It also engageth the blessed saints in glory, the spirits of just men perfected,' 'the church of the first-born,' to bear dearest affection to us, to further our prosperity with their good wishes and earnest prayers, mightily prevalent with God.

It rendereth all sorts of men our friends. To good men it uniteth us in holy communion; the communion of brotherly charity and hearty good will, attended with all the good offices they are able to perform to other men it reconcileth and endeareth us; for that innocent and inoffensive, courteous and benign, charitable and beneficent demeanor, (such as piety doth require and produce,) are apt to conciliate respect and affection from the worst men. For, vincit malos pertinax bonitas ;* men hardly can persist enemies to him whom they perceive to be their friend : and such the pious man in disposition of mind, and in effect when occasion serveth, is toward all men ;+ being sensible of his obligation to love all men, and, as he hath opportunity, to do good to all men.' It assureth and more strictly endeareth our friends to us. For as it maketh us hearty, faithful, constant friends to others; so it reciprocally tieth others to us in the like sincerity and fastness of good-will.

It reconcileth enemies. For when a man's ways do please the Lord, he maketh his enemies to be at peace with him.' It hath a natural efficacy to that purpose, and divine blessing promoteth it.

By it all conversation becometh tolerable, grateful, and useful. For a pious man is not easily disturbed with any crossness or perverseness, any infirmity or impertinency of those he converseth with: he can bear the weaknesses and the failings of his company; he can by wholesome reflexions on all occurrences advantage and please himself.§

In fine, piety rendereth a man a true friend and a good com

* Sen. de Benef. vii. 21.

+ Qui sibi amicus est, scito hunc amicum omnibus esse.-Sen. Ep. 6.

† Οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις.Arist. Eth. viii. 4.

§ Συνδιάγειν τε οὗτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ.(Aristot. Eth. ix. 4.) τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνῆμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί.

panion to himself; satisfied in himself, able to converse freely and pleasantly with his own thoughts.* It is for the want of pious inclinations and dispositions, that solitude (a thing which sometimes cannot be avoided, which often should be embraced) is to most men so irksome and tedious, that men do carefully shun themselves, and fly from their own thoughts; that they decline all converse with their own souls, and hardly dare look on their own hearts and consciences: whence they become aliens from home, wholly unacquainted with themselves, most ignorant of their own nearest concernments, no faithful friends or pleasant companions to themselves; so for refuge and ease they unseasonably run into idle or lewd conversation, where they disorder and defile themselves. But the pious man is, like Scipio, never less alone than when alone :'t his solitude and retirement is not only tolerable, but commonly the most grateful and fruitful part of his life; he can ever with much pleasure and more advantage converse with himself; digesting and marshalling his thoughts, his affections, his purposes into good order; searching and discussing his heart, reflecting on his past ways, enforcing his former good resolutions, and framing new ones; inquiring after edifying truths; stretching his meditations toward the best and sublimest objects, raising his hopes and warming his affections towards spiritual and heavenly things; asking himself pertinent questions, and resolving incident doubts concerning his practice: in fine, conversing with his best friend in devotion; with admiration and love contemplating the divine perfections displayed in the works of nature, of providence, of grace; praising God for his excellent benefits and mercies; confessing his defects and offences; deprecating wrath and imploring pardon, with grace and ability to amend; praying

Quæris quid profecerim ? amicus esse mihi cœpi.-Sen. Ep. 6.

+ Nemo est, cui non satius sit cum quolibet esse, quam secum.Sen. Ep. 25.

Ἔνιοι τὸν ἴδιον βίον, ὡς ἀτερπέστατον θέαμα, προσιδεῖν οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν, &c.-Plut. περὶ Πολυπρ. p. 916.

Ζητοῦσιν οἱ μοχθηροί μεθ' ὧν συνημερεύσουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν.—Arist. ix. 4.

↑ Nunquam minus solus, quam cum solus.

for the supply of all his wants. All which performances yield both unconceivable benefit and unexpressible comfort. So that solitude (that which is to common nature so offensive, to corrupt nature so abominable) is to the pious man extremely commodious and comfortable; which is a great advantage peculiar to piety, and the last which I shall mention.

So many, and many more than I can express, vastly great and precious advantages do accrue from piety; so that well may we conclude with St. Paul, that godliness is profitable for all things.'

It remaineth that, if we be wise, we should, if we yet have it not ingrafted in us, labor to acquire it; if we have it, that we should endeavor to improve it, by constant exercise, to the praise of God, the good of our neighbor, and our own comfort. Which that we may effectually perform, Almighty God in mercy vouchsafe, by his grace, through Jesus Christ our Lord; to whom for ever be all glory and praise. Amen.

Acquiescit sibi, cogitationibus suis traditus.-Sen. Ep. 9. Sapiens nunquam solus esse potest, habet secum omnes qui sunt, quique unquam fuerunt boni; et animum liberum quocunque vult transfert: quod corpore non potest, cogitatione complectitur; et si hominum inops fuerit, loquitur cum Deo. Nunquam minus solus erit, quam cum solus fuerit.-Hier, adv. Jovin. i. 28.

BAR.

VOL. I.

D

SUMMARY OF SERMON IV.

1 SAMUEL, CHAP. II.-VERSE 30.

THE words of the text were uttered immediately by God himself, and therefore may well command our attention. They plainly imply two things; a duty required of us, to honor God; and a reward proferred to us on the performance of that duty, being honored by God. The method of this discourse is, first, to estimate the reward, then to explain the duty; afterwards to show briefly why in reason the duty is injoined; how in effect the reward is conferred.

I. The reward may be considered either absolutely, as to what it is in itself; or relatively, as to its rise, and whence it

comes.

The appetite

1. For itself, it is honor; a thing, if valued according to the rate it commonly bears, of highest price among all the objects of human desire, the chief reward unto which the greatest and best actions pretend this point enlarged on reasons given why honor is in such request and of such force. for it shown to be rooted in our very nature: examples of this ambition in eminent men. A moderate regard for honor shown even to be commendable, as an instance of good-will towards others, and an argument of humility as it concerns ourselves. The authority also of the more cool and candid sort of philosophers alleged for its commendation, inasmuch as they have ranked honor among the principal of things desirable, and adorned it with fairest eulogies. But beyond all this, the holy Scripture, that most certain standard by which we may examine and determine the true worth of things, does not teach us to

slight honor, but rather in its fit order and just measure to love and prize it: this is not only shown to be the case in temporal affairs, but the blessed state hereafter is represented and recommended to us as a state of honor and glory; to be ambitious of which is the character of a good man: Rom. ii. 6. 7. Such is the precious reward proposed to us in itself: to obtain this reward our text prescribes to us the certain and the only way.

2. Such a benefit is here tendered to us (which yet more highly enhances its worth) by God himself: I, saith he, will honor: he who is the prime author of all good, is in especial manner the sovereign dispenser of honor. The king, we say, is the fountain of honor. What any king, as the representative and delegate of God, is in his particular kingdom, that is the Almighty absolutely and independently in all the world; the excellence and surety of his grants enlarged on. Consideration of what it is which is here required of us, or wherein this honoring of God consists, that we may thereby discern when we perform this duty, and when we are deficient therein.

II. There are several ways of honoring God, or several parts and degrees of this duty; all of which may be referred to two sorts, according to a distinction suggested by St. Paul, 1 Cor. vi. 20. one of them being, as it were, the form and soul, the other the matter and body of the duty.

1. The soul of that honor which is required of us towards God, is the internal esteem and reverence which we should bear in our hearts for him; signifying that we have impressed on our minds such conceptions about him as are suitable to the perfection of his nature, to the eminency of his state, to the just qua lity of his works and actions; that we apprehend him to be, what he really is, in his nature superlatively good, wise, powerful, and just this point enlarged on.

2. The bodily part consists in outward expressions and performances, whereby we declare our esteem and reverence of God, and produce or promote the like in others. This viewed first in