Conviction and In

It is evident, therefore, that the first step to be taken by him, is to lay down distinctly in his own mind the Proposition or propositions to be proved. It might indeed at first sight appear superfluous even to mention so obvious a rule; but experience shews that it is by no means uncommon for a young or ill-instructed writer to content himself with such a vague and indistinct view of the point he is to aim at, that the whole train of his reasoning is in consequence affected with a corresponding perplexity, obscurity, and looseness. It may be worth while therefore to give some hints for the conduct of this preliminary process,the choice of propositions. Not, of course, that I am supposing the author to be in doubt what opinion he shall adopt: the process of Investigation* (which does not fall within the province of Rhetoric) being supposed to be concluded; but still there will often be room for deliberation as to the form in which an opinion shall be stated, and, when several propositions are to be maintained, in what order they shall be placed.

On this head therefore I shall proceed to struction. propose some rules; after having premised (in order to anticipate some objections or doubts which might arise) one remark relative to the * Logic, book iv. chap. 3. § 2.

object to be effected. This is, of course, what may be called, in the widest sense of the word, Conviction; but under that term are comprehended, first, what is strictly called Instruction; and, secondly, Conviction in the narrower sense; i. e. the Conviction of those who are either of a contrary opinion to the one maintained, or who are in doubt whether to admit or deny it. By Instruction, on the other hand, is commonly meant the conviction of those who have neither formed an opinion on the subject, nor are deliberating whether to adopt or reject the proposition in question, but are merely desirous of ascertaining what is the truth in respect of the case before them. The former are supposed to have before their minds the terms of the proposition maintained, and are called upon to consider whether that particular proposition be true or false; the latter are not supposed to know the terms of the conclusion, but to be inquiring what proposition is to be received as true. The former may be described, in logical language, as doubting respecting the Copula; the latter, respecting the Predicate. It is evident that the speaker or writer is, relatively to these last, (though not to himself,) conducting a process of Investigation; as is plain from what has been said of that subject, in the treatise on LOGIC.

The distinction between these two objects gives rise in some points to corresponding differences in the mode of procedure, which will be noticed hereafter; these differences however are not sufficient to require that Rhetoric should on that account be divided into two distinct branches; since, generally speaking, though not universally, the same rules will be serviceable for attaining each of these objects.

$ 2.

The first step is, as I have observed, to lay down (in the author's mind) the proposition or propositions to be maintained, clearly, and in a suitable form.

He who strictly observes this rule, and who is thus brought to view steadily the point he is aiming at, will be kept clear, in a great degree, of some common faults of young writers; viz. entering on too wide a field of discussion, and introducing many propositions not sufficiently connected; an error which destroys the unity One subject of the composition. This last error those are imply unity apt to fall into, who place before themselves a

does not

of compo

sition.

Term instead of a Proposition; and imagine that because they are treating of one thing, they are discussing one question. In an Ethical work, for instance, one may be treating of

virtue, while discussing all or any of these questions; "Wherein virtue consists ?" "Whence our notions of it arise ?" "Whence it derives its obligation?" &c.; but if these questions were confusedly blended together, or if all of them were treated of, within a short compass, the most just remarks and forcible arguments would lose their interest and their utility, in so perplexed a composition.

Nearly akin to this fault is the other just mentioned, that of entering on too wide a field for the length of the work; by which means the writer is confined to barren and uninteresting generalities; as e. g. general exhortations to virtue (conveyed, of course, in very general terms) in the space of a discourse only of sufficient length to give a characteristic description of some one branch of duty, or of some one particular motive to the practice of it. Unpractised composers are apt to fancy Copious that they shall have the greater abundance of matter, the wider extent of subject they com- by a reprehend; but experience shews that the view. reverse is the fact: the more general and extensive view will often suggest nothing to the mind but vague and trite remarks; when, upon narrowing the field of discussion, many interesting questions of detail present themselves. Now a writer who is accustomed to

ness of

matter furnished a

stricted

state to himself precisely, in the first instance, the conclusions to which he is tending, will be the less likely to content himself with such as consist of very general statements; and will often be led, even where an extensive view is at first proposed, to distribute it into several branches, and, waiving the discussion of the rest, to limit himself to the full development of one or two; and thus applying, as it were, a microscope to a small space, will present to the view much that a wider survey would not have exhibited.

Inquiry after pro

§. 3.

It may be useful for one who is about thus positions. to lay down his propositions, to ask himself these three questions: first, What is the fact? secondly, Why* (i. e. from what Cause) is it so? or, in other words, how is it accounted for? and thirdly, What Consequence results from it?

The last two of these questions, though they will not in every case suggest such answers as are strictly to be called the Cause and the Consequence of the principal truth to be maintained, may, at least, often furnish such propositions as bear a somewhat similar relation to it.

* See Logic. Appendix. Article "WHY."