a subject has a right to the forbearance of his rightful ruler, who, in violating that right, becomes a tyrant. Thus rights vary with relations. Those of parent in child are different from those of child in parent; those of benefactor in recipient, from those of recipient in benefactor; and both differ from those lying in elder and younger brothers, and in master and servant. But in all such relations, however they may otherwise differ from each other, we see the existence of mutual rights, whose character and extent are determinable only by, and ascertainable only from, the nature of the relation. It is therefore held as an ethical principle that rights are conditioned on personal relations, discerned in personal relations, and determined by personal relations.

In attempting to unfold the ethical theory grounded on personal relations, we shall confine our attention primarily and for the most part to the simple and indifferent relation of man to man, in entire equipoise and reciprocity.

§ 34. A slight attention to the notion of a right discovers that it is conditioned on a social relation. A solitary man, one absolved from all fellowship, however entire his liberty, however abundant the means of gratifying many desires, has not, strictly speaking, any rights.1 Now a right, since it exists only by virtue of a personal relation, near or remote, implies a liability of conflict between wills; at the least, the conceivable possibility of an interference in one's liberty by some other person. For example, a right to go involves the notion of possibly being hindered or opposed, not by the

1 "To speak of natural rights as belonging to the isolated person (Einzelperson) is in itself false. By nature man has merely physical and spiritual capacities, and the possibility of exercising them; but he has a right to the last only in society. . . . A right can only be called natural, in so far as it is not gained through special title, but in so far as it is enough to be a man among men in order to know that others are obligated to respect it.". LOTZE, Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie, § 32.

physical difficulties of the way, but by the counteracting will of some other person, which coming into play, the right to go is orally claimed, and perhaps violently exercised. Any right whatever that any man or people or nation may have, is held in view of a conceivable hindrance or obstruction on the part of others.

Let it be next observed that not every interference in one's liberty is an interference in his right. Warranted interference does not violate any right, but only unwarranted interference. The notion of a right implies that any intelligent interference with its free exercise is unwarranted, which interference is a wrong. Now a right and a wrong are logical antithetical correlatives. The notion of the one necessarily carries with it the notion of the other, like as the notions of straight and bent, of order and disorder. A wrong, however, is conditioned on a right; that is, a right must be in order that a wrong may be. Whenever, then, a person knowingly and willingly interferes in my right, checking or preventing or making vain my effort to realize it, thereby restraining the free course of my powers in seeking to gratify

my normal desires, he does me a wrong. Thus a wrong is a violation of a right, and it again appears that a right can exist only in view of its conceivable violation, a possible wrong.1

1 Right (Lat. jus) as a substantive, a right or rights, denotes a claim of one person against the infringement of others, or a possession which can be defended against aggression. It is illustrated in such phrases as the right to life, the right to vote, human rights, etc., and essentially means that force may be legitimately used in the defense of it, though there may not always be an obligation to do so."— HYSLOP, Elements of Ethics, ch. iii, § 3.

A helpful distinction, taken by the Civilians writing subsequently to the revival of Roman Law, is between jus in rem, a right which avails against persons generally, and jus in personam, a right which avails only against particular persons.

One instance of the former kind is ownership or property, which is "the right to use or deal with some given subject, in a manner, or to an extent,

§ 35. The principle that every man has a right to the free use of his powers in gratifying his normal desires,1 may be stated thus: Every man has a right to the free use of his powers in so far as he does not interfere in the rights of any other; that is, does not violate the right of another, or does no one a wrong. We have just seen that the right of either party exists only in view of its conceivable violation by the other. The modified expression of the principle brings out the point that rights in different parties limit each other; or that each of two parties has a sphere of rights which touches but does not intersect the sphere of the other.2

The necessary and universal limitation expressed in the foregoing modified statement of the principle, is merely a

which, though not unlimited, is indefinite." Another is jus servitutis, which is "the right to use or deal with, in a given or definite manner, a subject owned by another; as, a right of way over another's land; a right, against any third party, of a husband relative to his wife, of a parent to his child, of an officer to his subordinate, e.g. a soldier, of a master to his slave, servant, or apprentice, and vice versa. A third is the right styled a monopoly, which is jus in rem though having no subject, that is, no specific person or thing over or to which the right exists, or in which it inheres. Of this sort is the exclusive right to a trade mark, and a man's right to his reputation or good name. Jura in res are all prohibitive, obligating persons generally to

forbear or abstain from interference.

Instances of jus in personam are, a right arising from a contract or agreement or a simple promise, and a right of legal action, with all other rights founded upon injuries. Jura in personas are either prohibitive or requisitive. See Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, § 510 sq., and § 1041 sq.

1 See supra, § 25.

2 Fichte, in his Theory of Rights, holds that: "Since no one with freedom passes beyond his sphere, and each one therefore limits himself, they recognize each other as rational and free. This relation of a reciprocity acting through intelligence and freedom between rational beings, according to which each one has his freedom limited by the conception of the possibility of the other's freedom, under the condition that this other limits his own freedom also through that of the first, is called a relation of rights. The supreme maxim of a theory of rights is therefore this: Limit thy freedom through the conception of the freedom of every other person with whom thou canst be connected."— SCHWEGLER, Hist. Phil., § 41,

partial explication of what is implied in the qualifying term normal occurring in the prior statement. Normal desires are those that strictly conform to the natural and original constitution of man, harmonize with his other powers, and accord with his relations to his fellows and to his general environment. Those are abnormal which have not this congruity. Normal desires, as acquisitiveness, are limited to such gratification as may be attained without interference in the rights of others. Abnormal desires, as covetousness, impel to action in disregard of the rights of others. It appears, then, that the latter statement of the moral principle modifies the former, not in content, but in expanded expression only.

§ 36. In the further treatment of this matter it will be convenient to use the word trespass, with some latitude of meaning, yet quite definitely. A wrong is any violation of a right; so is a trespass. The terms have identical extension, indeed are strictly synonymous. We have found that liberty is necessary to the exercise and realization of a right, and that a violation of a right is an interference in liberty. Also we have found that a warranted interference in liberty is not a violation of any right, not a wrong, not a trespass. It remains, then, that a trespass is an unwarranted interference in liberty.1

1 Trespass, a passing over a boundary, a crime, sin, offense, injury; from Old French trespas, a decease, departure out of this world. The literal sense is a step beyond or across, so that it has direct reference to the modern use of trespass in the sense of intrusion on another man's land. From Lat. trans, across, and passus, a step. Cf. transgression, violation of law; from Fr. transgression, from Lat. transgressus, pp. of transgredi, to step over, pass over, from trans, across, and gradi, to step, walk. - SKEAT.

In the Pater Noster we have: And forgive us our debts (openμaтa), as we have also forgiven our debtors (¿peiλérais.) Matthew, 6:12. In Luke,

11:4

And forgive us our sins (àμaprías); for we ourselves also forgive every one that is indebted (öpelλovri) to us. The comment in Matthew, 6:14,

In legal definition a trespass is an unlawful act committed with force and violence, vi et armis, on the person, property, or relative rights of another. This narrow, technical statement is intended to designate those forms of trespass which are forbidden by civil law, and have a remedy or a penalty therein provided. But in common, free and correct usage the term includes many forms of offense of which civil law takes no cognizance, indeed any and every act that injures or annoys another, that violates any rule of rectitude or bond of obligation, and we here adopt this comprehensive meaning.1

'T

is: For if ye forgive men their trespasses (аражтúμата, from Tаρаπíπтw, to fall beside or aside, to mistake, err), etc. It is evident that the several terms are used synonymously and interchangeably in a widely comprehensive

sense.

1 The contrast of the juridical and ethical definitions of trespass gives occasion to note the usual legal distinction between perfect and imperfect rights. Perfect or determinate rights, duties, obligations, officia juris, are those recognized and enforced by civil law. Imperfect or indeterminate rights, duties, obligations, officia virtutis, are those not recognized and enforced by civil law. The former, which we shall call jural rights, are the sole subject of Jurisprudence; the latter are customary and conventional, and being equally intrinsic, are included in the more comprehensive science of Ethics. The distinction is practically important as marking the existing limits of authorized jurisdiction; but it is accidental, not essential, and hence of little or no theoretical value.

The phrase perfect right indicates merely that an existing right has been recognized, defined, and made the subject of judicial decision or perhaps of statutory enactment. It is thereby perfected in the sense of being established and protected; and it has gained weight, since to the original merely human right is added the right of a legal subject or citizen. But it should not be understood that an imperfect right, one lacking this authorization, is in itself defective. Imperfect rights are often of greater weight and sanctity than many perfect or jural rights; e.g., those intimate within the famiy circle, and many others likewise non-jural or merely customary. Hence the nomenclature is misleading and unfortunate. There is in fact a vast variety of untold rights which civil law cannot protect and therefore does not recognize. In the common intercourse of men, their personal relations are so manifold and intricate, so various and variable, that specific definition of rights and trespass is impossible, except in a comparatively few marked cases passing from latent to patent. Very much is necessarily left to the voluntary respect