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§ 48. The law in its primarily negative sense, forbidding certain actions and requiring none, tends to isolate men, to set them apart from each other, to sever their natural relations. It It says: Let your neighbor be, do not interfere in his liberty, do not step in his way or on his ground, respect his rights.1 Accordingly, even among highly cultured people, ends. This is the intuition, the immediate recognition of Moral Law. . That principle which determines what is right, determines what is law for "— CALDERWOOD.

me.

"Respect the freedom of others." - COUSIN.

"Limit thy freedom through the conception of the freedom of every other person with whom thou canst be connected."- FICHTE

"Be a person, and respect others as persons." HEGEL.

"Act at every instant with thy whole moral energy, endeavoring to do thy whole moral work." SCHLEIERMACHER.

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“There is but one categorical imperative, namely this: Act on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become universal law."-KANT. See supra, § 44.

Of Kant's famous categorical imperative be it noted that, like several of the other forms given above, it has, as he himself says, no content, it is a form only. We venture the criticism that a law of conduct should tell us what to forbear or to do; it should have matter as well as form. Again, his imperative clearly has a tincture of the utility which he discards, in that it makes the consequences determine the right or wrong of actions; for, why can I not will theft to be universal?—because it would be ruinous. But, indeed, this imperative seems to be, not a law, but a rule by which to test conduct. I take a straight-edged rule or ruler, and laying it on my paper, draw a right line, or test one already drawn. Why is it known to be right? Because it conforms to the rule. Now this rule is not the law of a straight line. Its law, in the Cartesian co-ordinate geometry, is the linear equation a x + by c, wherein a, b and c are fixed numbers, and x and y variables; which is a very different thing from my wooden ruler. Likewise, a law of conduct, and a rule by which to guide or test conduct, are very different things. Kant's empty imperative is not properly a law; but it is a rule, by which we may know the moral quality of certain conduct by bringing to view its natural consequences, these not (causæ essendi) making, but merely (causæ cognoscendi) showing, its quality. For a violation of moral law results in evil, and vice versa, and when the application of the law itself to a case is obscure, the patent consequences will enlighten us. See infra, § 48,

note.

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1 "The most original obligation of man in intercourse is that of leaving every other unmolested until that other has disclosed his purpose to enter

there are many who, while rigidly conforming their lives to the prohibitions of the law, apparently have no wider conception of obligation, and know no difference between legality and morality. Indeed there are some who regard the laws of the State, with all their manifest imperfections and narrow inadequacy, as marking the bounds of obligation, and consider it right to claim or do whatever civil law does not forbid, all unforbidden actions being permissible and supererogatory.1

A thorough analysis, however, of the conditions and implications of trespass, such as we shall subsequently undertake, discovers that the limitation to prohibition is inadmissible, that it is far from exhausting the moral principle, that there is a positive aspect of this formally negative imperative, that the injunction placed upon trespass by the universal moral law is both a prohibition and a requisition, forbidding to do this but equally requiring to do that, and embracing all particular acts and general conduct.2 The morality of the New Testament advances to this higher positive plane. It does not abrogate the earlier form of the law, but arises from it, demands active benevolence, and so exhausts the obligation of

into some intercourse. No one therefore has any right to force unsolicited services upon another; although each one is at the same time bound to behave with good will toward the intentions of every other, as soon as they are made known to him."- LOTZE, Practical Philosophy, § 41.

1 The Greeks held that the State should provide by legislative enactments for the moral education of the people. Accordingly Aristotle says: "What law does not command, it forbids."- Nic. Eth., bk. v, ch. 11, § 1. On this, Michelet remarks: "The Greeks recognized the principle that it was the duty of their State to support the sanctions of virtue by legislative enactments; the moral education of the people formed part of the legislative system. Hence the rule which Aristotle states: Quæ lex non jubet, vetat. The principles of our [the German] law, on the contrary, are derived from the Roman law, which confines itself in all cases to forbidding wrongs done to society. Hence the rule with us is exactly the contrary: Quæ lex non vetat, permittit.” —The Ethics of Aristotle, p. 195,

2 See supra, § 41,

man to man.1 The influence of this positive presentation of the law effectively counteracts the isolating tendency of the

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1 Thus "The Royal Law, according to the scripture: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."- James, 2: 8. Cf. the rule: "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them; for this is the law and the prophets."- Matthew, 7: 12. This contravenes the old Lex Talionis: Do unto others as they do unto you; and resounds in the Anglo-Saxon; Put yourself in his place. It has sometimes been mistaken for the moral law, perhaps because of the addendum, which, however, doubtless means: By this ye may fulfill the law. For evidently it is a rule merely, a form without content, a guide or test of conduct. Even as a rule it is inadequate, for it does not provide for: 1st. Duties to self; but in this we hold it correct; there are no duties to self (see infra, § 74, sq.). 2d. Benevolence; one might say, I want no alms, and so am not bound to give alms. The usual gloss, "in like case, is supposed to correct this, but it does not correct the next point. 3d. Legal justice; by it a judge should always discharge the accused. The gloss, "if it be right, ," begs the whole matter.* We note also that the rule makes self-love the test and measure of obligation; but so too does the royal law; probably, however, not the ultimate test and absolute measure, yet setting a mark we may hardly reach. Notwithstanding these exceptions, it is rightly called "The Golden Rule” for its intrinsic worth and practical value are of the highest. As a rule easy of apprehension, if not of observance, in the vast majority of actual cases, none can exceed its simplicity, its clearness, its wisdom, its excellence. Kant's categorical imperative (supra, § 47, note), taken as a rule, is superior in philosophical comprehension, but vastly inferior in practical application. We accept the one as The Golden Rule of Philosophy, and the other as The Golden Rule of Christianity.

In the Confucian analects, bk. xv, ch. 23, we find: "Tsze-kung asked saying: Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one's life? The Master replied: Is not reciprocity such a word? What you do not want done to yourself do not do to others." Cf. bk. v, ch. 1.. From Samuel Cox, on Ecclesiastes, p. 315. Cf. Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. i.

Isocrates (d. 338 B.C.) said: What you are angry at when inflicted on you by others, this do not do to others.

Aristotle (d. 322 в.C.), being asked how we should behave towards our friends, replied: As we should wish them to behave toward us.

* Henry More, in Enchiridion Ethicum, gives the following revision: "The good which you prefer for yourself in given circumstances, you ought to prefer for another in the same circumstances, so far as it is possible without injury to any third person," - Noema, 14, p. 29.

exclusively negative view, restores and strengthens the mutual relations of men, bringing them into fraternal fellowship, and uniting them by common and indissoluble bonds.

Tobit said to his son: Do that to no man which thou hatest.-Apocrypha, v, 15.

Hillel (d. 4 B.C.) said: Quod tibi ipsi odiosum est, proximo ne facias, nam hoc est tota lex.. The Talmud, as quoted by Wetstein.

Philo Judæus (d. cir. A.D. 45) said: One must not himself do what he hates to have done to him.

Seneca (d. A.D. 65) says: We should give as we would wish to receive. The didax or Teaching of the Apostles (2d century), followed by the Apostolic Constitutions, vii, 2, says: All things whatsoever thou wouldst not have befall thee, thou, too, do not to another.

These early forms are all negative, except that of Aristotle (about friends), of Jesus, and of Seneca. That the thought occurred to so many ancient

sages indicates its natural origin.

CHAPTER V

SANCTIONS

§ 49. The human will originates actions in the sense that it elects one rather than another possibility, and does that instead of this. It is therefore rightly regarded as the first cause in a series of events whose subsequent members are its effects or consequences. As this mastery of the will is itself subject to the moral law, the causes and effects in the series are qualified as moral causes and effects. But let it be observed that causation in the mental or spiritual sphere is still causation, and in that sphere moral causes determine their effects as rigidly as, in the physical sphere, physical causes determine their effects. Moreover, such is the reciprocal relation between the spiritual and material spheres that an activity in either may be the cause of an event in the other.1

When a voluntary act takes place, I have determined it shall be this rather than some other. Until then the deed is merely potential, I am master, I have to do with it. When it becomes actual, then no longer have I to do with it, but it has to do with me. I cease to be the actor, and become an observer, perhaps a sufferer. What is done can never be undone. There may be counteraction, readjustment, restitution, compensation, but there is no restoration or erasure of the past. The act is unchangeable. It has passed from the domain of moral law and entered the realm of natural law, to become a first link in an irrefragable chain of causes

1 See supra, § 10, note; and § 18.

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