of God himself assumed our nature in order to make us partakers of its benefits?

dual at li

concede a

in matters of

§ 8. The principles, then, of moral discipline No indiviand of social government, are altogether dissi- berty to milar. Moral obligations cannot originate with legislative superiority man, and cannot be enforced by the ultimate to another sanctions of political rule. Compulsion is religion. wholly foreign from a system which regards men as rational and accountable agents, because outward force cannot act as a motive upon the conscience. Political rule is substantially a delegated power; it is founded on a conceded superiority, by which a certain portion of individual liberty is compromised for the general weal. But no one is at liberty to concede a superiority of a legislative nature to another in matters of religious duty, or to surrender any portion of that moral freedom which is the basis of accountableness. Power in relation to conscience, cannot be delegated: the will of another cannot become our law; the usurpation is impiety. The free agency of man not only involves a sacred unalienable right which the magistrate cannot lawfully infringe, but it imposes upon every individual a duty from which there is no discharge. There may be a public will: a public conscience is a monstrous chi

mera.

A sense of personal responsibility lies at the foundation of all religion, and in proportion as this sense is awakened in the minds of

men, they become excited to think and to act as moral beings. Whatsoever tends to weaken this consideration, by leading them blindly to confide in the proffered guidance of others, has the most baleful effect upon the intellectual character. The argument of Cicero referred to by Montesquieu, "A chief or head is sensible "that the affair depends upon himself, and "therefore he thinks," may be applied to every individual in the case of religious duty. In proportion as a man is sensible that the affair depends upon himself, he thinks.*

"That outward force," remarks Milton, "cannot tend "to the good of him who is forced in religion, is unquestion"able. For in religion, whatever we do under the Gospel, "we ought to be thereof persuaded without scruple; and

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are justified by the faith we have, not by the work we do. "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind.'-If "not by the works of God's law we are justified, how then "by the injunctions of man's law? Surely force cannot work persuasion, which is faith; cannot therefore justify nor "pacify the conscience; and that which justifies not in the Gospel, condemns. We read not that Christ ever exer"cised force but once; and that was to drive profane ones "out of his temple, not to force them in. If by the Apostle we are beseeched as brethren, by the mercies of God, to present our bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable "to God, which is our reasonable service,' or worship, "then is no man to be forced by the compulsive laws of men "to present his body a dead sacrifice, and so under the "Gospel most unholy and unacceptable, because it is his "unreasonable service."-Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes. PROSE WORKS, Vol. III. p. 342.

as subject to

human laws,

must consist

of voluntary

societies.

In pursuing the inquiry into the nature of The Church, ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the preliminary question to be determined is, whether the laws of the Church, which we are about to examine, are Divine or human. If they are Divine, they must regard man simply as a religious being, and the interference of political authority is altogether excluded; if they are human, they must respect man as the subject of social obligations. The Church of Christ, in its genuine and most comprehensive signification, is not a human society; it is not susceptible of human government; its character is that of universality, and its members are attached to each other only by relations of a spiritual nature, the only Head of this Church being the Great Shepherd and Bishop of souls." But the visible Church must necessarily consist of human societies, of which there are only two sorts; those which are natural or political, and those which are voluntary. Christian churches cannot be considered as natural societies, of which a person becomes a member by birth or heritage: (what modification they may assume, in consequence of the alliance of ecclesiastical jurisdiction to secular power, does not at present come under our consideration :) a society which originates in no natural or political necessity; which in its primitive character possesses no features of a political institution; can

be no other than a voluntary society. As such, we shall accordingly proceed to contemplate the constitution of a Christian Church, and the natural order of the inquiry will lead us to consider, first, the laws respecting the formation of such a society, or the terms of communion; secondly, the laws of its constitution, including the consideration of the sacred functions; and thirdly, the laws relating to discipline.

CHAP. II.

On the Law of Admission.

port of the

Church,

§ 1. A CHRISTIAN Church, taken in its sim- Primary imple primary import, is an assembly of the pro- term fessed disciples of Christ. Before the organization of Christian societies, while "all that "believed were" as yet together," "" conti

nuing with one accord daily in the temple, "and breaking bread from house to house," the collective body of the disciples are spoken of under this designation, as "the Church." At first, they constituted, strictly speaking, an assembly, meeting "with one accord in one place;" but when "the number of the dis

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ciples multiplied in Jerusalem greatly," three thousand converts being added in one day, and a great company of the priests having become obedient to the faith, one room would be insufficient to contain the assembly, and unity of place would soon cease to be included in the term. For some time, it is certain that they continued to assemble together in large companies in the Temple, for the purpose, pro