ber of the community, having, as already said of the family, an individual personality distinguishable from the individual personality of its components. Moreover, although the bounds of any single community be ill defined, still communities are recognized as more or less distinct from one another. Now each of these as an organic whole has not only obligations to its various members, but also to neighboring communities with which it is in communication. Thus the community as a whole is an individual, a personality, with a conscience, and a moral judgment in the consensus of its members, which passes upon its own character and conduct, upon that of its several members, and upon that of affiliated communities. § 128. The organic nature of a community distributing various functions or offices and consequent duties among its members, is clearly seen in its division of labor. The necessities of life necessitate labor, but no one by his own labor alone can surely supply even these, much less can he produce the many requisites to comfortable living. The civilized man has many desires or wants that have become so habitual as to be classed as necessaries.2 For the full gratification of these he is dependent on the productive labor of his fellows. Hence the pressure of such wants molds the community into an organism, in which each works for every other, and they for him; also he labors for the welfare of the whole, and the end of the whole is the welfare of each. Thus a simple community will comprise a shoemaker, a tailor, a carpenter, a blacksmith, a shopkeeper, a printer, a doctor, a lawyer, a schoolmaster, and a curate. These exchange services or 1 See supra, § 118. 2 Said Voltaire : "Le superflu, c'est le vrai nécessaire." This paradox was revived by Charles Boyle, saying: "Only give me the luxuries of life, and I will dispense with the necessaries." products, and a variety of duties is a consequence of the organization. A discussion of division of labor is not proper to a treatise on Ethics, but belongs rather to the theory of Economics.1 It is appropriate, however, to observe that, in addition to its economical advantage, it has the moral advantage of giving rise to the common virtues of honesty, industry, and respect for order, and to a sense of personal responsibility, the responsibility of each worker to his fellows and to the community at large. Besides, it originates the conception of a vocation, a calling, and establishes each worker in a position, changed from a mere man into a member, whereby he is no longer just like all others, but assumes a place and mark specially his own.2 Extreme division of labor, however, depresses the intellectual status of the laborer, narrows his spiritual horizon, and assimilates his activity to that of an automatic mechanism. The distribution of functions brings about social classification. Mere laborers are distinguished from farmers and mechanics, and these from skilled artisans, and these again from artists and the professional class whose work is mostly intellectual. Greater honor always attaches to the finer, and less to the coarser kinds of labor. This has the wholesome effect of inducing effort to rise into what is accounted a higher social rank, and is thus a powerful stimulus to civilization. But here also an abatement must be made. Classes strongly marked tend to become castes, in which form their 1 See supra, § 76, note. 2 The familiar word vocation implies Providential superintendence and appointment to special service. The reality of this is perhaps not commonly recognized. Still" die sittliche Weihe des Berufs," or the moral consecration of callings, has great influence in the regulation of society. It acts like "the expulsive power of a new affection," ejecting all that is inconsistent and unworthy, and assimilating all that is concordant and befitting in a new consecration. wholesome effect disappears, ambitious effort is paralyzed, improvement discouraged, and civilization restrained. § 129. In a prosperous community, one whose wealth in general is increasing, capital or the wealth destined to reproductive consumption tends to accumulate in the hands of those more intelligently industrious, and thereby a special class is formed, the capitalists. These are marked off from the wage-earners whom they employ in their large and enlarging industrial enterprises. Now the economical advantages of large capital engaged in extensive and systematic industry are obvious, yet just because of the greater uniformity, abundance and cheapness of its products, the ability of the small free crafts to subsist is curtailed, which reduces the larger portion of the community to the position of wageearners under the mastership of the capitalists, on whom their livelihood depends. The evils of this division of society, and of this enforced relation, have become familiar in what are known as labor troubles. The grasping selfishness of moneyed power induces oppression; and the sense of injustice, and the dissatisfaction with the unequal distribution of the amenities of life, induce violent revolt. Certain remedial schemes, under the generic name of socialism, have attained notoriety and many advocates. They propose a reorganization of society, giving it a more definite and compact solidarity. In general, they would abolish competition in labor, wages, and particular or private ownership of property, especially of land; substituting work under the stimulus of public spirit, an equal distribution of products, and a common ownership and disposition of all fixed property by closely organized society. A still more radical scheme of reorganization, called communism, proposes to abolish also the family, substituting for domestic relations and the government of parental authority, temporary unions, and a com munistic care for the nurture and education of offspring. Attempts to maintain such schemes in practical operation have hitherto failed. A discussion of socialism as to its economical value, and even as to its ethical worth, must be passed by with the general remark that the evils of society as actually constituted arise, not from contrived injustice, but from a lack of moral equipoise. In the ideal community, which moral culture seeks to attain, there would be no tolerated trespass upon the rights of even the humblest member; and in the absence of just cause of revolt, all would be content in the station determined by merit, by the relative value of services. Until this Utopia be realized, a more intelligent apprehension of the inseparable interests of capital and labor would conduce to greater harmony, to mutual respect, and to a wider recognition of reciprocal rights.1 Meantime, remedy against oppression by either party should be sought, not in turbulence and disorder, but in appeal to that which is set for the guardianship of rights, to the strong arm of the State. 1 "Voici une sage et belle devise: Prendre pour point de départ et pour point d'appui de tout progrès le devoir du rich plutôt que le droit des pauvres; de sort que l'accord dût pu se faire entre les deux adversaires, à l'aide de quelque concessions, en somme assez peu douloureuses." — Revue des deux Mondes, 1883, p. 725. CHAPTER IV THE STATE § 130. It is essential to any widely associated life of men that there should be definite and effective provision for the protection of rights. For in every community evil-doers, or at least doers disposed to trespass, are so many, active and strong, that its several members are not competent, without combination, to maintain intact their rightful liberties. Moreover, certain important interests of the total community are best served by concerted action, indeed many cannot otherwise be served. To attain these two general ends, the safeguard of rights and the advancement of the common weal, the one protecting, the other promoting, is the purpose of the State.1 1 "The society of many families, instituted for mutual and lasting advantage, is called a village, kúμn. . . . When many villages join themselves perfectly together into one society, that society is a State, róλs, and contains in itself, if I may so speak, the perfection of independence. It is first founded that men may live, and continued that they may live happily [i.e., in the perfect practice of virtuous energies. — bk. vii, ch. 8]. For which reason every State is the work of nature, since the first social ties are such ; for to this they all tend as to an end, and the nature of a thing is judged by its tendency. For what every being is in its perfect state, that certainly is the nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or a house. Besides, its own final cause and its end must be the perfection of any thing; but a government complete in itself constitutes a final cause and what is best. Hence it is evident, that a State is one of the works of nature, and that man is naturally a political animal, πоλɩɩкòνšov, and that whosoever is naturally, and not accidentally, unfit for society, aroλis, must be either inferior or superior to man; just as the person reviled in Homer: No tribe, nor State, nor home hath he.' For he whose nature is such as this, must needs be a lover of strife, and as solitary as a bird of prey."— ARISTOTLE, Politica, bk, i, ch. 2. · |