the Orator is to speak, constitutes no part of the art of Rhetoric, though it be essential to its successful employment; and that though virtue, and the good reputation it procures, add materially to the Speaker's influence, they are no more to be, for that reason, considered as belonging to the Orator, as such, than wealth, rank, or a good person, which manifestly have a tendency to produce the same effect.

Extremes in

the limita

In the present day however, the province of Rhetoric, in the widest acceptation that would be reckoned admissible, comprehends all "Composition in Prose; in the narrowest sense, it would be limited to "Persuasive Speaking."

tion and extension of

the province

of Rhetoric.

present Trea

I propose in the present work to adopt a middle course between these two extreme points; Object of the and to treat of Argumentative Composition, tise. generally, and exclusively; considering Rhetoric (in conformity with the very just and philosophical view of Aristotle) as an off-shoot from Logic.

I remarked in treating of that Science, that Reasoning may be considered as applicable to two purposes, which I ventured to designate respectively by the terms "Inferring," and "Proving;" i. e. the ascertainment of the truth by investigation, and the estab lishment of it to the satisfaction of another and I there remarked, that Bacon, in his Organon, has laid down rules for the conduct of the former of these processes, and that the latter belongs to the province of Rhetoric and it was added, that Philosophy to infer is to be regarded as the proper office compared. of the Philosopher, or the Judge ;-to prove, of

and Rhetoric

the Advocate. It is not however to be understood

that Philosophical works are to be excluded from the class to which Rhetorical rules are applicable; for the Philosopher who undertakes, by writing or speaking, to convey his notions to others, assumes, for the time being, the character of Advocate of the doctrines he maintains. The process of investigation must be supposed completed, and certain conclusions arrived at by that process, before he begins to impart his ideas to others in a treatise or lecture; the object of which must of course be to prove the justness of those conclusions. And in doing this, he will not always find it expedient to adhere to the same course of reasoning by which his own discoveries were originally made; other arguments may occur to him afterwards, more clear, or more concise, or better adapted to the understanding of those he addresses. In explaining therefore, and establishing the truth, he may often have occasion for rules of a different kind from those employed in its discovery. Accordingly, when I remarked, in the work above alluded to, that it is a common fault, for those engaged in Philosophical and Theological inquiries, to forget their own peculiar office, and assume that of the Advocate, improperly, this caution is to be understood as applicable to the process of forming their own opinions; not, as excluding them from advocating by all fair arguments, the conclusions at which they have arrived by candid investigation. But if this candid investigation do not take place in the first instance, no pains that they may bestow in searching for arguments, will have any tendency to ensure their attainment of truth. If a man

begins (as is too plainly a frequent mode of proceeding) by hastily adopting, or strongly leaning to some opinion, which suits his inclination, or which is sanctioned by some authority that he blindly venerates, and then studies with the utmost diligence, not as an Investigator of Truth, but as an Advocate labouring to prove his point, his talents and his researches, whatever effect they may produce in making converts to his notions, will avail nothing in enlightening his own judgment, and securing him from error.

Composition however, of the Argumentative kind, may be considered (as has been above stated) as coming under the province of Rhetoric. And this view of the subject is the less open to objection, inasmuch as it is not likely to lead to discussions that can be deemed superfluous, even by those who may choose to consider Rhetoric in the most restricted sense, as relating only to "Persuasive Speaking; " since it is evident that Argument must be, in most cases at least, the basis of Persuasion.

present Trea

I propose then to treat, first and principally, of the Discovery of Arguments, and of their Plan of the Arrangement; secondly, to lay down some tise. Rules respecting the excitement and management of the Passions, with a view to the attainment of any object proposed, - principally, Persuasion, in the strict sense, i. e. the influencing of the Will; thirdly, to offer some remarks on Style; and fourthly, to treat of Elocution.

§ 2.

History of

It may be expected that, before I proceed to treat of the Art in question, I should present the Rhetoric. reader with a sketch of its history. Little however is required to be said on this head, because the present is not one of those branches of study in which we can trace with interest a progressive improvement from age to age. It is one, on the contrary, to which more attention appears to have been paid, and in which greater proficiency is supposed to have been made, in the earliest days of Science and Literature, than at any

Aristotle.

subsequent period. Among the ancients, Aristotle, the earliest whose works are extant, may safely be pronounced to be also the best, of the systematic writers on Rhetoric. Cicero is hardly Cicero. to be reckoned among the number; for he delighted so much more in the practice than in the theory of his art, that he is perpetually drawn off from the rigid Philosophical analysis of its principles, into discursive declamations, always eloquent indeed, and often highly interesting, but adverse to regularity of system, and frequently as unsatisfactory to the practical student as to the Philosopher. He abounds indeed with excellent practical remarks, though the best of them are scattered up and down his works with much irregularity; but his precepts, though of great weight, as being the result of experience, are not often traced up by him to first principles; and we are frequently left to guess, not only on what basis his rules are grounded, but in what cases they are applicable. Of this latter defect a re

markable instance will be hereafter cited.

Quinctilian is indeed a systematic writer; but cannot be considered as having much extended Quinctilian. the Philosophical views of his predecessors in

this department. He possessed much good sense, but this was tinctured with pedantry; — with that alagovela as Aristotle calls it, which extends to an extravagant degree the province of the Art which he professes. A great part of his work indeed is a Treatise on education generally; in the conduct of which he was no mean proficient; for such was the importance attached to public speaking, even long after the downfall of the Republic had cut off the Orator from the hopes of attaining, through the means of this qualification, the highest political importance, that he who was nominally a Professor of Rhetoric, had in fact the most important branches of instruction intrusted to his care.

Many valuable maxims however are to be found in this author; but he wanted the profundity of thought and power of analysis which Aristotle possessed.

The writers on Rhetoric among the ancients whose works are lost, seem to have been numerous; but most of them appear to have confined themselves to a very narrow view of the subject; and to have been occupied, as Aristotle complains, with the minor details of style and arrangement, and with the sophistical tricks and petty artifices of the Pleader, instead of giving a masterly and comprehensive sketch of the essentials.

Among the moderns, few writers of ability have turned their thoughts to the subject; and but little has been added, either in respect of matter, or of system, to what the ancients have left us. It were most unjust however to leave unnoticed Dr.

Campbell.

Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric: a work which