subjective self, and capable of being affected by it, which finds expression in such familiar phrases as one's self, control yourself, I hold myself responsible, and the like. The two are identified in the phrases I myself, he himself, we ourselves, they themselves.

This distinction between the conscious ego and the represented ego, is unreal, inasmuch as it contravenes the essential unity of the ego. Evidently, in thought it is a fiction, in speech a metaphor. Hence, although it is a natural, a normal mode of mind, there is need of caution lest it mislead us to commit the fallacy of figure of speech.

§ 74. The name self-love is commonly used to denote that longing for gratification which marks the craving desires when their end is self. But love is essentially a desire to benefit some other one, and this is contrary to the benefit of self. It necessarily implies a relation between two; in self there is really and literally but one. The compound word self-love is, therefore, a contradiction in terms, absurd literally, and can be allowed only as a metaphor derived from the fanciful idea of an alter ego.

But self-love is merely a misnomer, for the reality of the thing thus absurdly named is unquestionable. It is selfinterest, or simply interest, egoism, selfishness, the opposite of love. For while love is desire to impart, interest is desire to profit. Egoism makes self the end, seeking one's own enjoyment and welfare at cost of or in disregard of another's. Psychologically it is the supremacy of the craving desires, the appetites and appetencies, over the affections; either disregarding these, or neglecting their call, or what is worse, a more intense and refined egoism, making the affections subserve self. Clearly the term self-love is a euphemism, filching the name of love to sanctify what in truth is its contrary,

1 See supra, §§ 5, 6.

interest, egoism, selfishness. That, however disguised, it is to be condemned, will sufficiently appear in the sequel.1

Closely related to the notion of self-love, is that of duty to self. Can I literally owe myself anything? Can I owe myself a dollar? How is it to be paid? By passing it from one pocket to another? Can I in any manner or measure be indebted to myself? Is anything due me from me? Duty is essentially the name of a relation between two; I myself am but one. I cannot possibly be in debt except to some other one. Hence the phrase duty to self is, in its terms, self-contradictory and absurd.2 It, too, originates in the fancied alter ego, to whom the ego is said to be indebted as to another person. Clearly it is a metaphor, and deductions from the generic law of duty to this as a species of duty commit the subtle fallacia figuræ dictionis. As in the phrase love of self, so in the phrase duty to self, we detect selfishness again masquerading, now in the guise and under the sacred name of duty.

§ 75. But aside from terms the important question arises: Does not moral law command motives and actions that are selfish, that is, such as find in self an end? Moralists very generally answer affirmatively, and recognize a wide and weighty class of obligations terminating in self, having respect exclusively to self, impelled by self-love, and usually entitled duties to self.3 For example, they teach that every

1 It must be acknowledged that many eminent authorities hold a contrary view; e.g., Aristotle, in Nic. Eth., bk. ix, ch. 8, "Of Self-love"; Butler, Sermons, Preface, and i, xi; et al. In "the royal law," Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, the phrase, as thyself, evidently does not command self-love, nor does it sanction it, but merely sets up what is in fact, as men are, a high mark for attainment, one beyond the reach of most of us. There is no Scripture that commands or approves self-love. Cf. supra, § 48, note.

2 Let it be remarked that the term obligation is from the verb to oblige, meaning to bind to, to bind together. Obligation binds, and the binding is of at least two together. Cf. supra, § 19, note.

8 With Kant duties to self are even the source of all other duties. See

one owes it to himself to be temperate, that moderation, as opposed to excess in all things, is a duty to one's self, for the sake of one's own personality, and in order to self-culture. Popular speech also quite commonly recognizes, and is disposed to emphasize, duties to self, usually holding them paramount. It is heard in the every-day phrases, I owe it to myself, he was bound in justice to himself so to do, and the like. Postponing for the present a direct argument of the question, we here observe merely that, if a man be morally bound in any case whatever to make himself an end, or in other words, if there be any real thing answering to the lame phrase duty to self, then the moral law as heretofore formulated in this treatise is quite inadequate. For trespass necessarily implies at least two parties, and the given interpretation of duty and of justice, though very wide, presumes always a relation between two. Obviously, then, our view of moral obligation, in its widest comprehension, does not include the notion of duties to self, indeed it excludes self as an end.

And truly there is no duty to self. In this case the phrase is not merely a misnomer, for there is nothing corresponding to it in any admissible sense. Self is never, can never be a moral end, but on the contrary, all selfishness or egoism is violation of moral law. Duties, obligations universally relate

to others, and selfishness is sin.

§ 76. Let us briefly examine one or two of the duties usually classed as duties to self, and indicate their altruistic interpretation.

Grundlegung, etc., S. 56 sq.; Abbott's trans., p. 65 sq. Elsewhere he says: "Supposing that there are no duties of this kind, then there would be no duties of any kind; for I can only think myself under obligation to others as far as I am under obligation to myself.” Per contra, Martineau says: "Duties to self can be saved from contradiction only by an impossibility, namely, the splitting one's self in two, susceptible of reciprocal obligation."

Temperance or the control of appetites and passions, bringing them into conformity with reason, subjecting them to moral law, is commonly cited as one of the most comprehensive and prominent duties to self. Is it my duty to be temperate? Certainly. It is a cardinal virtue. Is it a duty I owe to myself in order to the perfection of my character? Is it a discipline in the process of self-culture for the sake of my personal excellence? Assuredly, say nearly all the moralists, both ancient and modern, it finds in self its end.

To be temperate is a primal duty, a weighty obligation; but it is strictly a duty, an obligation, to others. I owe to God, my maker and highest benefactor, to modulate into harmony the powers he has given me, that I may fulfill the mission on which he has sent me, and accomplish the work he has assigned me in the world. I ought to be temperate, husbanding my energies, that I may serve my family, my neighbor, the community, the state, mankind, as fully and completely as possible. Unless I be temperate, I cannot pay these dues. Moreover, I ought to be an example, in this golden mean, to my fellows, inclining them to its practice. Temperance is one of the highest obligations. It is the top round in the ladder of Christian graces. It ennobles. Still it is due, not to self, but to those around.1

1 For the graces, see Galatians, 5: 22, 23. Closely allied to temperance is economy. Do I owe it to myself to be economical? No; yet it is a duty, a real duty. I am but a steward, and am bound to economize my time, my energy, my property, because of my relations. Man is instinctively an economist. He naturally takes the short cut, the straight line. Also he takes what lies near as requiring less reach, and is, when calm, sparing even of unnecessary words. The habit is fostered, perhaps, by mere laziness or other selfish consideration; but one ought always to prefer frugality of means in attaining his proper ends, because this also is due. Economy generally takes part as one rational determinant in choosing, and often, in cases of light moment, is the sole determinant. Carelessness or thoughtlessness, excessive animal spirits, excited nerves, may neglect economy of effort; but this is waste, and all waste is wrong. To be economical, frugal,

The pursuit of truth for the sake of truth is regarded as a refined and noble avocation." Knowledge for its own sake is a high sounding phrase; but it is merely a euphemism concealing the reality, which is knowledge for one's own sake, a refined selfishness. But the worth of knowledge is in its power for good, and he who possesses it in large measure is a king among men. Every one is in duty bound to increase his stores, solely that he may thereby more efficiently promote the welfare of the present and the coming generations.

Much the same may be said of the duty of preserving life and health and strength. These belong not to me save in trust. They belong to my relatives and friends, to mankind. I am a guardian and agent. So of the duty of physical, mental and moral culture. I am bound to account with usury for the talents intrusted to me. So of cleanliness,

sparing of energy, is prudence, wisdom, duty, both private and public, personal and political, a saving for expenditure elsewhere. "Je loue l'econome; c'est la richesse des pauvres, et la sagesse des riches." — DUMAS.

.

The earlier political economists based their science on the aphorism that men are governed by interest, that in affairs selfishness determines conduct. Hence Carlyle dubbed it "the dismal science." But viewing economy as a duty, this reproach disappears, and Economics, so far as it depends on will, becomes a branch of Practical or Applied Ethics. This, however, would not greatly modify its other principles. For it is remarkable that industry, though so largely directed by interest, works out for society about what would follow from a strict observance of duty. The farmer, the manufacturer, the merchant, whether laboring for his own or for the common weal, accomplishes in the long run the same general result. "To men is not given that God-like unselfishness that thinks only of others' good; but in working for themselves they are working for us all. We are so bound together that no man can labor for himself alone. Each blow he strikes in his own behalf helps to mold the universe. Stephenson, to win a fortune, invented the steam engine. Shakespeare wrote his plays to keep up a comfortable home. The ambitious man, building a pedestal for himself, leaves a monument to posterity. Alexander and Cæsar fought for their own ends, but, in doing so, they put a belt of civilization half round the earth." Such is the beneficent world-ordering of human affairs.