The existence of the above faculties in the human mind once acknowledged leads, by necessary inference, to the admission; that there exists in the Great first Cause a power to create them. Not indeed that these faculties themselves

question; and must be answered by each man's conscience, He that puts it to himself, or to another, does in fact, institute an experiment on the phænomena of mind; and the answer of each man is his decision in his own case, as to his consciousness of possessing a free will, or selfdirecting, self-controling, self-determining power. There fore I say; that the general answer of mankind to this question, is by the laws of induction the true experimental decision, as to a matter of fact, which involves the whole controversy. That the determination of this practical question, must be regarded of the importance that I attach to it; may he proved from the language of Necessitarians themselves, whatever system they adopt. I give but one extract here; for others, see Appendix. "I will " even grant," says Dr. Priestly, "moral and physical causes to be as different, in their nature and operation, "as Dr. Price himself can possibly suppose them to be; "but if they be really causes producing certain effects, "that is, if we be so constituted, as that one definite de"termination, shall always follow a definite state of mind, "it must be true, that without a miracle, no volition or action, could have been otherwise than it has been, is, or "is to be; and this is all that, as a necessitarian, I con"tend for." (Free Discussion between Dr. Price and Dr. Priestly, London. 1778, p. 385.)

It is not my business to analyse this hypothetical reasoning. I only adduce it for sake of the conclusion. which will be found practically the same in all the dif

exist in him in the same manner as in us, but the power of originating and producing them, in all possible variety. For as well might we attribute to him materiality, or loco-motion, or actual seeing and hearing, because they evi

ferent schemes of fatalism, abstract Predestination, physical or moral necessity; however different may be the premises used, or however it may be attempted to disguise the result by the equivocal use of ordinary language, This conclusion may be thus stated that supposing his dispositions and the circumstances of the case 'unchanged, no man could have willed or acted otherwise than he has done, does, or shall do. This, I say, is exactly the practical question, to which the whole controversy is finally reducible. And it should be remembered, that it is always sought to establish this conclusion, by a priori arguments, such as those of the passage just quoted: whereas it is evidently a question of fact, that must be determined by an appeal to the phenomena of mind, or the testimony of consciousness. An appeal, in which the enactment of human laws with their respective sanctions, and also the universal language of repentance and prayer, are (as has been observed in the text,) so decisive. For how, consistently with common sense and justice, could men think of punishing others, or of blaming themselves, for willing, or doing that which they could not have possibly avoided? So forcibly indeed, did Priestly feel this to be the case, that although no way deficient in boldness of assertion, or ingenuity in perverting ordinary language to disguise and recommend his theory; yet he is here forced to give up all attempts at evasion, and to make acknowledgments the most revolting to a reflecting and religious mind.

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dently belong to our own nature; as ascribe to him in any but" an analogical or metaphorical sense," loving, hating, thinking, willing, reasoning or knowing.

"It is acknowledged," says he, "that a Necessitarian, "who, as such, believes, that strictly speaking, nothing goes wrong, but that every thing is under the best direc"tion possible, himself, and his conduct as part of an "immense and perfect whole, included, cannot accuse himself of having done wrong, (in the ultimate sense of "the word ;) he has therefore, in this strict sense nothing "to do with repentance, confession, or pardon; which are "all adapted to a different, imperfect, and fallacious view of things!!!" Ibid. p. 301.

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The great danger to man, of moral debasement, is according to him, a new species of Idolatry, which he has discovered to consist in "idolizing ourselves and the world; "considering other things," (beside God)" as proper

agents and causes, whereas strictly speaking, there is "but one cause, but one sole agent in universal nature. “ (306.) Consequently he represents the climax of virtue to be that state of mind, "where having less to reflect "upon ourselves, for; the sentiment of reproach shall naturally and easily vanish and we shall then fully concur and rejoice in the belief that in ALL THINGS we aré, " and have been, fellow workers together with God; and "that he works all his works in us, by us, and for us."(305.)

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He laments that few can realize this sublime view of things; for that "such are the influences to which all "mankind without distinction are exposed, that they necesστ sarily refer actions first of all to themselves and others; "it is a long time before they begin to consider themselves

- We can indeed conclude, that having created all these in us, his nature must be so perfect, that we cannot attribute to him any line of conduct, inconsistent with whatever is excellent in the exercise of these faculties in our

"and others as instruments in the hands of a superior agent. Consequently the associations which refer actions to themselves, get so confirmed, that they are never entirely ob"literated; and therefore the common language, and the "common feelings of mankind, will be adapted to the first, "the limited and imperfect, or rather erroneous view of "things." (298.) Nothing more need be desired to confute him, than this, his own confession; for it proves that man is actually so constituted, that he neither feels nor believes himself to be a necessitated agent, or one that could not have willed or acted otherwise than he has done. This is precisely the matter of fact in dispute, and which must be determined by the voice of conscience, the only admissible witness in such a case. And it is evident, that so far as his testimony deserves credit, the verdict of mankind is against him.

The same reasoning applies against every system that leads to the same conclusion, viz., that man cannot will or act otherwise than he does. It must be equally opposed to the testimony of consciousness, no matter how the conclusion has been obtaiued: and would, if believed, equally remove the feelings of remorse for sin; which are essential to all religion. With such notions, man might lament the infirmities, or corruptions of his nature; but knowing, that he was not his own creator; he could not blame himself, for the one or the other. And misled by such unprofitable speculations, to imagine that he had no self-controlling, self-restraining, self-determining power:

selves. And therefore we cannot ascribe to him as his special act, any thing we should perceive to be unworthy of any just or merciful, any wise or upright being. But this furnishes no clue whatever, to a knowledge of the real constitution of his nature, or of the manner in which his divine attributes exist together.

In truth, we no more comprehend how he wills, than how he acts; and therefore we have no better right to assert that he wills evil, than that he does evil. Again, we as little understand how he knows, as how he sees; and therefore might as well argue that all things exist in consequence of his beholding them, as that all events arrive in consequence of his foreknowing them.

In short, all that can be inferred by reason, concerning the intrinsic nature, of the invisi ble unsearchable Deity, must be admitted by the candid inquirer, to be no better than conjecture. And he, who should hope from such doubtful support, as his fancied insight into the

"the sentiment of reproach, would easily and naturally. "vanish." (Ib. p. 305.) And he would gradually become more and more content with his actions and his passions however wrong; unless conscience should re-assert her authority, rebel against his false creed, and force him to act in opposition to his hypothesis.