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decency, modesty, propriety, in private as well as in public. So of the preservation of my personal dignity and self-respect, of my honor, sincerity and truthfulness. Even the indulgence of innocent pleasures should be primarily for recreation, preparing me for renewed efficiency in paying my dues. The supply of necessities should ever be governed by the same general purpose, so that whether we eat or drink, or whatsoever we do, let all be done for others' sake.1

§ 77. This doctrine is not ascetic, but altruistic. It transfers the end of all right action from an exclusive self to its fellows. All righteous conduct is disinterested, unselfish. The moral law, Trespass not, or Be just, or Do duty, is equivalent to, Withhold no due, but bestow in due measure. We say in due measure, for not all giving is righteous; a

1 See 1 Corinthians, 10: 31. Robert Browning, in Balaustion's Adventure, l. 1212 sq., and 1723 sq., speaking of Herakles banqueting between his labors, expands the aphorism, Neque semper arcum tendit Apollo, thus: He was

"glad to give

Poor flesh and blood their respite and relief
In the interval 'twixt fight and fight again -
All for the world's sake;

frank and free,

Out from the labor into the repose,

Ere out again and over head and ears

I' the heart of labor, all for love of men ;
Making the most o' the minute, that the soul
And body, strained to height a minute since,
Might lie relaxed in joy, this breathing-space,
For man's sake more than ever; till the bow,
Restrung o' the sudden, at first cry for help,
Should send some unimaginable shaft
True to the aim and shatteringly through
The plate-mail of a monster, save man so."

See infra, § 83, Asceticism, a dis

2 Altruistic, from Lat. alter, other, regardful of others. note. Ascetic, from Grk. dσкnσis, exercise, training. torted out-growth from early Stoicism, is the exercise of the soul in suppressing and stifling many of the normal impulses, apparently holding that whatever is natural is wrong. The early Stoics taught, on the contrary, that whatever is natural is right (see supra, § 25, note), which is also the doctrine of the present treatise. Bentham, rather cynically, says: 66 Asceti

lavish or a disproportionate distribution of means or of service is wrong, being an expenditure that is due elsewhere.

The virtuous exercise of self-denial, of self-sacrifice, when clearly understood, is not the giving up of what one has a right to retain and enjoy, but the yielding to another his due, discharging his rightful claim, according to him a right of which he is perhaps quite ignorant. Truly it is a parting with what I might keep, but what I have no right to keep. It is free, unconstrained justice.

While the chief, indeed the only end of life is usefulness, the promotion of the welfare of those to whom some one is related in accord with the relations, he is not thereby excluded from participating in the benefaction. The law, by this doctrine, forbids his making himself alone the end, and requires his regard and intent to be constantly beyond himself; but it does not prohibit his sharing, as a member of a community of two or more, the welfare he promotes. It does not require self-abnegation, nor entire self-forgetfulness, but that the inclination, the impulse, the motive and the intention be altogether benevolent.

It is a fact that in the judgment of mankind, for some reason or other, the practice of self-denial, of self-sacrifice, the exercise of affection, is held in high esteem, is accounted generous, noble, even heroic, and receives the warmest praise; while, on the other hand, selfishness, exclusive or excessive regard for one's own, is accounted ignoble, ungenerous, mean, and is heartily condemned. Disinterested motives and conduct are always praised; interested motives and conduct are

cism approves of actions in as far as they tend to diminish the agent's happiness, and disapproves of them in as far as they tend to augment it." - Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. 2, § 3. Says Gibbon : "The ascetics renounced the business and the pleasures of the age, abjured the use of wine, of flesh, and of marriage, chastised the body, mortified [put to death] their affections, and embraced a life of misery, as the price of eternal happiness." Decline and Fall, ch. 37.

always blamed. Why is this? Is it a delusion? Is it merely because when my neighbor works in his own interest, I have less of his help in mine? If so, then it is merely my selfishness that prompts me to condemn his. Is there not some less degrading, some better reason for the universal condemnation of interested action, and the universal approbation of disinterested service? Surely there must be, for I judge after this manner of the conduct of the ancients, whose conduct cannot possibly affect me. Yet there is a school of moralists holding that disinterestedness is a delusion, that human nature is incapable of a purely disinterested action, that all conduct resolves, in the last analysis, into self-seeking.1 It is undeniable that selfishness generally prevails and is dominant. But let us distinguish between the actual and the potential, and heartily deny the impossibility of disinterestedness. Nay more, let us hold that purely disinterested conduct has sometimes been actually experienced, and also observed, and that it is truly the culminating perfection, the realization of ideal humanity.

§ 78. The thesis is presented in the following questions: Why is it that the affections, the giving desires, have a rightful supremacy over the appetites and appetencies, the craving desires? Why is it that the moral law enjoins the practice of affections, impulses to benefit others, and forbids the in

1 So Spencer in The Data of Ethics; and others. In the egoistic school of Ethics it is maintained that human nature is incapable of a strictly disinterested action, that the expectation of one's own profit or reward enters into all cases of personal sacrifice as the fundamental, informing motive. But this cannot be said of extreme cases involving, under the impulse of duty, the sacrifice of life itself. There is often a total giving away of self, as in defensive warfare, with no thought of reward beyond death, in order that those who remain may have their rights. We claim, in opposition to Hobbes, Mandeville, Rochefoucauld, Spencer, and the rest, that purely disinterested actions are not only possible, but often actual.

dulgence of impulses craving a gain for self as an end? The reason lies deep in human nature.

Let it be granted that all constitutional desires have natural and therefore rightful aims, and should harmonize, thus sustaining each other in their normal functions. Also, that craving and giving are contraries, whence a conflict between appetency and affection, which two therefore do not accord but are in constant and inevitable discord, unless one become subservient to the other. That our desires should be brought into functional harmony, will hardly be denied. That this harmony can be attained only by the subservience of one or the other class, is evident. Which is entitled to supremacy?

?

Now suppose affection be made to subserve interest. What is the consequence? The impulse to benefit another is obscured under the impulse to benefit self. I treat my friend with apparent and professed affection, using the manner and language of friendship, my real intent being to obtain for myself a gain. Perhaps I indulge my generous impulses in order to cultivate my generosity, a virtue I desire to possess in myself. Evidently this is egoism or selfishness doubly refined, and therefore doubly odious. I degrade my friend into a mere means for my own profit, and so dishonor and wrong him. I do it under the form, and name, and profession of love, when in reality it is the contrary, base, self-seeking hypocrisy. If there be one character the most despicable of all, it is the hypocrite, he whom our Lord denounces in his most scathing terms.

But such procedure is something more than hypocrisy. It is the extinction of half of one's nature, of his affections. For, if I confer a benefit on my neighbor solely in order to benefit myself, this does not merely subject love to interest, since love is then no longer love, but simply interest. has ceased to be, and I am wholly, exclusively selfish. This is not the subordination and subservience of affection to

Love

appetency, but the complete suppression and extinction of affection. A large part of the normal nature of the man disappears, and he stands in opposition to all his fellows. It is universal war; every man's hand against every other. Surely this is not the way to personal excellence, to perfection of character. Surely this violates the law. It is amazing that many moralists should hold it obligatory to cultivate our affections to the end that we may thereby perfect our own personality, thus advocating a principle which would result in the extinction of affection, and produce a character absolutely selfish.1

§ 79. Suppose, on the contrary, the craving desires be made subject to the affections. What follows? Are they likewise extinguished? Not at all. It is easy to understand how my appetency may, without loss, be made to subserve the ends of affection, craving various objects, not for my own sake as the end, but for the sake of those on whom I would bestow my energies and gains. Thus I may seek pleasure as a recreation, as a means of refreshing my powers for more efficient service. I may strive, with great earnestness and activity, to acquire property and increase my wealth, not from the miser's desire to possess, nor the voluptuary's desire to enjoy, but in order that I may bestow on others the benefits wealth commands, reserving for myself only such portion as is needful for further beneficence. I may cultivate my intellect, not for the sake of proficiency, but of efficiency. Further illustration is superfluous. But let us add, I may desire power in order to greater usefulness; and I may desire t reputation, the esteem of my neighbors, or even fame, simply D•• because my influence in favor of the welfare of others is therein extended. Evidently the craving desires may crave in order to give, that is, they may become entirely subject to 1 So Janet in The Theory of Morals; and others.

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