This, however, does not forbid premeditation, on what we intend to speak. With respect to the matter we cannot be too accurate in our preparation; but with regard to words and expressions it is very possible so far to overdo, as to render our speech stiff and precise. Short notes of the substance of the discourse are not only allowable, but of considerable service, to those especially, who are beginning to speak in public. They will teach them a degree of accuracy, which, if they speak frequently, they are in danger of losing. They will accustom them to distinct arrangement, without which, eloquence, however great, cannot produce entire conviction.

Popular assemblies give scope for the most animat ed manner of public speaking. Passion is easily excit ed in a great assembly, where the movements are com municated by mutual sympathy between the orator and the audience. That ardour of speech, that vehe mence and glow of sentiment, which proceed from a mind animated and inspired by some great and public object, form the peculiar character of popular eloquence in its highest degree of perfection.

The warmth, however, which we express, must be always suited to the subject; since it would be ridiculous to introduce great vehemence into a subject of small importance, or which by its nature requires to be treated with calmness. We must also be careful not to counterfeit warmth without feeling it. The best

P

rule is, to follow nature; and never to attempt a strain of eloquence which is not prompted by our own genius. A speaker may acquire reputation and influence by a calm, argumentative manner. To reach the pathetic and sublime of oratory requires those strong sensibilities of mind, and that high power of expression, which are given to few.

t

Even when vehemence is justified by the subject and prompted by genius; when warmth is felt, not feigned; we must be cautious, lest impetuosity transport us too far. If the speaker lose command of himself, he will soon lose command of his audience. He must begin with moderation, and study to warm his hearers gradually and equally with himself. For, if their passions be not in unison with his, the discord will soon be felt. Respect for his audience should always lay a decent restraint upon his warmth, and prevent it from carrying him beyond proper limits. When a speaker is so far master of himself, as to preserve close attention to argument, and even to some degree of accurate expression; this self-command, this effort of reason in the midst of passion, contributes in the highest degree both to please and to persuade. The advantages of passion are afforded for the purposes of persuasion without that confusion and disorder which are its usual attendants.

In the most animated strain of popular speaking we must always regard what the public ear will receive

without disgust. Without attention, to this, imitation of ancient orators might betray a speaker into a boldness of manner, with which the coolness of modern taste would be displeased. It is also necessary to attend with care to the decorums of time, place and character. No ardour of eloquence can atone for neglect of these. No one should attempt to speak in public without forming to himself a just and strict idea of what is suitable to his age and character; what is suitable to the subject, the hearers, the place, and the occasion, On this idea he should adjust the whole strain and manner of his speaking.

What degree of conciseness or diffuseness is suited to popular eloquence, it is not easy to determine with precision. A defuse manner is generally considered as most proper. There is danger, however, of erring in this respect; by too diffuse a style public speakers often lose more in point of strength, than they gain by fulness of illustration. Excessive conciseness indeed must be avoided. We must explain and inculcate; but confine ourselves within certain limits. We should never forget that, however we may be pleased with hearing ourselves speak, every audience may be tired; and the moment they grow weary, our eloquence becomes useless. It is better, in general, to say too little, than too much; to place our thought in one strong point of view, and rest it there, than by showing it in every light, and pouring forth a profusion of words upon it,

to exhaust the attention of our hearers, and leave them languid and fatigued.

ELOQUENCE OF THE BAR.

THE ends of speaking at the bar and in popular assemblies are commonly different. In the latter the orator aims principally to persuade; to determine his hearers to some choice or conduct, as good, fit, or useful. He, therefore, applies himself to every princi ple of action in our nature; to the passions and to the heart, as well as to the understanding. bar, conviction is the principal object. speaker's duty is not to persuade the judges to what is good or useful, but to exhibit what is just and true; and consequently his eloquence is chiefly addressed to the understanding.

But at the There the

At the bar speakers address themselves to one, or to a few judges, who are generally persons of age gravity, and dignity of character. There those advantages which a mixed and numerous assembly affords for employing all the arts of speech, are not enjoy. ed. Passion does not rise so easily. The speaker is heard with more coolness; he is watched with more severity; and would expose himself to ridicule by attempting that high and vehement tone, which is suited only to a multitude. Beside at the bar, the field of

speaking is confined within law and statute. Imagination is fettered. The advocate has always before him the line, the square, and the compass. These it is his chief business to be constantly applying to the subjects under debate.

Hence the eloquence of the bar is of a much more limited, more sober, and chastised kind, than that of popular assemblies; and consequently the judicial orations of the ancients must not be considered as exact models of that kind of speaking which is adapted to the present state of the bar. With them strict law was much less an object of attention, than it is - with us. In the days of Demosthenes and Cicero the municipal statutes were few, simple and general; and the decision of causes was left in a great measure to the equity and common sense of the judges. Eloquence, rather than jurisprudence, was the study of pleaders. Cicero says that three months' study would make a complete civilian; nay, it was thought that a man might be a good pleader without any previous study. Among the Romans there was a set of men, called Pragmatici, whose office it was to supply the orator with all the law knowledge his cause required; which he disposed in that popular form, and decorated with those colours of eloquence which were most fitted for influ encing the judges.

It may also be observed, that the civil and criminal judges in Greece and Rome were more numerous than