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APPENDIX I.

Some further applications, of the general principle laid down in the preceding Discourse.

I. The propriety of arguing, from things more known to those that are less so; is so evident, and so well established, as to be universally admitted in the abstract. But the aspirings of metaphysical pretensions, cannot brook this reasonable restriction. The application of this maxim to such controversies, has such a sad tendency to cramp the wings of speculation; and in place of visionary flights, to substitute the lowly walk of sober inquiry such a tendency in short, to show us how little we know, or can know; how much we are, and must be ignorant of: that none but a mind sincerely attached to Truth, and firmly resolved on the pursuit of practical and attainable knowledge, will submit to its humiliating restraints.

Nor are even the practical advocates of liberty, entirely exempt from error, in this respect. There is however, this material difference, between the Necessitarians and them: that these set out from legitimate premises, and to a certian point proceed philosophically. It is only when they attempt to pass, the impassible boundary, between finite and infinite; when they pretend to

understand the hidden nature of the Deity; when they fancy they have compassed Immensity, and travelled back through Eternity; when they would apply to Divine foreknowledge, the standard of human intellect, and portion out its boundless abyss, into feet and inches: it is then, that they grow dizzy with speculation, and quitting the firm footing of practical inquiry, they lose the knowledge they might have held fast, in a desperate plunge after shadows, into the gulph of Infinities.

Were practical inquirers to arrest their progress, when they find facts and common sense begin to fail them; their attainments would be, not only more satisfactory, but more secure. But this confession of ignorance, and of inability to advance, contrasted with the lofty pretensions of their opponents; is too humiliating, to be expected from the generality of disputants. Nevertheless, until the lovers of truth, consent to assign these philosophical limitations, to human research; they will be ever exposed to perplexity and disappointment: their most boasted discoveries, will ever prove the most untenable and unintelligible, and their paradoxes increasing in obscurity as they mount higher, instead of reflecting lustre will cast a shadow on the humble truths below.

But faulty as is this proceeding, that of their adversaries, is much more objectionable; in as much, as it not only terminates, but commences with speculation; and then proceeds with all the assumption of logical accuracy; from arbitrary definitions, to still more arbitrary conclusions.

True it is, that in some instances, (a few of which

shall be examined hereafter,) they quote facts in support of their system. But this is very different, from making them, (as they ought to be) its exclusive foundation. For in the multiplied appearances of nature, and ever varying phases of the human mind, there is scarcely any system, however anomalous, to countenance which, some facts may not be adduced. But in hypothetical schemes, investigation will generally prove, that such coincidences, if not merely apparent, are at best but partial and inconclusive.

II. Nothing, I conceive, would be more useful, than to make a rigid application of the test already mentioned, to the various systems of Predestination, and Necessity. This however, would lead me far beyond the bounds, prescribed by the nature of this publication. I shall therefore confine myself, to some points, more par.. ticularly connected with the statements advanced, in the preceding Discourse.

It has been already observed, that the attributes of the Deity, are supposed discoverable in either of two ways; a priori, or a posteriori. If the method a posteriori be adopted, it has I think already been sufficiently shown; that the premises must include, mental, as well as physical phenomena. Hence, one of the first questions for investigation, is the nature of man's moral powers; among which, the most important, is whether he be a free agent, or not.

It is therefore evident that this is a primary not an ultimate question; one of fact not of speculation, one that must be decided by an appeal to experience, not by abstract argument. If then, the decision of man

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kind, be in favour of moral free agency, this decision must be admitted among the postulates: and no subsequent deductions, whether immediately from these data themselves, or remotely from the Divine attributes, as deduced therefrom; can be admitted to overturn, one of these original premises.

Suppose the argument a priori to be preferred. In this case the only datum relied on, is the consciousness of our own existence. And this is proved from the consciousness of some mental operation. But it is evident, that willing is just as much a subject of consciousness, as thinking, or any other phenomenon of mind. Or in other words, it is as capable of being made, the subject of separate examination, and independant knowledge; as any other faculty. Clearly then, we are not warranted in arguing from the admission of any other faculty, to the denial or limitation of this, that is equally well known to us: whether the inference be direct, in which case its absurdity would be manifest; or circuitous, in which the fallacy is introduced, in a less palpable shape. But this obvious violation of the maxim laid down, is evident in the reasonings of those; who making use of the consciousness of one mental operation, to establish a priori the existence of God; double back again on us, with an inference from the Divine attributes, to the denial or restriction of another, viz. that of willing; whose real and true properties, are (as well as the former) ascertainable by experience. And here it is easily perceived, that the fallacy is introduced, in the application of the doctrine of infinites, to the Divine attributes. For in truth, all our statements concerning infinity, can amount to little more than negative propositions and cur ignorance about

it is so great, that there can be no more palpable inversion, of the maxim laid down, no more rash and reckless example, of arguing from our mistakes about things less known, to absurd speculations about things that might be known; than the process, of making deductions, from the incomprehensible attributes of the unsearchable God; under pretence of informing us, concerning matters within the reach, of the common sense, and consciousness of all mankind.1

1 The inextricable labyrinth, in which those involve themselves, who pretend to penetrate the Divine nature, and unfold the Divine decrees; might be illustrated by many quotations, from authors, who on that subject, have equally perplexed themselves, and their disciples. But I shall not tresspass on my readers, by more than one.

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The supralapsarian Dr. Twisse, in reasoning against the Sublapsarian doctrine, (which assumed the merit, of not making sin a consequence of decrees,) uses the following argument. "It seems impossible by any solid reason, to explain from these premises, how God may not be con"stituted the author of sin. Let it be granted that the "fall of our first parents, is removed from the decree of "Predestination. If in the mean time, it must only be subjected to a divine decree of another kind, what ad"vantage do we ultimately gain, from this our anxious desire, to avoid that rock? We have in reality not "avoided it; but while we have with sufficient solicitude wished, by one course to shun this rock, we have on "steering another, unhappily struck upon it. If this had "been the order of things in the Divine intention; that "the first place should be occupied by the creation; the "second by the permission of the fall; and the third by