Whoever will take the trouble, of carefully examining Dr. Milner's most candid statements, shall find, that admitting the previous parts of his system (so highly praised by Mr. Gilbert) it is impossible for an ingenuous mind, to avoid the revolting conclusion, here so justly denounced. This inevitable tendency to so ominous a result, has been always perceived, and urged by their opponents, against the Doctrines of Necessity and Absolute predestination.

Those whose minds are wedded to a system, will ever be more ready, to close their eyes against its consequences, than to reform its defects. But many able, candid, and pious men, have yielded an honest and manly conviction, to the force of these remonstrances.2

It was evidently a perception of the impossibility of escaping, in the regular course of metaphysical reasoning, from the legitimacy of Dr. Milner's conclusion, that drove Mr.Gilbert, to break its chains; and to take refuge from its awful and frightful consequences, in the foregoing bold and beautiful appeal, to the common sense and conscience of mankind.

To me his argument is quite satisfactory. But I must be allowed to suggest, that those Calvinists who adopt it, would do well to reflect, how, after such an unqualified protest against the validity of mere speculation, they can again consistently resort to its subtileties, to

2 See short notices of some of these converts from Calvinism, in the Appendix to Jackson's life of John Goodwin, (London 1822.)

patch up a delusive support, for those remaining dogmas, which,—according to the candid admissions of Dr. Milner,-lead inevitably to such portentous results. Dogmas, which, it could be easily shown, are themeslves equally open to similar objections, equally impotent against an appeal to the primary laws of our "constitution which to us us are the ultimate tests of “truth and falsehood;" equally "shocking to reason "and distressing to every pious feeling."

In truth, there is no medium between the two modes of proceeding; that practical inquiry, whose foundation rests exclusively in moral phenomena; or that metaphysical reasoning, which, with desperate consistency, rejects them both in its commencement and its termination.

More timid reasoners, who appeal to realities, only against those, whose abstractions surpass their own; may be nearer the truth, in proportion to the justness and extensiveness of that appeal: but they never can produce a concordant system. They may think to fight doubly armed with hypotheses, against their practical opponents and with facts, against their more speculative brethren. But, while they attempt to wield a sword in each hand, they forget to carry a shield on either; and assailed on both sides by their own admissions, they can present no unbroken or consistent defence to their adversaries, and must ultimately sink, under their united attacks.

V. The principle, on which the preceding remarks with regard to the physical attributes of the Deity depend, is equally applicable to his moral attributes. But since right conceptions concerning these, are of still greater importance, as they enter fundamentally into our notion

of his moral government, it may not seem improper to offer, with reference to them also, some further observations.

Even supposing it possible, to deduce the physical attributes, from the naked consciousness of existence ; it seems to me, that this premiss can hardly be adduced, as a sufficient foundation for the moral attributes.

To try the question fairly, we should endeavour to imagine a person born without the use of his senses. How could such a one, attain any notions of justice, mercy, benevolence, equity, &c. &c. ? These are evidently complex ideas, which are gradually collected, from observing, and reasoning on,-the various domestic and social relations of life, the works of creation, the arrangements of providence, the prosperity of exertion, the degradation of indolence, the happiness and approbation connected with virtue, the wretchedness and infamy consequent on vice ;-from all of which, reason and our moral sense, deduce the well established maxims on those points, which regulate human affairs. How difficult it is, to instruct in these matters, those who are destitute of one sense only, the teachers of the deaf and dumb can attest. How inadequate then, would be the reasonings of that unfortunate, who should be destitute of all his senses, to work out just, or indeed any conceptions on these subjects.

Now all our reasoning, about the moral attributes, and moral government of the Deity, are only applications of those maxims, to the supposed nature, and the actual proceedings, -as far as we know them,—of

the great first cause; and could not (in natural religion) be attained in any other way. Hence those maxims, embodying the dictates of reason, and the suggestions of conscience,-on a careful observation of moral phenomena,-are the things best known to us, and the results of their application to Deity are evidently less 80. It is true, indeed, that such application should be made with the utmost diffidence and humiliity: seeing that his intrinsic nature must ever remain unknown to us; and that any close inspection of his works, is confined to this limited span of our little earth. But still this is the only way (exclusive of Revelation) by which we can arrive at any just conceptions of his intentions towards us; that is, of his moral government. Hence we are justified in concluding, that if we mean to reason at all, about the divine economy, or moral attri butes, we must do it, by laying down these two fundamental propositions. (1) That God is the creative source, of all that is excellent or praise-worthy, according to the ordinary notions, of justice, mercy, equity, &c. that approve themselves to reason and conscience. (2) That however unknown, or incomprehensible his intrinsic nature may be, and however presumptuous it should be, to attempt to speak of it definitively; still we may be perfectly secure in saying, that no conduct can legitimately be imputed to Him, which is contradictory to conclusions so well understood by us;-so universally received, as part of our best established and least questionable knowledge.

Nor need we be less satisfied, that this course of argument is conformable to the intentions of Providence; than we are certain, that it is consonant to sound reason. We cannot be acting contrary to His will, in adopting

those conclusions, which he has absolutely forced upon us, by the constitution of our nature, and the moral phenomena around us. On the contrary, it could not but be displeasing to Him, that we should refuse to listen to the testimony of those witnesses, which He has placed in our bosoms; or reject the evidence of those facts which he presses daily on our attention.

It is, therefore, perfectly illegitimate to argue; that justice, mercy, and equity in the Deity, are not to be judged of, by any notions of them that man can form. For it has been clearly proved, that though there may he much in them, that exceeds these notions, there can be nothing contradictory thereto. Unless we should suppose, that the Deity has furnished us with indications of his purposes, which it were more reverent to despise, than to respect; and appointed us guides to the knowledge of himself, whose steps it were safer to forsake than to follow. But, suppose the foregoing position admitted to its full extent, the utmost it could fairly lead to, would be, that no knowledge whatsoever of these attributes, could be attained by us; or rather, to speak more correctly, that these terms are not to be predicated of Deity in any sense. For if we affirm them of him at all, we must do it in their ordinary acceptation, (unless we would use them as empty sounds) and to apply them to him in any sense, is, in fact, to assert a knowledge of his character in that respect. So, that the result must be, that we sit down under the admission, that we can neither know nor conjecture, whether the Deity be, or be not, merciful, or just, or equitable !—

Those who would drive us to this conclusion, should, at least, for consistency's sake, be ever afterwards silent on this subject; and, above all, should not pretend to