CHAPTER IV

THE LAW

§ 42. Let intellective attention be again fixed on the primary notion of a right. Pure reason immediately discerns that a violation of a right, knowingly and willingly committed, is a breach of normal order, a violation of law. Also it discerns that this law, being violable, is not, like natural law, the designation of a constant order of facts that have no alternates; but the designation of an order of facts that ought to be constant, an order which, though violable, should be inviolate and universal.

Moreover, pure reason discerns the very important and special characteristic of this law, that it is obligatory on the potential transgressor. It is addressed to his will, laying upon it a binding obligation, obliging him to conform his actions to its behests. Accordingly it is recognized as an imperative, a command, an order enjoining order on those capable of disorder.1

The order herein designated and demanded is a constantly observant respect for the rights of others, forbidding any unwarranted interference in liberty, forbidding trespass. Its formula is: Thou shalt not trespass. This widely yet definitely interpreted is the completely comprehensive Moral Law, binding all imperfect persons without exception, and at all times, in all places, under all circumstances. Thus it is both catholic and strictly universal.

The moral law is independent of experience, except that 1 See supra, §§ 17, 18.

experience must furnish the occasion for its discernment by pure intellect. It is not deduced from some higher law; there is none higher. It does not logically follow from the principle of liberty to gratify desire, but implies or is implied in that principle, and a mere unfolding of the essential content of either is all that is requisite for a clear apprehension of its truth.1 Indeed the principle and the law are but varied forms of essentially the same necessary truth. As a principle, it is an immediate intuition of pure intellect, having the light of truth in itself. As a law, its universally binding authority lies in its intuitively imperative truth.

§ 43. The intuitive cognition of this fundamental, catholic, and universal law, is the sole function of the pure practical reason or conscience. Conscience is pure reason discerning moral law. This faculty has the moral law for its exclusive object, and its exercise is the primary, original, antecedent condition of any moral activity whatever, without which liberty has no moral restraint, and volition no moral character.3

In thus identifying conscience with the pure practical reason, we give to the term a clear and sharp definition, fitting it for scientific use by distinguishing it from those other fac

1 On the distinction between implication and inference, see The Theory of Thought, p. 103; and Elements of Deductive Logic, § 78.

2 See supra, § 2, and § 11. Also Elements of Psychology, § 267.

3 Conscience, consciousness of good or bad. From Fr., from Lat. conscientia, from con-, for cum, together with, and scientia, knowledge, from scienti-, stem of pres. part. of scire, to know, orig. to discern. - SKEAT.

Consciousness, conscia sibi, and Conscience, conscia obligationis, have the same etymology. For three centuries our language has had the separate terms, like the German Bewusstsein and Gewissen, both being contained in the Old English inwit, in the French conscience, in the Latin conscientia, and in the Greek σvveldŋols, from ovv and eldeɩv, to see together. The Modern English and the German discrimination is an aid to clear expression, but the indiscriminate oneness in other languages is significant. It indicates that conscience is a special functioning of consciousness; that we have no proper consciousness of conduct except in terms of conscience.

ulties which, subordinately and occasionally, are concerned with moral matter, and whose exercise on such matter is quite commonly and confusedly spoken of as the exercise of conscience. Except the pure practical reason, there is no original, distinct, special moral faculty in the human mind.1

1 Conscience in popular usage signifies any or all exercise of mind concerning the morality of action. The moral judgments are attributed to it, also the moral sentiments, and the moral impulse; as in the familiar phrases, a scrupulous or an inconsiderate conscience, a tender or hardened, an approving or upbraiding conscience, a restraining or constraining conscience. In such indefinite sense no scientific use can be made of the term. Moralists find a limiting definition necessary, but they do not altogether agree as to its comprehension. Many definitions include the moral judgment or decision respecting cases; some include also the moral sentiments (§§ 2, 3). It is not a disagreement in doctrine, but merely as to the extent of the meaning of a term in the exposition of doctrine. We gather for comparison a few definitions by recognized authorities, as follow:

"By conscience, or the moral sense, is meant that faculty by which we discern the moral quality of actions, and by which we are capable of certain affections in respect to this quality."- WAYLAND, Moral Science, bk. i, ch. 2, § 1.

"Conscience is the mental faculty or feeling which recognizes and reveals the distinction between right and wrong."— McCosн, Divine Government, bk. iii, ch. 1, § 4.

"A perception of the right, together with a feeling of approbation or disapprobation."— Cooк, Conscience, Lec. i.

"Conscience is that power of mind by which moral law is discovered to each individual for the guidance of his conduct."— CALDERWOOD, Handbook of Moral Philosophy, Pt. I., div. i, ch. 4, § 1 (ed. 1872).

"Nothing else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or pravity of our own actions."- LOCKE, Essay, bk. i, ch. 3, § 8.

"The principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is conscience; for this is the strict sense of the word, though it is sometimes used so as to take in more."- BUTLER, Sermon i. "That principle by which we survey, and either approve or disapprove our heart, temper, and actions. You cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency.”. Idem, Sermon ii.

“Conscience is man's practical reason, which holds before him his law of duty in every case, so as either to acquit or condemn him."— KANT, Tugendlehre, p. 205. "The consciousness of an inner tribunal in man, before which his thoughts accuse or else excuse one another, is conscience."

Let it be remarked that conscience, as herein defined, cannot err. The criterion of a pure intuition is its necessity and universality. Conscience in its intuitive discernment discovers what is necessarily and universally true, and this discernment, being intuitive, is infallible. It is not, however, itself a complete guide of conduct. It must be supplemented by the logical function of intelligence, by thought, deducing minor rules or the moral quality of particular actions. Thought may err, is peculiarly liable to error.1 Herein is the explanation of the great diversity of moral judgments among men. The data of pure reason are the same in all human minds; but the judgments formed in the application of these data often greatly differ, because of illogical thinking. The liability to error is greatly increased by a common acceptance of traditional moral standards, expressed in readymade rules, which, if not themselves erroneous, are often imperfectly comprehended and applied to cases beyond their scope. Thus certain individuals, or large classes of men, or nations, are said to have high or low standards of morality

- Idem, p. 293. "Conscience must be conceived as a subjective principle which declares our responsibility to God for our actions."— Idem, p. 295.

"Conscience is that act of the mind by which we apply to a particular case, to an action to be performed or already performed, the general rules prescribed by moral law.”—JANET, Elements of Morals, § 10.

"There must be a voice of conscience which gives direction in particular cases concerning the praise-worthiness or blame-worthiness of an action presented before it."— LOTZE, Practical Philosophy, § 3.

"Die ganze Seite unseres Wesens, wodurch wir uns urteilend zu uns selbst als wollenden oder handelden Wesen verhalten, heisst Gewissen."-PAULSEN, Einleitung in die Philosophie, Anhang.

1 See Elements of Psychology, § 219. "Right reason," Hobbes calls true, that is, concluding from true principles rightly framed, because that the whole breach of the Laws of Nature [the Moral Law, see supra, § 18, note] consists in the false reasoning, or rather folly, of those men who do not see those duties they are necessarily to perform towards others. - De Cive, vol. ii, p. 16, note. On the diversities of moral judgment, see Lecky, History of European Morals, vol. 1, p. 93 sq., Am. ed., 1870,

according to the degree of approach and logical conformity of these standards to the intuition of pure reason.

The moral intuition, like all others, may be cleared by discriminating attention to its occasions, abstracting from the empirical elements, and fixing upon the pure; and further, by distinguishing those abstract notions with which it is liable to be confused, as, for example, utility. In this manner only is conscience capable of improvement, of education. The accuracy and acumen of the logical faculty, by which the moral quality of an action is inferred, may be greatly improved by intelligent exercise, and thus furnish means for the refinement of moral character. The moral sentiments may be intensified and the moral impulse strengthened by indulgent activity, and the will may become more and more submissive to its law by habitual observance. Conscience, in its loose general meaning, has these several sources of culture; but in the narrow scientific sense here adopted, it is capable only of clearance.1

§ 44. Turning from the faculty by which the law is cognized to the law itself, we observe that this imperative truth is categorical.

There are two classes of hypothetical imperatives, each

1 "Beings like ourselves, in a world like this, compounded of a soul and sense, wrought upon by wild, struggling forces within and without, require for tolerable existence, some ideal scheme of life, some law lodged in the understanding and informing the will. Otherwise we are lost at the outset, and bound for shipwreck as certainly as any vessel sailing into wintry seas without chart or compass, rudder or pilot. Morality is the chart, drafted by religion; rectitude is the compass; duty, the rudder; and conscience, the steersman at the helm. Only, in this case, pilot and rudder are not things separate from the vessel; it is the ship of life herself, thrilling with intelligence and purpose in every part, that bends her forces to the direction of her course, and wins her perilous way through reefs and quicksands, against buffeting storm and treacherous current, till she reaches the far haven where she would be."— PROFESSOR FINDLAY.