is needful to our welfare. But the mere pleasure seeker, studying his own enjoyment, not occasionally as a recreation but as the end of living, the devotee of social amenities, the professional sportsman, the dissipated spendthrift, the dissolute libertine, each of these is even more justly reprobated, hardly for lack of wisdom in his way, rather for total lack of wisdom's way. A life of pleasure, whether generous or selfish, even one of simple playful gayety apart from vice, is accounted a wasted life, and wise men take infinite pains to secure, through much self-denial, a regulated and sober welfare. § 94. We are, then, in great need to know, clearly and distinctly, the meaning of welfare. In accord with the fundamental doctrine of this treatise, the following definition is proposed: Welfare is the gratification of normal desire. From this it follows that continuous welfare is the constant gratification of normal desires throughout a complete life. Its attainment calls for self-control, for a measured adjustment of incompatible gratifications, in order to harmony, and to the maximum gratification of those desires that are natural, normal and in accord with moral law. The primary principle is, a man has a right to gratify his normal desires, if he do not trespass. Hence he has a right to welfare; but whether he will attain it or not depends on the intelligent regulation of his desires, together with the possibility of their gratification within the given limits. It has been pointed out that, taken concretely, virtuous conduct is conduct conformed to practical reason or conscience, and, taken abstractly, virtue is action in conformity with moral law. Also it was observed that virtue implies a struggle against obstacles. Now, besides the subjective difficulties of virtuous endeavor, the judging, choosing and 1 See supra, § 70. striving for right life, there are practically numerous and great objective difficulties, external obstacles in circumstances, that oppose one at every turn, preventing the complete gratification of virtuous longings. If the subjective intention and effort be accomplished, then, even though the objective result fail, the chief condition of welfare is fulfilled, and its principal element provided. But to complete welfare, there must be an external realization of the subjective virtuous intent. So it is that, in the actual warfare of life, though it chastens and strengthens, there is rarely, if ever, a complete realization of thorough-going welfare. Since we have defined welfare as the gratification of normal desires, and have characterized virtue as being the effort to realize this gratification in loving service, it appears that one's welfare consists in seeking disinterestedly to promote the welfare of others, and that an earnest constant striving to reach this end comprises the sum total of obligation. It is attained on two parallels. First, as a prime condition, one should seek, directly and indirectly, by precept, by example, and by whatever influence he may rightly use, to cultivate in his fellows a virtuous disposition, inducing generous impulses, and impressing the mandate, Go, and do thou likewise. Such education is due especially from parents to children, from teachers to pupils, from the enlightened civilizer to the benighted barbarian.1 Secondly, he should strive to remove, in so far as practicable, the external obstacles to their welfare lying in the way of his fellows, especially of those more nearly related to him; and also to furnish out of his own resources all reasonable facilities for these others to do likewise, thus helping them to modify and arrange their circumstances favorably to their own righteous 1 Semita certe Tranquillæ per virtutem patet unica vitæ." — JUVENAL, lib. iv, sat. 10, ends. So doing, he shall himself, without thought of himself, experience the working of that great natural law of human activity, It is more blessed to give than to receive.1 § 95. It is now needful to inquire concerning happiness, of which nothing has heretofore been said. The term is very indefinite, and though in common use, there is difficulty in fixing its meaning.2 Sometimes we hear that happiness is continuous pleasure. If this be allowed, then happiness cannot be identified with welfare; for, as we have seen, welfare is something more than pleasure. But, while pleasure is a large, and perhaps an essential ingredient in happiness, this also seems to have other elements.3 Then shall not happiness and welfare be identified? Not strictly; for, though surely there is an intimate connection between them, a distinction remains. It is the distinction of antecedent and consequent in causal relation. Welfare consists in the constant gratification of right desires. Now, like as pleasure is the reflex or correlate of spontaneous and unimpeded 1 "Remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he himself said: Μ κάριόν ἐστιν μᾶλλον διδόναι ἢ λαμβάνειν.”—Acts, 20 : 35. Words not found elsewhere. 2 Happy, from hap, a word of Scandinavian origin, meaning fortune, chance, accident; seen in hap-hazard, hapless, haply, happen, perhaps, and mishap; cf. Ger. Glück, luck, and Glückselig, blissful; Fr. bonheur, from bon, and heur, luck; Lat. felix, from which, felicity; Grk. evτuxía, good-hap, and evdarpovía, a good dalμwv, genius, fate, destiny, fortune, providence. Happiness," says Coleridge, "is not, I think, the most appropriate term for a state, the perfection of which consists in the exclusion of all hap, that is, chance.". - Aids to Reflection, i, p. 31. 66 8 "We can only have the highest happiness," says George Eliot, in her epilogue to Romola, "by having wide thoughts, and much feeling for the rest of the world as well as for ourselves; and this sort of happiness often brings so much pain with it that we can tell it from pain only by its being what we would choose before everything else, because our souls see it is good." "We think," says Aristotle, "that pleasure should be mixed up, πapaμeμíxlai, with happiness.” — - Nic. Eth., x, 7, 3. Yet it hath been said, Blessed are they that mourn, energy exerted in any special case, so, in the general course of living, happiness is the reflex or correlate of virtuous and successful conduct. Thus welfare is antecedent, well-being consequent; the one is dynamic, the other static; the one, prosperity, the other, happiness.1 There can be no doubt that happiness is universally regarded as desirable in the highest degree. Whence it may be presumed that the desire for happiness is a subjective necessity, an established uniformity, a natural law in humanity. Also it may be allowed that no man can forecast the particular circumstances that would make him happy.2 Yet it seems not impossible for practical ethics to lay down rules of conduct in accord with fundamental principles, which, if 1 "Oh happiness! our being's end and aim, Good, Pleasure, Ease, Content, what'er thy name, Say in what mortal soil thou deign'st to grow. Where grows? Where grows it not? If vain our toil; We ought to blame the culture, not the soil. Ask of the learned the way? The learned are blind; Some place the bliss in action, some in ease, -POPE, Essay on Man. 2 "There is one end," says Kant, "which may be assumed to be actually such to all rational beings, and therefore one purpose which they not merely may have, but which we may with certainty assume that they all actually have by a natural necessity, and this is happiness. To be happy is a purpose which we may presuppose with certainty and à priori in every man, because it belongs to his being. . . The notion of happiness is so indefinite that although every man wishes to attain it, yet he never can say definitely and consistently what it is that he really wishes and wills. He is unable, on any principle, to determine with certainty what would make him truly happy, because to do so he would have need to be omniscient." Excerpts from Grundlegung, u. s. w., S. 39-43; Abbott's trans. p. 46 sq. favored by environment and followed intelligently and persistently, should conduce to happiness. But only a brief theoretical consideration is herein admissible. It appears, then, there are in general two necessary conditions of welfare and its consequent happiness, subjective observance of moral law, and objective environment favoring realization. The former is necessary, but insufficient. The inward satisfaction arising from a full discharge of obligation, is an essential and the chief element of happiness; but untoward circumstances may so mar the felicity of a righteous worker that we deem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. The most perfect man was a man of sorrows, suffering the contradiction of sinners against himself. On the other hand, the full possession of health, wealth and honors does not in itself constitute welfare. Outward success only, like that of Alexander, what doth it profit a man? There must be prosperity both within and without in order to welfare, and to its reflex, happiness. Also we observe that no one can hopefully make happiness, however much he may desire it, his immediate object. It is altogether out of direct reach. The only possible way to it is through its condition, welfare. Hence wisdom disregards happiness as an end, not looking beyond welfare, but seeking this as the end of all endeavor. This attained, happiness results by a benign law of human nature; wellbeing, the sanction of well-doing. A poet has said: Happiness is a wayside flower; plucked, it withers in the hand; passed by, it is fragrance to the spirit. Moreover, let it be especially observed that, still less can any one hopefully make his own personal happiness his end. It has been sufficiently shown that, one's own welfare depends on his seeking the welfare of others. Hence one's own happiness is found only in thus promoting that of others. Outward duty done for the sake of inward satisfac |