high prerogative?

And why have the floodgates of misery been let loose upon the world?"

It is vain to meet such reasonings by saying, "Let us mind our own duties, and not presumptuously attempt to sound these depths.” If, indeed, our duties were only to provide for the wants of animal life, then all such considerations would be folly. But if, on the contrary, our prime duty be to love the Lord our God with all our heart, and if we cannot love merely because we are so commanded, but must have a clear perception of the amiableness of an object before it is in our power to love it; can it be unimportant to ascertain whether any character, plainly opposite to all our notions of goodness and benevolence, can be warrantably attributed to God? Let us, I say, with ever so prostrate a humility, abase ourselves before God's footstool, and let us there be willing to confess that our most cherished conceptions of true amiableness are erroneous, and that it may be right to withhold blessings, and to render those in our power less happy than we could make them, merely because it is our pleasure to do so: still, after all this, it will not be possible for us to keep the first and great commandment, unless we have tasted and seen that the Lord is good.

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point, then, before us is one, I conceive, which it is our duty not to waive, but to search into, and examine.

It may be urged, as it respects the case of man particularly, that all his trials are sent for his improvement, and his benefit; that all things work together for good to them that love God; that present sorrows will issue in greater joy hereafter; and that our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us, a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory. This is all most true, and affords the most abundant proof that God does not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men. But such statements do not meet the difficulty proposed. It is answered at once, "What benefits can painful discipline produce, or what degrees of happiness can the path of suffering lead to, which could not be as amply secured, without these pains and sufferings, by an unlimited and absolute omnipotence?"

The truth is, that the only rational conclusion which we can arrive at in the matter, is that, in the nature of things, no such attribute can exist. And until the cloud, which its supposed existence throws on every procedure of the Divine Providence, is dissipated, we must either not think at all, or think amiss, on that subject in comparison

of which all other subjects are unimportant, namely, the character of God.

I know that many may, at first sight, be startled at the assertion, that the power of God can, in any sense, be limited. In this, as in various instances, they will object to the same truth as a distinct proposition, which they will freely assume, and take for granted in all their reasonings. These very persons will speak of Providence as devising means, and moving by gradual advances to the accomplishment of an end. If asked, "Why not decree the end, without the means?" They will answer, "Because it could not be attained, at least so well, without them." If, then, the term could not be at all admitted (and how freely is this term applied to God in Scripture), no such thing as unrestricted omnipotence exists. It is not that there is any limit in God. God forbid that I should dare to say so. It is that power is in its own nature limited. It can act only on possibilities. And here I would observe, that this principle, instead of lowering our conceptions of the Divine attributes, tends to exhibit them, nay, is absolutely necessary if we would see them, in their due proportions. Even power itself is but a vague and unintelligible notion, unless displayed to us as triumphing over difficulties, and rising superior to obstacles. A

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