not the ultimate ground of obligation. A practical ethics may be built upon it, but complete theory needs to look beyond, into the nature of the Maker, which is the ultimate determinant of all nature, and more especially of the native obligation which binds his rational creatures to each other and to himself.1

§ 104. We are to pass now from the consideration of obligation, a binding together, to that of organization, a working together. Heretofore the simple reciprocal relation of man to man, with occasional anticipations of other relations, has been the basis of our explanation. This view has proved sufficient for the development of certain ethical principles, and their application to the case supposed. But human relations are mostly complex, consisting largely of relations of the individual man to societies, and of societies to their individual members, and also of societies to each other. In considering hereafter these complex relations, it will be found that the same principles without addition are applicable to solve the obligations involved. The right aim of society, in its various organic forms, is likewise the common welfare, to be sought under the impulse of love. Every moral agent is a member of some system in whose welfare his own is bound up, and thus sharing his own beneficence, he finds his welfare, not in opposition to or deprivation of others or in any self-seeking, but in union with his kind.

1 The doctrine that the moral law is discoverable in the constitution of human nature brings to light the profound ethical significance of the motto inscribed over the portal of the temple at Delphi: Know thyself. See in Elements of Psychology, opposite p. 1, Plato's comment as found in Charmides, 164d, Step.

Perhaps the first who declared the unity and divinity of the law was Herakleitos of Ephesus (circa 500 в.c.) who, in Fragment 91, says: "All human laws are nourished by (or fed by, and so get their strength from) One, the divine (or of God); for it has power (strength, force) so much as he wills, and it has enough for all, and more than enough." See his words on the title-page of this volume, and cf. his Kolvós (§uvós) Xóyos in Fr. 92.

The advantage of organized effort is familiar in the notion of help, the combination of several energies to accomplish a single purpose, one will directing many forces to the same end. The will may be that of one man, as a Cæsar, a Loyola, a Richelieu, a Napoleon, a Bismarck, overmastering and bringing to unity the wills of a multitude; or, turning from autocracy to democracy, the unity of many wills may be the result of a free consensus, as in a republic, and in voluntary associations of all kinds. In this oneness of will the divided becomes an individual, a Briareus. What is subjectively

plural is objectively single. The individuality is complete in its solidarity, and the combination is to be judged as an undivided whole, whether it be a family, a mercantile firm, a society, an army, or a nation.

Likewise let it be observed that conscience is catholic, and the law it reveals universal. Now a combination of men for a common purpose or purposes must be duly regulated by the common conscience. An organized association is responsible for its official actions. Even a nation may do right or wrong, and accordingly is honored or censured and perhaps punished. As a common will makes it an individual, so a common conscience makes it a person; for as a body it is conscious of obligation, and thus is a person. This organic personality, though not wholly independent of, yet is to be distinguished from, the private and persistent personality of the members taken severally, for it implies a mass of superadded obligations dominating the whole. Thus an organism, or that wherein all parts and the whole are mutually means and end, is recognized, when it consists of men, as an individual personality, subject in all functional activity, both internal and external, to the moral law.

CHAPTER I

THE MAN

§ 105. It will be well, as introductory to the subsequent matter and for the sake of its clear treatment, to examine here the organic character of the human constitution.

Each individual man is a completely organized being. Primarily he consists of a body and a mind or spirit. He is essentially a duality. A human body without a mind is not a man; it is merely a corpse. A mind without a body is science knows not what. The disembodied human spirit may furnish matter for revelation, but since it presents no phenomena for our observation, it is beyond the reach of science. The man we study is a body and mind. These are coördinate. Both being essential, we cannot say which has priority in efficiency, any more than we can say which blade of a pair of shears does the more work. They coöperate, and neither can perform its functions apart from the other. Thus the body is for the mind, and the mind is for the body. Each is a means serving the other as an end, so that together they constitute a duplex organic whole.1

1 For definition of organism, see supra, § 15. Ever since Plato declared the end of philosophy to be unity, science has constantly been seeking the reduction of the many to one; and in the history of philosophy we find a doctrine of the absolute. But does not the ultimate constitution of the universe of things seem rather to be essentially duplex; essential, since each thing depends for its actuality upon some other; ultimate, since analysis of what is essentially a pair is annihilation? God and the world; creator and creature; the spiritual and the corporeal spheres; mind and matter; subject and object; means and end; time and space; attraction and repulsion; love and hate; heaven and hell; good and evil; and so on indefinitely.

Evidently the body is itself an organism. The limbs are for the sustenance of the trunk, and the trunk is for the sustenance of the limbs. If the body suffer mutilation, the loss may in a measure be compensated by an increased or a specialized activity of other organs, yet it is a defect. The heart supplies the brain with blood, the brain supplies the heart with energy. Moreover, each subsidiary organ is itself an organism. The visual organ, the eye, serving as a guide to the movements of the whole, is composed of various organs, as the cornea, the lens, the retinal screen, each of which is a means to every other as an end. Thus the whole body is an organism composed of many organisms, to each of which every other and the whole brings its contribution.1

§ 106. The mind is a complement of faculties, an assemblage of functions.2 Its several generic powers, knowing and

That contraries are first principles of entities is a Pythagorean doctrine (see Aristotle's Metaphysics, bk. i, ch. 5). Necessarily we conceive things by virtue of their oppositions (see Elements of Psychology, § 56 sq.), and if the realities correspond with our conceptions, the universe is a system of counterparts (see supra, §§ 14-18).

Philosophic materialism on the one hand, and idealism on the other, teach monism, the unity of the human being, of self; but the prevailing doctrine in philosophy is dualism, and such is the common notion of mankind. This dualism of mind and body is usually thought of as limited to mankind, or at most extended to animals; but, in the very dawn of philosophy, two centuries before Plato, the Ionians taught hylozoism, û^ŋ, matter, and wn, life, that all matter is endowed with life, or, as Thales expressed it, all things to be full of gods, πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι. ARISTOTLE, De Anima, i, 5. This doctrine, with some modification, has in our day been revived under the title panpsychism or the universal subconsciousness of matter. See Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, bk. i, ch. 1, § 5.

1 "In the physical constitution of an organized being," says Kant, “we assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found in it but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose.". Grundlegung, etc., Abbott's trans. p. 13. What follows on pp. 14-16 will repay thoughtful reading.

2 See supra, § 1, and note; also § 16.

feeling, desiring and willing, are reciprocally related. Each class is a means to the others as ends, enabling them to fulfill their normal functions. Were there no intelligence, there could be no emotion or sentiment; were there no intelligence and feeling, there could be no desire; were there no desire, there could be no volition; and were there no motived volition, there could be no intelligence higher than mere brutal receptivity. Each serves the other and the whole.

We must be on our guard lest we transfer to this spiritual sphere our notions of corporeal organs. These organs are distinct entities standing apart in space; whereas the mental faculties and capacities are simply properties or functions of one and the same entity whose substance has no relation to space, except through the incorporating body. It is nevertheless evident that these generic properties are mutually related as means and end. Hence they are organized as to their functions, and the mind, by virtue of this constitution, is a spiritual organism.

Furthermore, the specific powers are organically related, each special faculty being supported in the exercise of its functions by each and all the rest of its class. It will be best to exemplify this by the desires, with which, as motives of the will, we are here particularly concerned..

The desires are primarily divided into the craving desires, or appetites and appetencies, whose function impels to acquire, and the giving desires, or affections, whose function impels to impart.2 This opposition is merely logical, for actually, in their naturally constituted order, they coöperate, the former seeking to acquire in order that the latter may be prepared to impart. The suppression or hinderance of either would be a mutilation, worse than the amputation of a leg or arm. As already pointed out, the exercise of the

1 See Elements of Psychology, §§ 77, 78, 149, 154.

2 See supra, §§ 5, 6.