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More briefly, science is systematized knowledge. There are a number of sciences which may be distinguished as sciences of human nature, Ethics being the chief. Pre-supposing and involving more or less knowledge of the others, it assumes a basis, develops a system, and elaborates principles and rules for the conduct of men individually and collectively. In view of its basis, Ethics is the science of rights; in view of its system, Ethics is the science of obligation.1

1 "Ethic, relating to custom. (Lat. from Gk.) Commonly used as ethics, sb. pl. 'I will never set politics against ethics'; BACON (in Todd's Johnson). From Lat. ethicus, moral, ethic. From Gk. 40kós, ethic, moral. From Gk. 0os, custom, moral nature; cf. 0os, manner, custom. Cognate with Goth. sidus, custom, manner; with Ger. sitte, custom; with Skt. svadhá, self-will, strength. And cf. Lat. suetus, accustomed. The Skt. form is easily resolved into sva, one's own self (Lat. se = Gk. *), and dhá, to set, place (= Gk. 0e); so that Skt. svadhá (= Gk. ě-0os) is a placing of one's self,' hence self-assertion, self-will, habit.”— SKEAT. "Moral virtue results from habit, 00s, whence also it has got its name, houń, which is only in a small degree altered from 0os."-ARISTOTLE, Nic. Eth., bk. ii, ch. 1. Perhaps this was suggested by Plato : κυριώτατον γὰρ ουν ἐμφύεται πᾶσι τότε πᾶν ἦθος διὰ ἔθος. — Laws, vii, 792 e. See also infra, § 21, note.

Right, erect, correct, straight, upright, according with truth and duty. From A. S. riht, from Teut. base rehta, right; from the base rak, root rag, to rule, direct; whence Lat. rectus (for regtus), right, pp. of regere, to rule. -SKEAT. Used also substantively with a modified meaning. See infra, § 34, note. For etymology of wrong, see infra, § 55, note.

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Obligation, from vb. to oblige: to bind to, to constrain; from Fr. obliger, from Lat. obligare, to bind together, from ob, to, and ligare to bind.—SKEAT. We shall use the word exclusively in its most usual sense of moral constraint, or bounden duty, as distinguished from physical constraint.

Deontology, the science of obligation; from Tò déov, what is binding, p. of de, impers. from déw (the Gr. correlate of Lat. obligo), to bind, and Xóyos, discourse. Bentham chose this word as the title of his system and treatise, using it, as he says, "to represent, in the field of morals, the principle of utilitarianism, or that which is useful." Whewell objects, and says: "The term deontology expresses moral science, and expresses it well, precisely because it signifies the science of duty and contains no reference to utility." Stewart tells us that "the ancient Pythagoreans defined virtue to be "Eis Tou déovros, the habit of duty, or of doing what is binding, the oldest definition of virtue of which we have any account, and one of the most unexceptionable." The term is, however, insolens verbum, having been superseded by the word ethics.

§ 20. The hypothesis of evolution has been applied to the explanation of ethical phenomena. Evolution, as a doctrine, is concerned with sequence in the form of a series, without a beginning and without an end. It can neither ascertain the primal origin of the series, nor predict its ultimate issue. Only a small section of the series is accessible to observation, yet it is boldly projected into a prehistoric past, and upon this hypothetical history is founded an explanation of present phenomena. The speculation is pleasing but hazardous. It inquires how morality has come to be, assuming an origin in some heterogeneous principle transmuted under the influence of environment. But we are rather concerned to know what morality is, and purpose to study its phenomena as manifest in mankind of to-day and of history. Inquiry into its genesis and prehistoric development may well be postponed until at least we have a firm hold upon the thing itself.1

There are many moralists who educe their ethical systems from the Scriptures. No doubt the light of revelation has enabled the Christian philosopher to advance far beyond the conceptions of the heathen world; his higher height has given him a greatly enlarged horizon. But a science may not borrow its essence, nor appeal to authority in support of its doctrines. More especially we should not confuse science and revelation. These are distinct though concordant means of knowledge, the one aspiring to attain truth by its own

1 See supra, § 6, note; and Elements of Inductive Logic, §§ 75, 85. Professor Huxley, in his Romanes Lecture, affirms that: "The practice of what we call goodness or virtue involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion it demands selfrestraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual should not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence."

effort, the other condescending to impart from its abundant store. If Ethics is to take rank with the philosophical sciences, it must have a basis of its own, and build thereon its system. Therefore, in the progress of our proposed investigation, we shall in no case cite Scripture as warrant or as proof, but only for illustration or verification. Still it will be encouraging to find the elaborated and the revealed doctrines in accord, and mutually corroborative.

§ 21. A brief sketch of the ground and the process adopted in the present treatise is now in order.

The basis assumed is human nature. Man has an original, native constitution, which, however much it may be distorted, disordered and depraved by his perverted free wilfulness, is nevertheless traceable amid its ruins. There are certain fundamental and essential features of humanity, which no process of suppression or violation can ever wholly efface. There are capacities and faculties whose organic functions in their mutual relations, and relatively to their environment, are clearly manifest, however enfeebled by misuse, or deformed by abuse. The recognition of these features and powers, and a representation of their orderly functioning, is an ideal restoration of human nature to its normal condition, and to its fitting place in the life of the world. This rehabilitated man we shall call the natural man, and propose to find in him, in the native ordering of his being, a safe and sufficient ground for determining his universal though intricately varied obligation.1

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1 Professor Birks of Cambridge Univ., Eng., in his Lectures on Moral Science, defines happily thus: "Ethics is the Science of Ideal Humanity." - Lecture ii.

The phrase "the natural man" is used scripturally and theologically to mean the man in his present actually disordered state. To avoid confusion it should be understood that by the natural man we mean on the con

Referring to the foregoing definitions of Ethics, we observe that a right in one person is correlative to an obligation in some other person. A right and an obligation exist only as they coexist; neither can be alone. But rights are logically prior; they condition and originate their corresponding obligations. For a right, being founded in the nature of its possessor, determines that there be a corresponding obligation; whereas an obligation cannot be conceived to determine a right. Hence we shall take the notion of a right as our

trary, here and throughout, not man as he is, but man as he should be, the normal man.

Bishop Butler in the Preface to his Sermons, Whewell's Ed. p. xlii, in the passage beginning, "There are two ways," etc., presents an approved statement of the matter, substantially reproduced in the following:

"The question concerning the basis of morals may be put in two different ways, subjectively or objectively. We may ask, What is there in man that constitutes him moral? what do we mean by morality as an attribute of human nature? Or, on the other hand, What ground is there for morality in the nature of things, in the order and frame of the universe around and above us? The answer to the first question constitutes what is called psychological ethics; the second belongs to metaphysical ethics. The former method, that commonly pursued by British philosophers, addresses itself to our daily usage and self-acquaintance; the latter leads up to the first principles of knowledge, to those primary concepts and fundamental necessities of thought that lie behind our ordinary thinking and govern our mental operations unawares, and which form the subject matter of the highest and ultimate philosophy. We set out on the former line of inquiry, asking ourselves what are the facts concerning our ethical constitution, and how we are to interpret them. But we shall find that those facts point us beyond ourselves. The human consciousness is not self-sufficient nor selfexplaining. The psychological question pushed far enough in any direction passes, beyond arrest, into the metaphysical. The soul cannot conceive of itself without some corresponding conception of the world and of God.”— PROFESSOR FINDLAY, of Headingly College, Leeds. See also infra, § 25, where the matter is more distinctly expressed.

"The problem of Ethics is to set forth in general outlines the form of life for which human nature is predisposed. . . This science is related to life as grammar is to language, æsthetics to art, dietetics to bodily life. It sketches the form of the possible and of the allowable, and these forms may be filled with different contents."- PAULSEN, Int. to Phil., Appendix.

point of departure for a search into the philosophy of morals.1

treatment.

As already indicated, the matter that constitutes the content of Ethics is real truth. In order to become a science, its matter must be developed in logical form whose perfection is attained through clear, distinct, complete and consistent To approximate this ideal a methodical procedure is requisite. Beginning with observation, primarily of facts of consciousness gathered by introspection or furnished by testimony, and secondarily of the behavior of men in social relations, present and past, the intellect discovers in these phenomena the universally determinative notion of inherent rights, native and acquired, and therein discerns a formative principle, imperative in character, and constituting the common bond of obligation among men. This strictly universal and necessary principle is not inductively generalized, but is intuitively discerned. From it deductions are then made to subordinate truths, until these, arranged in a logical system, shall extend throughout all lines of human activity, and comprehend all modes of human obligation. Ethics thus constituted is a deductive science.2

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1 Moral, virtuous, excellent in conduct. From Fr. moral; from Lat. moralis, relating to conduct, from mor - stem of mos, a manner, custom. Root uncertain. Derivatives, moral, sb., morals, sb. pl., moralize, “But what said Jaques? Did he not moralize this spectacle?" - As You Like

It, ii, 1, 44; moralist; morality, "I had as lief have the foppery of freedom as the morality of imprisonment." — Meas. for Meas., i, 2, 125; from Fr. moralité. SKEAT. Moral science or the philosophy of morals is synonymous with ethics. Cicero says: ". . . quia pertinet ad mores, quod eos illi vocant, nos eam partem philosophæ, De moribus, appellare solemus ; sed decet augentem linguam Latinum nominare Moralem." De fato, ch. i, 1.

2 Theories of morals are primarily the authoritative or heteronomous and the autonomous. Heteronomy finds the origin and sanction of moral conduct in constraining precepts whose validity is derived from supreme authority, demanding submission and obedience without condition or question.

It recognizes the Deity, the Church, or the State as lawgiver. The

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