66

ing to conscience, piety, and common sense; every man of plain understanding, is, I conceive, at liberty, to decline altogether, so unprofitable à controversy. He should, in the spirit, both of practical humility, and of sound philosophy, regard the difficulties themselves, as the natural consequences of his inability to penetrate the Divine nature; while, he may justly meet the portentous conclusions, attempted to be deduced from them, with that instinctive rejection, which they naturally excite, in all unprejudiced minds; and which is the best possible proof, that they stand opposed, to those " primary laws of our constitution, which to us, are the "ultimate tests of truth and falshood." Now, whether the doctrines of absolute irrespective Predestination, be, as I have endeavoured to show, thus repugnant to our understandings➡revolting to our feelings and, contradictory to our most established notions of moral government is a question, that must be determined, by the verdict, of the majority of unprejudiced, pious, and reflecting men. The appeal therefore, is (in Natural Theology) to conscience, to common sense, and to practical religion. And to those tribunals I have no fear of submitting the decision.

The preceding remarks may serve to show, how little reason there is, in an objection, that is frequently brought by Predestinarians, against the popular arguments of their opponents: viz. that "eloquence has "been often called to the aid of the Arminian, but that "the Calvinist has generally contented himself with "simple argument." This means, in truth, that the Calvinist generally confines himself, to metaphysical disquisitions: while, his opponent appeals, to common sense, and to enlightened conscience to the moral feel

ings the virtuous emotions-the instinctive principles, and intuitive convictions, of pious and reflecting men.

Now, these being the things, that are best known to us-that are most sensibly felt-most distinctly understood by the bulk of mankind: may be considered, as implanted in their nature, and "written in their hearts," -by a wise and gracious Providence-to the end, that those who have not the "law," should be "a law unto themselves."8 As such, therefore, they must ever be regarded-in Natural Religion-as "the ultimate "tests, of truth and falsehood." Hence those arguments thus detractingly styled, eloquent, popular, and declamatory-which consist, of honest and direct appeals, to these moral principles, convictions, and feelings; instead of suffering in our estimation, on account of such charges are thereby proved to be-according to the rule laid down-the most philosophical and satisfactory, that can be adduced, on this subject. Whereas, those metaphysical abstractions, which refuse the application of such tests, should ever be regarded with strong suspicion, as harbouring some latent opposition, to the truth of moral phenomena, and to the nature of things; which, otherwise, they would not pretend, to despise and reject.

VI. I have already observed, that although predestination does not pretend, to take its premises from observation, or experience, yet, its advocates sometimes appeal to partial views of facts, to corroborate their speculative conclusions. The length to which, this appendix has already extended, prevents me from alluding to more

8 Rom. ii. 14, 15.

than one of these. And I select it, not for its ingenuity or real weight-for it seems to me deficient in both,but because of the strange and undue importance, which I perceive attached to it, both in open controversy, and in private discussion, by the most excellent and pious, of modern Calvinists. It has been resorted to by Calvin himself, and by several other writers on that side; but I prefer giving it, in the words of one, whose name is at present deservedly high, in the estimation of the religious world.

66

"Let us advert,” says this author, " to the analogies "of the human system: Is not the principle of election "to special advantages, visible on every side? Do we "not find it in the various climates and temperature of "the earth? and in the combinations of political in"stitutions? Why are the ravages of disease, and the perils of climate, connected with one country, and "not with another? Why is the power of despotism "in the hand of an European, to oppress the victim "of weakness in the Asiatic or African? Why are the "refinements of science, prevalent in one quarter of "the globe, and the degradations of barbarism in the "other? And is not the same inequality, the same spe- "cial choice in the distribution of benefits, equally appa"rent in the superiorities of mental character? Why

66

are some men endowed with personal qualities, which "at once lift them above the level on which the multi❝tudes stand around them? Why have the names of "Alfred, Newton, Bacon, or Locke, become endear"ed to our own land, but because they possessed qua

9 Inst. v. ii. p. 411. Vaugh. 87, 97, 131, &c.

lifications superior to those which mark out the ordi"nary portraiture of human agents?" 1

As this reasoning claims for itself, the weight and importance, generally attached to the so justly celebrated argument from analogy, it is necessary to examine, how far its claims are well founded.

The argument from analogy, may be stated thusThat it is probable, at least, that it is not improbable, that the Deity, in like circumstances, will act in a like manner to what he has already done: or perhaps, it might be more correct, to say, that in such cases, he would act on the same, or similar principles. 2 Now, let us examine, how far the circumstances of the case, warrant the argument from analogy or likeness, which, it is attempted to establish, in the preceding quotations.

In the first place, it is evident, that this present existence, is to man-only a primary state. That

'Noel's Prospects of the Christian Church. Lond. 1828, p. 194.

2" But it must be allowed just," says Butler, "to "join abstract reasonings with the observation of facts, "and argue from such facts as are known, to others that are "that are like them :****This method, then, of conclu

66

ding and determining****being evidently conclusive, in " various degrees, proportionable to the degree and exactness of the whole analogy or likeness; &c.”

I may also quote the definition of an antagonist:-" Ana"logy argues from proportionable causes, to proportionable "effects, and from similarity of circumstances, to similarity "of consequences." (Belsham's Elements, Lond. 1801.Introduct. p.lxxxii.)

is, it has not been preceded by any other-the subjects of it, have not occupied any other; and therefore its inequalties are those, of simple creation; and can have no reference whatever, to any past conduct of those concerned. Now, the utmost that analogy

can infer from this similar inequalities of

view is, that there may exist creation, among other beings, and in other worlds. Hence the natural conclusion, that there may be various orders of angelic existences, widely differing from each other, in glory and excellence. But, our future existence will be an ultimate, not a primary state one, the subjects of which, will have already made their appearance, and acted their parts on a previous scene; and who will have thus exhibited, their various conduct and characters, to a surrounding world. Hence, the inequalities arising out of simple creation, can furnish no analogy by which to determine the differences of their destinies. For the circumstances-so far considered are totally unlike; and analogy is not a dissimilarity, but a likeness.

In the next place, it is acknowledged on all hands, that the present life, is one of probation: and that man is answerable for all the gifts committed to his charge. In this point of view, the utmost that analogy can infer, from the inequality of these gifts-whether natural or spiritual-is, that there may be other worlds of probation, where similar differences exist. But it is not denied, at least in words, (though the predestinarian representations of a future judgment-as has been shown do virtually deny it,) that a future life is to be one of retribution-one, whose gradations, must have a reference, to those previous differences of fidelity and conduct, whose existence shall be made