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Give examples.

Who invented the Corinthian capital ?
From what did he take its form?

What objections are made to it?

What rule with respect to buildings is dictated by utility?—what

by beauty?-why?

What is the great care of the artist?

What kind of ornaments is most difficult?

What is the effect of mixing them with realities?

Give examples.

What is observed of the statue of Moses striking a rock from which water actually issues?

Why are statues employed for supports disagreeable?

How do gardening and architecture contribute to rectitude of

manners?

Give examples.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Standard of Taste.

It is a common proverb that there is no disputing about taste. One thing at first view is evident, that if the proverb holds true with respect to taste in its proper meaning, it must hold equally true with respect to our other external senses: if the pleasures of the palate disdain a comparative trial, and reject all criticism, the pleasures of touch, of smell, of sound, and even of sight, must be equally privileged. At that rate, a man is not within the reach of censure, even where he prefers the Saracen's Head upon a sign-post before the best tablature of Raphael, or a rude Gothic tower before the finest Grecian building; or where he prefers an unpleasant smell before that of the most odoriferous flower, or discords before exquisite harmony.

If the pleasures of external sense be exempted from criticism, why not every one of our pleasures, from whatever source derived? If taste in its proper sense cannot be disputed, there is little room for disputing it in its figurative sense. The proverb accordingly com

prehends both; and in that large sense may be resolved into the following general proposition, That with respect to the perceptions of sense, by which some objects appear agreeable, some disagreeable, there is no such a thing as a good or a bad, a right or a wrong; that every man's taste is to himself an ultimate standard without appeal; and consequently that there is no ground of censure against any one who prefers Blackmore before Homer, selfishness before benevolence, or cowardice before magnanimity.

The proverb in the foregoing examples is indeed carried very far: it seems difficult, however, to sap its foundation, or attack it successfully from any quarter; every man is equally a judge of what ought to be agreeable or disagreeable to himself. Is it not whimsical and absurd, to assert, that a man ought not to be pleased when he is, or that he ought to be pleased when he is not?

This reasoning may perplex, but will never afford conviction: every one of taste will reject it as false, however unqualified to detect the fallacy. Though no man of taste will assent to the proverb as holding true in every case, no man will affirm that it holds true in no case; there are objects that we may like or dislike indifferently, without any imputation upon our taste. Were a philosopher to make a scale for human pleasures, he would not think of making divisions without end: but would rank together pleasures arising perhaps from different objects, either as conducing to happiness, or differing so imperceptibly as to make a separation unnecessary. Nature has taken this course as to the generality of mankind. There may be subdivisions without end; but we are only sensible of the grosser divisions, comprehending pleasures equally affecting to these the proverb is applicable in the strictest sense; for with respect to pleasures of the same rank, what ground can there be for preferring one before another? If a preference in fact be given

by any individual, it cannot proceed from taste, but from custom, imitation, or some peculiarity of mind. Nature, in her scale of pleasures, has been sparing of divisions; she has wisely and benevolently filled every division with many pleasures, that individuals may be contented with their own lot, without envying that of others. Many hands must be employed to procure us the conveniences of life; and it is necessary that the different branches of business, whether more or less agreeable, be filled with hands: a taste too refined would obstruct that plan; for it would crowd some employments, leaving others, no less useful, totally neglected. Fortunately the plurality are not delicate in their choice, but fall in readily with the occupations, pleasures, food, and company, that fortune throws in their way; and if at first there be any displeasing circumstance, custom soon makes it easy.

The proverb will hold true as to the particulars now explained; but when applied in general to every subject of taste, the difficulties to be encountered are insuperable. We need only to mention the difficulty that arises from human nature itself. Do we not talk of a good and a bad taste?—of a right and a wrong taste?-and upon that supposition, do we not censure writers, painters, architects, and every one who deals in the fine arts? Are such criticisms absurd, and void of common sense?-have the foregoing expressions, familiar in all languages and among all people, no sort of meaning? This can hardly be; for what is universal, must have a foundation in nature. If we can reach that foundation, the standard of taste will no longer be a secret.

We have a sense or conviction of a common nature in our own species, and in every species of animals: and this common nature is a model or standard for each individual that belongs to the kind. Hence it is a wonder to find an individual deviating from the common nature of the species, whether in its internal or external construction: a child born with aversion to

its mother's milk, is a wonder, no less than if born without a mouth, or with more than one. This conviction of a common nature in every species, paves the way for distributing things into genera and species; to which we are prone.

With respect to the common nature of man in particular, we have a conviction that it is invariable not less than universal. Nor are we deceived: because, giving allowance for the difference of culture and gradual refinement of manners, the fact corresponds to our conviction.

We We are so constituted, as to conceive this common nature to be invariable, perfect or right; and that individuals ought to be made conformable to it. Every remarkable deviation from the standard makes an impression upon us of imperfection, irregularity, or disorder: it is disagreeable, and raises in us a painful emotion; monstrous births, exciting the curiosity of a philosopher, fail not at the same time to excite a sort of horror.

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This conviction of a common nature or standard, and of its perfection, accounts clearly for that remarkable conception we have of a right and a wrong sense or taste in morals, and also in the fine arts. man who, avoiding objects generally agreeable, delights in objects generally disagreeable, is condemned as a monster; we disapprove his taste as bad or wrong because we have a clear conception that he deviates from the common standard.

Men are prone to flatter themselves, by taking it for granted that their opinions and their taste are in all respects conformable to the common standard; but there are exceptions without number, of persons who are addicted to gross amusements without having any relish for the more elegant pleasures afforded by the fine arts; yet these very persons, talking the same language with the rest of mankind, pronounce in favor of the more elegant pleasures, and invariably approve those who have a more refined taste, being

ashamed of their own as low and sensual. No reason can be given for this singular impartiality, other than the authority of the common standard with respect to the dignity of human nature; and from the instances now given, we discover that the authority of that standard, even upon the most grovelling souls, is so vigorous, as to prevail over self-partiality, and make them despise their own taste compared with the more elevated taste of others.

Thus, upon a conviction common to the species is erected a standard of taste; which standard, ascertaining what actions are right or wrong, proper or improper, has enabled moralists to establish rules for our conduct, from which no person is permitted to swerve. We have the same standard for ascertaining, in all the fine arts, what is beautiful or ugly, high or low, proper or improper, proportioned or disproportioned.

With respect to the fine arts, there is less difference of taste than is commonly imagined. Nature has marked all her works with indelible characters of high or low, plain or elegant, strong or weak; which if perceived, are seldom misapprehended: and the same marks are equally perceptible in works of art. A defective taste is incurable; and it hurts none but the possessor, because it carries no authority to impose upon others. Differences about objects of taste are endless: but they generally concern trifles, or matters of equal rank, where preference may be given either way with impunity: if, on any occasion, persons differ where they ought not, a depraved taste will readily be discovered on one or other side, occasioned by imitation, custom, or corrupted manners, as described above. And considering that every individual partakes of a common nature, what is there that should occasion any wide difference in taste or sentiment? By the principles that constitute the sensitive part of our nature, a wonderful uniformity is preserved in the emotions and feelings of the different races of men; the same object making upon every person the same impression, the

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