CHAPTER II LIBERTY § 27. Freedom means the absence of causal restraint or constraint. It is a function purely negative, yet a special subjective property of volition. It is the power of choosing. Causative determination is incompatible with the existence of choice, for in causation there is no alternative, whereas in choice an alternative is essential. The power of choosing is simply the ability to decide freely for one act or line of conduct rather than for its possible alternate. Whether or not there be in reality a power of choice is an old and difficult question in metaphysics. It has already been briefly considered, and the point made that the reality of choice is a necessary condition and hence a postulate of Ethics. Whoever is morally responsible must be free. Consequently we here assume that in all voluntary activity there is real freedom in measure sufficient for responsibility.1 1 See Supra, §§ 8-10. Aristotle teaches that "morality presupposes liberty. This exists whenever the will of the agent meets no obstacles, and he is able to deliberate intelligently. It is destroyed by ignorance or constraint."- UEBERWEG, Hist Phil., § 50. The matter is specially treated in the Nicomachean Ethics, bk. iii, first five chapters. The principle of all moral action is πpoalpeσis, i.e. what is commonly termed choice, or the deliberately preferring one act or one course of action to any other on moral ground, under the direction of reason, voûs. It is this, he says, which determines the moral quality of an act, and distinguishes the habit of virtue. At the threshold of the investigation is the freedom of the human will, and on the establishing of this doctrine depends the whole question of human responsibility. See especially Grote's Aristotle, 2d Ed., 1880, ch. xiii, § 2. § 28. Certain limitations of freedom need now to be observed. Freedom lies in the power of choice, and in it alone. All other powers of mind are subject to causation, their activities being always definitely determined by causative antecedents. That choice alone is free is a simple fact in human nature, and a very narrow constitutional limitation of our original and originating ability; but it is the essential difference between a creator and the passive work of his hands. It renders possible not only moral obligation, but also an infinite variety of self-determined activities. A choice resolved is intention. The intention accords with that desire to which preference is given by choice.1 The elected desire, if it be for action, induces a voluntary effort whose end is the object desired. This effort consists solely in an act of attention. The fixing attention more or less intense on a chosen object is the total of possible voluntary energy. We observe here a second very narrow constitutional limitation of human ability. Still this power of attention proves sufficient for the purposes of life, and for fulfilling the demand for moral action and conduct, since by means of it we are capable, directly or indirectly, of complete self-mastery.2 Because determined by the free act of choice, freedom is attributed to the exercise of attention. This freedom, however, is not absolute, but suffers restriction. That the exer 1 An exercise of choice is commonly viewed as directly resolving the question: Shall I do this or that? The view is narrow, but the fact is even narrower. An election is not primarily between two positive alternatives, but between one positive and its negative. Shall I do this or not? Shall I act or refrain? If the decision is to abstain, then, secondarily, the election may occur between the other positive alternative and its negative. Very often, in deliberation, the two positives seem to be weighed directly against each other, as in two scales of a balance; but, on close analysis, it appears that there is but one scale, counterpoised by native inertia, in which scale proposed actions are weighed in quick succession. 2 See Elements of Psychology, §§ 89, and 269 sq. cise involves effort, a nisus or striving, shows the presence of obstacles within the mind itself. Evidently there is some mental inertia to be overcome, which checks and limits the action; otherwise there would be no occasion for effort, no point of application whereon to expend energy. Herein is a third limitation. Mental effort is a force or cause, free in that according to choice it may or may not be put into play, and in that, if put into play, its intensity may be varied. Now the mental may be transformed into physical energy, and issue in muscular action. This, too, is accomplished through attention. To move my arm, I must have an idea of the arm and of it as moving. Fixing my attention thereon, and willing the realization, the arm moves accordingly. This is inexplicable. We know it only and simply from experience. But let it be observed that the direct control of the animal body lies exclusively in this power to contract, according to choice, the voluntary muscles, a limited class, thus producing motion of the limbs and some other organs, while very many vital activities, as pulsation and digestion, are beyond direct control. Moreover, when the movable organs are at liberty, still the extent of their motion is very closely circumscribed. This discovers a fourth very narrow constitutional limitation of free action, restricting or confining it to the ability to contract a muscle, and so to move a member through a small space. Still it is much, very much, to possess and to have at command a free physical force, free in that it accords with choice, which force we may use at will, combining it with fixed natural causes, varying its direction and small intensity, so as to arrest or modify the operations of nature. It is a noteworthy corollary that this limitation to locomotion extends to the body as a whole, and to all external things. These we move from place to place, but this is the total of our direct physical efficiency. The planter moves a spade and seed from one place to another; the forces of nature do the rest, producing the crop. The smith moves his hammer up and down, the weaver throws his shuttle to and fro; the outcome is fabricated by virtue of the natural forces inherent in the materials. A knowledge of natural forces, and an intelligent, purposeful placing of things so as to take advantage of them, enable men to manage factories, to tunnel Alps, to navigate oceans, to wrap the earth with iron, and to cover its face with cities. But in all his infinitely varied works, man has at command only the single free physical ability to place or displace things.1 § 29. Freedom isolates each man from every other, setting him apart and alone in the universe. For this center of his personality is intangible, out of reach of any other being. By the gift of his image the Deity has made man to this extent independent of himself, putting it beyond his power to cause a human creature willingly to do otherwise than that creature may choose; since therein would be a contradiction. He may reason and persuade, command and threaten, but cannot causally coerce the man, for this destroys the essential conditions of personality; the man in such case is not a man, not a moral being. Much less may a fellow-man causally determine his choice. One may de 1 Lord Bacon wrote: "Man, whilst operating, can only apply or withdraw natural bodies; nature, internally, performs the rest."— Novum Organum, bk. i, aph. 4. Mr. J. S. Mill, apparently unaware of Bacon's aphorism, makes the point and expands it, with many illustrations.- Political Economy, bk. i, ch. 1, § 2. "Son of immortal seed, high-destined man, Know thy dread gift, - stroy another's life, but not otherwise his personality. The freedom of man, within constitutional limits, is absolute.1 Freedom and liberty are synonymous terms, denoting the absence of causal determination. They are commonly used interchangeably, but it will be convenient here to use them distinctively. Freedom signifies the absence of causal determination antecedent to and effective of election and intention. It is strictly subjective. Liberty signifies primarily the absence of preventive causes subsequent to intention, of obstacles, impediments or hindrances that interfere more or less effectively with its successful accomplishment. It implies the untrammeled exercise of voluntary effort in its normal function of carrying out the intention. It is objective in that it has reference primarily and especially to external difficulties. A prisoner is entirely free in preferring release to continued confinement; but not until the door opens is he at liberty. The term is also applied in this sense to purely physical facts; as, an unscotched wheel is at liberty; a spark on powder liberates energy.2 1 Says Epictetus, the philosophic freedman: "Put me in chains! No, no! You may put my leg in chains, but not even Zeus himself can fetter my will." "Je n'ai jamais cru, quant à moi, que la liberté de l'homme consistât à faire ce qu'il veut, mais bien à ce qu'acune puissance humaine ne lui fit faire ce qu'il ne veut pas."-ROUSSEAU, Réveries d'un Promeneur Solitaire. We 2 See Elements of Psychology, § 285. The distinction is rarely observed, and the neglect of it has in some instances led to erroneous doctrine. remark that: Freedom is essential in personality; Liberty, accidental; Freedom is absolute; Liberty, merely functional; Freedom appertains to choice; Liberty, to effort, and beyond; Freedom implies free-will; Liberty, merely free-agency; Freedom is negative of any causality; Liberty, of preventive causality; Freedom contradicts necessity; Liberty consists with necessity; Freedom is subject to morality; Liberty, to legality; Freedom conditions proficiency; Liberty, efficiency; Freedom is a primary, Liberty a secondary condition of obligation. |