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a practical belief of these two systems should produce very different conduct in them that hold them; yet 66 we see no such difference in the affairs of common The Fatalist deliberates and resolves, and

"life.

both are, and ever have been " precisely what the Author "of nature intended them to be, and has made provision "for!!!" (See also Sect. x. same vol.)

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Philosophical liberty may be defined," (says Mr. Crombie, another advocate for Necessity,)" to be the power of doing either of two contrary actions in any given defi"nite situation."

"The state of the question," he continues, may be "illustrated by the following example. Judas impelled by "avarice, betrayed his master. A Libertarian affirms, "that he might have avoided the crime; a Necessarian "denies it, and asserts, that every man in the same circum"stances, in which he was placed, all things considered, "would have acted precisely in the same way!!!"

"A Necessarian, believing in the necessary concatenation of "all events, maintains, that the treachery of Judas was the "certain and unavoidable effect of his situation at the time "of action, which situation was the necessary and pre"determined effect of a previous one; so that tracing to its origin this continued chain of necessary causes and ef'fects, of antecedent circumstances, and unavoidable con

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sequences, every action of his life is ultimately ascribable "to that condition in which his Maker originally placed "him. A Libertarian contends on the contrary, that there " is no necessary connexion between certain situations and "certain volitions; that in every condition in which he was "placed he might have acted otherwise than he did act; and "that his virtue and vice resulted, not from any previous appointment of the Deity, but from the determinations

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slights his faith. He lays down a plan of conduct, " and prosecutes it with vigour and industry. He exhorts "and commands, and holds those to be answerable for "their conduct, to whom he hath committed any charge.

"of his own free will. In general, a Necessarian believes "that every thing is predetermined by the Divine Being— "that whatever has been must have been; and that what"ever will be, must be." (Crombie on Philosophical Necessity. Lon. 1793. p. 5, 6.)

The foregoing statement, relative to Judas, is paralleled by a declaration of Mr. Toplady's relative to the sin of our first parents. The excuses resorted to by them are well known. "And the man said, the woman whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat." "And the woman said, the serpent beguiled me, and I did "eat." This defence, so generally condemned by divines, as groundless and impious, is adduced by Wesley, as one that the Necessarian hypothesis would authorize; and, as therefore furnishing a proof, of the unscriptural character of that scheme; since the plea was not admitted by their most righteous judge, but a tremendous punishment was inflicted; which, on the supposition of the truth or validity of the defence, would be altogether irreconcileable with divine and unerring justice. In answer to Mr. Wesley, Mr. Toplady attempts to prove; "that the first man and his wife, "were Necessitarians antecedently to their fall. And if they "afterwards endeavoured to account for their fall on the "principle of necessity, I must declare, that for my own 66 part, I see neither the impiety of the attempt, nor the "lameness of the reasoning!!!" (Topl. Neces. p. 86.) What a system must that be, which could tempt so pious a man, and so zealous a Calvinist, as Mr. T. to hazard in its defence, such a declaration.

I have given these extracts, thus at large, because I

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"He blames those that are false or unfaithful to him, "as other men do. He perceives dignity and worth in 66 some characters and actions, and in others demerit “and turpitude. He resents injuries and is grateful "for good offices. If any man should plead the doc"trine of necessity to exculpate murder, theft, or robbery, his judge, though a fatalist, would laugh at "such a plea, and would not allow it even to alleviate "the crime. In all such cases he sees that it would be "absurd not to act and judge as those ought to do who “believe themselves and other men to be free agents; "just as the sceptic, to avoid absurdity, must, when "he goes into the world, act and judge like other men "who are not sceptics. If the fatalist be as little in"fluenced by the opinion of necessity in his moral and

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religious concerns, and in his expectatious concerning "another world, as he is in the common affairs of life, "his speculative opinion will probably do him little hurt. But if he trust so far to the doctrine of necessity, as

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to indulge sloth and inactivity in his duty, and hope "to exculpate himself to his Maker by that doctrine, "let him consider, whether he sustains this excuse from "his servants and dependents, where they are committed "to his charge."

This, and much more to the same effect, that might be advanced, goes to prove from facts, that the great bulk of mankind act, as if they disbelieved the doctrines of necessity: nay, that so strong is the current of

should hope, that these statements, which so boldly contradict (as it seems to me) the general testimony of consciousness, would when thus fairly presented to the mind, carry with them their own practical refutation.

opinion and of practical feeling against it, that even Necessarians themselves, whatever they may profess to the contrary, are obliged to regulate their conduct, on the supposition, that men are free agents, that is, that they can, on various occasions, both will, and act, dif ferently from what they do. All of which goes to establish the position, that the existence of moral liberty is supported by the most philosophical tests that can be resorted to on this subject; because they are the things we know best, and about which, we are most capable of forming a practical-an experimental judgment: viz. the general testimony of consciousness-the prevailing convictions of mankind, as evidenced by their manner of treating each other, and of submitting to be treated themselves.

How speculative and fallacious is the method of arguing adopted in the extract cited before, (p. 125) may be further illustrated by the following consideration; that it pretends to determine in this particular, (by such metaphysical abstractions) not only the the nature of Man, but that of all created intelligences, nay, even that of the Deity himself. Now, what should we think of that naturalist, who should take upon himself to deduce and demonstrate from abstract principles, what must, or what must not be, those chemical properties, by which, omnipotence has diversified the myriads of unknown substances, that are crowded through countless unknown worlds? Would the reasonings of such a theorist be listened to for a moment, by practical sensible men? Yet, the foregoing arguments tend to assign limits to the creating power of God with regard to mind, of the essence and possible varieties of which, we are just as ignorant, as we are about those of matter.

They pretend to prove that there cannot be such a thing as a free agent, or in other words that Omnipotence cannot create one; nay, that even God himself must be a necessitated being! For, it is evident that whenever an attempt is made to establish any theory of mind, by considerations of a general character only, and which do not so essentially involve some such qualities of finite beings, as shall effectually serve to restrain its application to such beings alone; whenever I say this is done, the resulting conclusions, if true at all, must be true of all beings whatsoever. The arguments generally adopted by the supporters of moral necessity, seem to me to be of this description. Nor can I discover in them, any limiting premises which would legitimately warrant them, to restrict their conclusions to any order of intelligences. Consequently, if true at all, they must prove the necessitation of the highest, not less than of the lowest of beings: that is of all angelic existences, nay, even of the Deity himself as well as of man.

Most of its advocates seem to have felt this diffculty. Some have boldly admitted and maintained it; thus falling into a scheme of theology, presenting no practical difference, that I can perceive, from fatalism itself. A scheme, which not only annihilates the power of man, but annihilates that of God also, and subjects him, as well as all his creatures, to the control of causes which he is unable to resist." A necessity which thus ingulphs and forces onward, in its resistless and mysterious course, the volitions and actions of the Deity, as well of his creatures; and chains up with as

8 Stewart's Active and Moral Powers, vol. II. p. 483.