SOME HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE IN ILLINOIS TO REALIZE EQUALITY IN TAXATION.-An address by Prof. Harvey B. Hurd, Booth, before the Michigan Political Economy Association, Jan. 19, 1901.-Chicago Legal News. Mr. Hurd said that " previous to 1898 our standard (taxation) of value in Illinois was the fair cash value, estimated at the price the property would bring at a fair voluntary sale." Theoretically, the system may have been ideal, but in practice it was quite the reverse.

In 1870 a new state constitution was adopted and a clause inserted which further militated against "the fair cash value standard," viz., "limiting municipal indebtedness to five per cent. of the value of the taxable property."

The legislature passed a new revenue law in 1872 which preserved the above mentioned standard and "the immediate effect was to more than double the total valuation of the property of the State,” and soon influence was brought "upon the assessor to reduce the valuations."

After calling attention to conditions and experiences in Chicago and other districts, Mr. Hurd lays down the reasonable principle that "the standard of valuation and the rates of taxation must be so adjusted that living up to the one, the other will not be excessive."

He then goes on to note the jugglery of assessments, and describes the system of the tax-agents under a departure from the legal standard; and of course "the more assessments that are brought down, the more there must be that are put up,” ... and "assessments [of the merchant] were frequently put up for the very purpose of compelling him to buy them down." Accordingly on appeal "if the actual standard were the legal standard of valuation, he could easily show he was over-assessed."

In 1898, legislation made real estate assessable once in four years; personalty, annually, with the standard of valuation as one fifth the fair cash value. From the new requirements and details of the law "it is regarded a great point gained, getting the equalization out of the hands of the assessor and into independent hands. But more important still is the giving of ample time to the taxpayer to get his assessment corrected."

F. B. S.

LEGAL EDUCATION.-By David Pugh, Swan, of the Ohio Supreme Court.-Law Student's Helper, Jan., 1901.

Judge Pugh's article may be summaried as follows: The law school is the best place for legal education. The vital point and

point of difference is the method of instruction; i. e., text-book, case system, or lectures.

Lectures alone are poor; the text-book supplemented by quizzing is good; the case system is good, but the best method is adopting the method which best fits the particular subject. The student should have a good liberal education and a high literary standard should be reserved for admission to the Bar.

R. H. G.

THE CONSTITUTION AND INEQUALITY OF RIGHTS.-Edwin Burritt Smith, Booth.-Yale Law Journal, Feb., 1901.

The writer argues against the claim that the United States may enforce, in her new islands, inequality of rights.

"The vision of the equality of rights," he writes, "was the inspiration of our national life." "The great purpose of the Constitution was to establish equality of personal rights" (citing the Constitution, etc.); "the departure from right principles ... is not a possibility. The executive and legislative branches of the government have done and are doing their utmost to make it a fact."

He quotes Secretary Root to the effect that "the people of the ceded islands have acquired a moral right to be treated by the United States in accordance with the underlying principles of justice and freedom."

Excerpts also follow from the military order of President McKinley, and the speech of Mr. Hoar, delivered in the Senate, April 17, is noted to support the author's contention that no one has a right "to quarry out of the Constitution rights for gracious bestowal on the people of the territories and islands of the United States."

"Equality of rights is denied," the author continues, "in order that the President and Congress may govern these islands by power as absolute as is anywhere known."

Turning to Supreme Court precedents he cites Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 315, 317, where "Chief Justice Marshall defined the term 'United States' to be the name given to our great Republic, which is composed of States and Territories." He also cites to the same effect Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164, 198.

He makes other points as follow: That "Congress holds in the Territories the same powers, subject to like limitations over local affairs as the States possess over local affairs," Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. S. 15; that "the provisions of the Constitution relating to trials by jury for crimes . . . apply to the territories, . . . Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 346; Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540;

.

"that Congress in legislating for the territories. . . is subject to those fundamental limitations in favor of personal and civil rights in the Constitution Mormon Church v. U. S., 136 U. S. 1; McAllister v. U. S., 141 U. S. 174; American Pub. Soc. v. Fisher, 166 U. S. 464, 466; "And that the United States, upon acquiring territory by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the Constitution and laws,"" Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 312; that Congress must act within constitutional authority merely in legislating as to the territories, Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393, 449; and, similarly, as to colonies, Id., p. 448; that the terms of the treaty itself fail, New Orleans v. U. S., 10 Pet. 662, 736; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 225. Finally, that the status of all persons born in the islands after possession are beyond the power of Congress, U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 703; and that citizenship even does not determine personal and property rights, Lem Moon Sing v. U. S., 158 U. S. 538, 547.

F. B. S.

THE ALASKAN BOUNDARY QUESTION.-Charles Noble Gregory, Harlan,-Law Magazine and Review (Eng.).

Professor Gregory points out that the main dispute was apparently "as to the interpretation of the passage in the Convention entered into in 1825 by Great Britain and Russia, fixing the boundary in question."

The claim of the United States is that the Russian strip "is to be measured from the shore of every bay or harbor, following the sinuosities of the coast. The Canadian claim is that it shall be measured from the border of the open sea."

On the authority of the Hon. John W. Foster, formerly U. S. Secretary of State, and others he shows that for seventy-three years after the treaty the American interpretation of the treaty was always followed; and he cites, as further upholding the United States, Article VII. of the convention, whereby English vessels were privileged to frequent the inland waters on the coast in question for ten years, which privilege Russia terminated at the end of ten years. Moreover, in 1839 both governments (Russia and England) authorized a lease by the representatives of the Russian American Company, (holding the land under Russia), to the Hudson Bay Company, of this same strip, together with all waters in that line of coast, for 2,000 otters, annual rental, which lease was continued until 1865.

Certain specific governmental acts by the United States, Canada, and England and declarations are recalled to show "that the general

administration of the territory has always been discharged by America since her purchase of it from Russia in 1867."

The original Canadian contention was for some of the islands and many harbors but now Canada seems to claim substantially only the "harbor near the head of the Lynn canal," "a deep fjord some sixty miles long by six miles wide," at the head of which are two American settlements which are convenient passes to the Canadian gold fields.

Concluding, Mr. Gregory expressed the hope that the modus vivendi indicates that upon further consideration the right may appear clear and conclusive, and in the event of America's retaining sovereignty bespeaks for us the policy of "the open door."

F. B. S.

BENTHAM AND THE CODIFIERS.-An address by Prof. Chas. Noble Gregory before the Virginia Bar Association. Mention is made in introduction of the anonymous pamphlet, entitled, “A Fragment on Government," or as it has been called, "A Comment on the Commentaries," published in London and written in the same year as the adoption of the Declaration of Independence by the American colonies, the real author being Jeremy Bentham, a young barrister. The pamphlet violently assailed the Commentaries of Blackstone and, moreover, remained a powerful liberal force against the pronounced conservatism of the English Bar.

Bentham assumed from Hume "an unassailable central principle, the principle of utility as a test of moral precepts and legislation, looking to their tendency to promote the greatest possible happiness to the greatest possible number."

Interesting data and cases are cited from the earlier English morals, law penalties, and government, as showing the incentive or justification for Bentham's assault upon the English Bar. So, it is intimated that he was nothing if not comprehensive "for he soon sought to furnish minutely formulated codes of law and procedure according with these principles, not only for his own, but for all countries, whether he had any knowledge of their language, customs, necessities, history, and feelings or not."

While instances enough are given to show the general rejection of Bentham's principles and codes by his contemporaries, yet it has been stated "that hardly an important reform in law has been effected within this century which Bentham had not foreshadowed and advocated," as pointed out in detail by Mr. Gregory, and the writer enumerates many codes of various countries merely "as an intimation of the wide recognition of the principle of codification and the steady growth of such recognition."

An interesting outline follows of the career of Edward Livingston as a publicist and codifier, and the work of David Dudley Field, said to be "the greatest codifier since Bentham," is noted in tracing the spread of the codification movement in so many of the states. F. B. S.

INTERNATIONAL Arbitration, and DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR OFFICERS.-Prof. Isaac Franklin Russell, Field, of the New York University law school, in his recent course of quasi-legal lectures at the Brooklyn Institute spoke on these two subjects. His address on "Arbitration" may be summarized as follows:

"The organization of an international tribunal is peculiarly difficult on account of the great inequality subsisting between the different nations of the earth. Of course we are familiar with the academic maxims that all men are created free and equal, and that all sovereign states are free, independent, and equal. But these are fictions of the law. Equality here means simply equality before the law, equality in the eye of the court. Nature, however, abhors equality, and nowhere more than in distributing the power and influence of sovereign states. To be practical, let us ask how many judges shall the proposed international tribunal have? and further, will England, France, Germany Russia, and Austria be content each with one judge, and cheerfully concede an equal voice in the court's decision to Portugal, Greece, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium? The dogma of equality before the law does not mean that the poor man, ignorant and vicious, is equal, on a trial before a judge and jury, to his neighbor who is wealthy, intelligent, and highly respected. Nor can one nation, bankrupt, corrupt, and reactionary, hope to prevail against a competitor that is vigorous, healthy, and progressive. The equality of states is a dogma of theorists. The difficulties of enforcing obedience to the decisions of such a tribunal are too great to be overcome. Obedience can be coerced ultimately only by war, which it is the professed object of such a tribunal to avoid; and sanctions of international authority consisting of differential rates of duties on imports, by which disobedience is to be punished, can be dismissed as visionary and Utopian." A summary of his address on "Diplomatic and Consular Officers" is this:

"The mission of the foreign minister is to maintain the peace and happiness of nations. To qualify him for this high duty he must be free from all fear and constraint. He is, therefore, not subject to the civil or criminal law of the place where he resides. This immunity extends to his family and his official staff, his secretary, chaplain and other servants. By a fiction of law a minister's official residence is regarded as the very soil and territory of his fatherland.

"Agreements between nations are called treaties or conventions. The earliest of modern treaties were written in Latin, the common tongue of Christendom. French is now the lauguage of diplomacy. Nations having a common language use that tongue in their treaties. Treaties may regulate permanent conditions, such as international