fessor Williston's charge that he (Professor Langdell) is inconsistent in his statements. (2) Whenever one of two mutual promisors, who is sued upon his promise, claims that the plaintiff's promise, though it be supported by a sufficient consideration, is not binding upon him, and therefore is not a sufficient consideration for the defendant's promise, the question thus raised can be put in issue, tried, and decided in the same manner, and with as much facility as any other question which will be decisive of the cause. (3) That Professor Williston's mode of getting out of the difficulty which he has conjured up is inadmissible.

These three things are accomplished in a manner entirely satisfactory to Professor Langdell. For our own part after rereading the article eight times or more we are still in the dark as to just what Professor Langdell is driving at. We await with interest Professor Williston's sur-rebutter. D. A. R.

THE DODGE-COURSE LECTURES AT THE YALE LAW SCHOOL.Justice Brewer, Green, has been giving this year's Dodge lectures in New Haven. The second lecture of the course, "Responsibilities of Citizenship" is reported in full in the Yale Law Journal of April, 1901. We summarize it thus: The responsibility of the American citizen is greater than that of the citizen of any other nation, consequently he should understand his responsibilities. The first obligation is that of personal character; the second, is national character. A nation may be regarded in a two-fold aspect; as an artificial entity, coming closely within Marshall's definition of a corporation; and as an aggregation of individuals. In either case, the moral element is the bright coloring in the picture. Mr. Brewer states that in spite of the Monroe Doctrine, commerce is making us act with the other nations.

In the lecture of February 15th he spoke of the juror and the witness as follows: "Men don't like to serve as jurors, and I don't blame them. The jury system as it is at present administered is little less than a relic of the semi-barbarous age. The juror is treated little better than a criminal. He is locked up at night, and receives but little more pay than a day laborer. He is compelled to listen to the wrangling of lawyers. I hope that the time will come when the juror will be treated like a gentleman, when he will receive the pay of a business man. I also hope that the present system of conviction will give way to one in which the concurrence of a reasonable number of jurors shall determine the verdict. It is one of the obligations of American citizenship to perform the duties of a witness when sum

moned into court, although in the present system the witness is treated as a liar, and is browbeaten by opposing lawyers. But the juror and the witness should strive for their own elevation and should perform their duties of citizenship when called upon to do so."

In another of the lectures he spoke of strikes and the disturbances attending them. "Such collisions involve a matter of disobedience, their cause being an endeavor to prevent the employer from exercising the right to conduct his business under the law in his own way—that is to say, without the assistance of his locked-out or striking workmen. It makes little difference whether the attempted coercion is by force or intimidation. In either case it is an effort not to change, but to break the law. In either it is a matter of disobedience, in the truest sense of the term. It may be wise that all who are engaged in pursuing the same vocation should be organized into one body, but whether they should be so organized or not depends, as the law now stands, solely on voluntary action, and to attempt to deny a laborer his right to work, whether he be within or without an organization, and to deprive him of full protection in that work, implies a plain disregard of the mandates of the law. If it be, as a matter of political economy, wise that there should be a consolidation of all employes into one or more organizations, and that no one should be permitted to work except he be a member of such organization, let the lawmakers so enact, and whenever a constitutional enactment to that effect is passed, then every good citizen should strive to enforce it." And in the first lecture of the course, to illustrate the heterogeneous character of our population, he told this: "At a little party the other day Chief Justice Fuller was talking boastfully about his home city, Chicago, saying that there were more Jews there than in Jerusalem, more Irishmen than in any Irish city, more Frenchmen than in any French city except Paris, more Germans than in any German city except Berlin, etc., when I added: ' Yes, and there are more saints and sinners there than anywhere except Heaven and Hell.” ”

THE DUTY TO LITIGATE.-Prof. Isaac F. Russel, Field, Dean of the Woman's Department of the New York University law school, at the graduating exercises of the school, Madison Square Garden, New York, March 28, 1901, spoke on the above subject. His remarks in part, were as follow:

"Public policy demands that there be an end of litigation; so speak the sages of the ancient law. Practical sagacity prompts lawyers to compose quarrels through compromise; the spoils of the profession

are thus the greater. Some judges have an irresistible passion for settling cases while yet undetermined in court: reversals for error are thus cleverly avoided. Some railroads and other large corporations maintain distinct funds, administered by ingenious and experienced counselors, which are drawn upon regularly in settlement with blackmailers who bring lawsuits which are certain to be vexatious, even though the defendant win and get judgment against a plaintiff who is financially irresponsible.

"On the other hand, the duty to litigate is equally clear and certain. The right to justice is inalienable, and a contract not to sue is void. Self-defense is the supreme and first law of nature.

"We hear in many quarters the vulgar criticism of corporate wealth, that is intrenched in the courts, whereas every corporation has the undoubted privilege of having its status and legal rights examined and defined by the highest judicial authority. If these rights be found excessive and dangerous to society, the remedy rests with the legislature to change the law. Good may thus come from the spirit of litigiousness; a bad law may by the very effort to enforce it reach its doom through repeal, and progress toward perfection may receive new stimulus from the establishment of a better precedent."

In the aid of those of a statistical turn of mind we add that the class, entirely of women, numbered 53; 32 names began with Miss and 21 with Mrs. One paper in reporting the above ran this heading: "Fifty More Lawyers at One Swoop!" Probably not more than five of this fifty will take the Bar examinations and fewer than that will practice.

FUTURE INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY.-Prof. John C. Gray, Choate.-Harvard Law Rev., Feb., 1901.

In a certainly original way Prof. Gray begins by a dialogue on Socratic principles between S. (Student) and G. (Prof. Gray), S. & G. finally agreeing that future interests in personality are usually considered as executory rather than vested, but in the only two cases in which it really makes any difference whether they are the one or the other they are always regarded as vested, namely, (1) bequest of a cup to a person for life, on his death to his oldest son for life, and then to a college, is not too remote; if held to be executory it would be too remote; (2) Bequest of a cup to a man for life, and no reference made as to further disposition; it reverts to donor-it being again regarded as vested rather than executory.

As to chattels real the theory of law was that an estate for life was of greater value than any possible estate for years; so the giving

to A for life of an estate for 100 years and after his death to B, gave to A absolute ownership of the estate and on his death it went to his administrator. As to devises, this rule was avoided by construing such language to mean a devise of the term to B after the death of A, and what was left (the life estate) to A; that is, B has an executory devise, and A the whole estate subject to the executory devise. In England this could only be done by devise; but now in the United States it applies both to dispositions by will and inter vivos.

We cannot do better than to quote freely from the summary at the end of the article.

Chattels Real.-There can be an estate for years (sub-lease) in a chattel real; there can be no estate for life in a chattel real, because a life estate is larger than any term. A gift for life passes the absolute interest, therefore after a gift for life there can be no vested interest or quasi remainder; any future interest after such gift can be good only as an executory limitation: such an executory limitation may be created by will, and though there is no decision absolutely in point it seems that it may also be created inter vivos in all American states except North Carolina. It is claimed that this cannot be done in England. If a chattel real is bequeathed to A, a living person, and his executors after a bequest for life to an unborn person, such gift to A being an executory limitation should on theory be held void for remoteness, but there is no authority on this point. If a chattel real is bequeathed to A for life, with no limitation over, A takes the whole term, and there being no limitation over, it should on theory go on A's death to his executor, but the only authority is contra.

Chattels Personal.-A chattel personal can be bailed for years; the use and occupation of a chattel can be given to A for life, the property remaining in the donor, and a gift of a chattel personal for life is construed to be a gift of the use and occupation.

If a chattel personal is given to A for life, and on his death to B, B takes a legal interest. This may be done by will, both in England and United States, and also inter vivos in the United States, except in North Carolina, while in England the modern writers say it cannot be done.

Suppose a chattel personal is bequeathed to an unborn person for life, and on his death to A and his executors. If the gift to A is vested (according to the old theory), then it is not too remote; if the gift to A is executory, then it is void for remoteness. All the authorities hold it is not too remote. Suppose a chattel personal is given to A for life, with no limitation over. Then, on the old theory, upon

A's death, there is a reversion to the donor or his executors. On the modern English theory, A takes the whole property in the chattel, and on his death it should go to his executors, though there are no English authorities. The American cases stick to the old doctrine.

Professor Gray has indicated several of the conditions that arise on the distinction still kept up between chattels, real and personal, and suggests that these should be treated as exactly similar.

The cases on such future interests are in a chaotic state, and so poorly digested that many are found only by accident.

It is to be hoped that the ideas advanced by Professor Gray will lead to further examination into this interesting question. M. I. ST. J.

CONKLING ALUMNI.-Harry L. Taylor, '93, has recently become prominent in baseball circles by being successful as attorney for the Players' Association. Ernest De L. Magee,'97, was married April 9th, to Miss Maud Godell at 619 El Dorado avenue, Linda Vista Terrace, Oakland, California. Cornell Phi Delta Phi men will be interested in hearing of the success of Samuel S. Slater, Field, '90, and affiliated with Conkling Chapter 1892-4, who last fall was elected to the New York State Senate from the 14th District, New York City. Mr. Slater served in the Assembly in 1899 and 1900. Among the students recently admitted to the bar of New York State were Albert H. Ryan, '99, of Watertown, N. Y. Harry C. Davis, of the firm of Fillius & Davis, mining and corporation lawyers, Denver, Colorado, will preside as toastmaster at the banquet at the reunion of the Alumni Association of the Medina (N. Y.) High School, June 26, 1901. John McW. Durant, '97, has been having a high time over in Paris. It was he, so the newspapers say, who gave out the statement of his death in a duel at the hands of a Russian count, etc., and then later appeared in England with the story that he gave out the yarn to escape being sued for breach of promise by a ballet girl.

F. B. S.

FIELD ALUMNI.-Fritz v. Briesen, '97, was given the degree of LL.M. at the recent commencement of the Columbian University Law School. J. Albert Stover and R. A. M. Hobbs, both '99, have formed a law partnership and opened offices at 32 Broadway, New York City. The firm name is Blymyer, Hobbs & Stover. Chas. S. Champion, 'or, has opened an office for the practice of patent law in the Park Row building, New York. H. S. Howard, '99, has returned to Burlington, Vermont, and resumed practice. He will pay special attention to investment securities and estates. H. B. Lister, 99, who went to San Francisco and begun practice with Robert B. Gaylord, Pome