admitted, would this statement here used as an Argument, serve to account for and explain the truth, or not?" It will then be readily referred to the former or to the latter class, according as the answer is in the affirmative or the negative; as, e. g. if a murder were imputed to any one on the grounds of his

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having a hatred to the deceased, and an interest in his death," the Argument would belong to the former class; because, supposing his guilt to be admitted, and an inquiry to be made how he came to commit the murder, the circumstances just mentioned would serve to account for it; but not so, with respect to such an Argument as his "having blood on his clothes" which would therefore be referred to the other class.

And here let it be observed, once for all, that when I speak of arguing from Cause to Effect, it is not intended to maintain the real and proper efficacy of what are called Physical Causes to produce their respective Effects, nor to enter into any discussion of the controversies which have been raised on that point; which would be foreign from the present purpose. The word "Cause," therefore, is to be understood as employed in the popular sense; as well as the phrase of "accounting for" any fact.

E

Argument from cause

As far, then, as any Cause, popularly speakto effect. ing, has a tendency to produce a certain Effect, so far its existence is an Argument for that of the Effect. If the Cause be fully sufficient, and no impediments intervene, the Effect in question follows certainly; and the nearer we approach to this, the stronger the Argument.

lity.

This is the kind of Argument which produces (when short of absolute certainty) that species of the Probable which is usually called Plausibi- the Plausible. On this subject Dr. Campbell has some valuable remarks in his Philosophy of Rhetoric, (book i. § 5, ch. vii.) though he has been led into a good deal of perplexity, partly by not having logically analysed the two species of probabilities he is treating of, and partly by departing, unnecessarily, from the ordinary use of terms, in treating of the Plausible as something distinct from the Probable, instead of regarding it as a species of Probability.*

* I do not mean, however, that every thing to which the term "plausible" would apply would be in strict propriety called "probable;" as e. g. if we had fully ascertained some story that had been told us to be an imposition, we might still say, it was a "plausible" tale; though, subsequent to the detection, the word "probable" would not be so properly applied. But certainly common usage warrants the use of "probable” in many cases, on the ground of this plausibility alone; viz. the adequacy of some cause, known, or likely to exist, to produce the effect in question.

This is the chief kind of Probability which poets, or other writers of fiction, aim at; and in such works it is often designated by the term "natural."* Writers of this class, as they aim not at producing belief, are allowed to take their "Causes" for granted, (i. e. to assume any hypothesis they please,) provided they make the Effects follow naturally; representing, that is, the personages of the fiction as acting, and the events as resulting, in the same manner as might have been expected, supposing the assumed circumstances to have been real. And hence, the great Father of Criticism establishes his paradoxical maxim, that impossibilities which appear probable, are to be preferred to possibilities which appear improbable. For, as he justly observes, the impossibility of the hypothesis, as e. g. in Homer, the familiar intercourse of gods with mortals, is no bar to the kind of Probability (i. e. Verisimilitude) required, if those mortals

* It is also important for them, though not so essential, to keep clear of the improbable air produced by the introduction of events, which, though not unnatural, have a great preponderance of chances against them. The distinction between these two kinds of faults is pointed out in a passage in the Quarterly Review, for which see Appendix, [B.]

For some remarks on this point, see the preface to a late (purified) edition of the "Tales of the Genii."

د

are represented as acting in the manner men naturally would have done under those cir

cumstances.

The Probability, then, which the writer of fiction aims at, has, for the reason just mentioned, no tendency to produce a particular, but only a general, belief; i. e. not that these particular events actually took place, but that such are likely, generally, to take place under such circumstances:* this kind of belief (unconsciously entertained) being necessary, and all that is necessary, to produce that sympathetic feeling which is the writer's object. In Argumentative Compositions, however, as the object of course is to produce conviction as to the particular point in question, the Causes from which our Arguments are drawn must be such as are either admitted, or may be proved, to be actually existing, or likely to exist.

On the appropriate use of this kind of Argument, (which is probably the eixos of Aristotle, though unfortunately he has not furnished any example of it,) some Rules will be laid down ment of the hereafter; my object at present having been merely to ascertain the nature of it. And here it may be worth while to remark, that

Employ

phrase 4

priori.

On which ground Aristotle contends that the end of Fiction is more Philosophical than that of History, since it aims at general, instead of particular, Truth.

though I have applied to this mode of Reasoning the title of "a priori," it is not meant to be maintained that all such arguments as have been by other writers so designated correspond precisely with what has been just described.* The phrase, "a priori" a priori" Argument, is not indeed employed by all in the same sense; it would, however, generally be understood to extend to any argument drawn from an antecedent or forerunner, whether a Cause or not; e. g. "the mercury sinks, therefore it will

Some students, accordingly, partly with a view to keep clear of any ambiguity that might hence arise, and partly for the sake of brevity, have found it useful to adopt, in drawing up an outline or analysis of any composition, certain arbitrary symbols, to denote, respectively, each class of Arguments and of Propositions; viz. A, for the former of the two classes of Arguments just described, (to denote "A priori," or "Antecedent," probability,) and B, for the latter, which, as consisting of several different kinds, may be denominated "the Body of evidence." Again, they designate the proposition, which accounts for the principal and original assertion, by a small "a," or Greek a, to denote its identity in substance with the Argument bearing the symbol "A," though employed for a different purpose; viz. not to establish a fact that is doubtful, but to account for one that is admitted. The proposition, again, which results as a Consequence or Corollary from the principal one, they designate by the symbol C. There seems to be the same convenience in the use of these symbols as Logicians have found in the employment of A, E, I, O, to represent the four kinds of Propositions according to quantity and quality.