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nation that should be our high endeavor, as well claiming that they had a warrant for his arrest. as to make progress in material things."

The trials through which the country has passed, the sifting of the wheat from the chaff, of good from the bad officials - which it is hoped is going on and to which the people of the United States are addressing themselves — will renovate the several departments of government; and surely the exigency will produce the men demanded:

Young Cudahy was then forced into the buggy, blindfolded, and driven rapidly into the southwestern part of the city of Omaha, where he was imprisoned in a vacant house previously prepared for his reception and detention. Here he was kept a closelyconfined prisoner until a ransom was paid for his release and safe return.

The disappearance of young Cudahy was soon dis

Strong minds, great hearts, true faith and ready covered, but it was not until the next morning that

hands;

Men whom the lust of office does not kill;
Men whom the spoils of office cannot buy.

Then, will America stand upon the threshold of a new age, and her name be an inspiring incentive to justice and freedom the world over; and then will she take an onward stride toward the goal of neverending peace, unity and national grandeur, or as Our Own Oliver Wendell Holmes rythmically puts it:

"Long as the watch towers of our crownless queen
Front the broad oceans that she sits between,
May her proud sons their plighted faith maintain,
And guard unbroken union's lengthening chain
Union, our peaceful sovereign, she alone
Can make or keep the western world our own."

Her free institutions being canonized in the hearts of the people, no political upheaval can wrest them from her grasp. As we are prone to remember with peculiar pride the trials through which we have passed, the victories won, the strides of progress in civil and religious liberty, and in all of the elements of national security, we naturally work for the conservation and glory of the system.

America enters upon the second century of her existence with high and abiding hopes honored at home and respected abroad, as the grand and successful pioneer in the ennobling principles of representative government, while her people, with one accord utter the hopeful prayer, Esto Perpetua. JOHN FREEMAN BAKER.

No. 156 BROADWAY, NEW YORK CITY.

THE CUDAHY ABDUCTION.

BY JAMES M. KERR.

The incidents in the Cudahy abduction are still fresh in the mind of the people, not only of the community where the crime was committed, but of the nation at large. It will be remembered that on the evening of December the eighteenth, at Omaha, Nebraska, Eddy Cudahy, a lad of fifteen summers, while passing along the street within a block of his home, was accosted by a couple of strangers who drove up in a buggy, one of whom represented himself to be the sheriff of Sharpy county, declared that the young man was Eddy McGee, who was wanted in their county for stealing $600 from his aunt, and

anything definite was known regarding the real cause of his disappearance. On the morning following the abduction an unknown horseman cantered up to the front gate of the Cudahy mansion, flung a letter on to the greensward and rode rapidly away. The letter, when opened, was found to contain an offer to return the missing boy for a ransom. Finally, by similar letters, delivered in the same manner, the amount of the ransom was fixed, and the method of payment pointed out. The elder Cudahy was directed to drive at a specified time of day, in a manner described, carrying a designated signal a lantern attached to his dash-board — with no one accompanying or following him, to a certain lonely spot, particularly designated, also marked by a designated lantern, and there deposit $25,000 in gold currency in a sack, and the boy would be safely returned the next morning. The gold was taken as directed and deposited at the place designated. On the following morning the boy was mysteriously returned to his parents.

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The search for the parties who committed the outrage and divided the ransom was then commenced, with the object of bringing them to the bar of justice. Recently one, James Callahan, was arrested on suspicion of being one of the parties implicated in the crime, - "No. 3," who acted as "jailer," — and is now being held for trial, charged with various

felonies and misdemeanors.

On the facts above presented the questions arising in the public mind are, is Callahan one of the guilty parties, and if so what are his crimes and what is likely to be his punishment?

Whether Callahan is one of the parties implicated in the abduction and shared in the ransom money, remains to be yet proven, although the police claim to have abundant evidence to establish all the charges against him. But policemen are neither lawyers nor judges, and their presumptions as to the sufficiency of evidence to make out a case on close questions turning on legal technicalities, is not always to be relied on. It is the common experience of laws that police evidence in such a case is about the most unsatisfactory class of evidence they encounter; more unsatisfactory and less conclusive to the average mind, than circumstantial evidence even.

We have to assume, for the time being, that Callahan is one of the parties implicated in this outrage; for, under the benign provisions of the law of the land, no matter how heinous the crime with which a person stands charged, he is presumed to be inno

cent until his guilt is clearly established by competent evidence. Assuming then that Callahan is one of the guilty parties, what are his crimes, and what is likely to be his punishment?

The catalogue of crimes and misdemeanors popularly charged against Callahan and the others implicated in this transaction, is about as long as the moral law, and includes, among other things, criminal conspiracy, falsely impersonating an officer, kidnapping, child stealing, false imprisonment, sending threatening letters, extortion, grand larceny and robbery. If he is one of the parties implicated, is Callahan in reality guilty of all of the offenses and misdemeanors charged? It is worth while to examine all the items of the accusation with a view to determining whether the offenses have been committed, and if so what the punishment thereof may be.

do a criminal and unlawful act in a criminal and unlawful manner; for the abduction and false imprisonment of young Cudahy was unlawful. Conspiracy of this kind was a crime at common law, punishable at ancient common law, by what is known as the "villenous" judgment; that is, the loss by those convicted of conspiracy of their liberam legem, or legal rights, whereby they were discredited and disabled as witnesses and jurors; forfeited their goods and lands for life; were liable to have those lands wasted, their houses razed, their trees rooted up, and their bodies committed to prison. But by the later common law such delinquents were usually punished by imprisonment, fine and the pillory.

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While the conspiracy in this case is conceded, yet it is not one of the crimes prohibited by the Nebraska Criminal Code. The only conspiracy inhibited by that instrument being a conspiracy to falsely and maliciously charge and indict, or cause or procure to be charged and indicted, any person for a criminal offense. This being the case, the conspiracy charged against Callahan is not a crime, and not punishable under the Nebraska statutes, unless the common-law crime of conspiracy is still in force in that State by virtue of section 1 of article XVI of the Constitution, which provides that "all laws in force at the time of the adoption of this Constitution * shall continue to be as valid as if this Constitution had not been adopted;" and section 1675 of the Compiled Statutes, which declares that "so much of the common law of England as is applicable and not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, with the organic law of this territory (this statute was enacted while the State was yet a territory), or with any laws passed to be passed by the legislature * is adopted and declared to be law." And also unless the Nebraska Criminal Code is merely declaratory of the common law. (See 42 Neb. 505.) If criminal conspiracy is an offense in that State, it is simply a misdemeanor and not a felony, and punish

That a heinous crime was committed, and the feelings and indignation of the people of Omaha and the whole country stirred to the very foundation, cannot be questioned. It is agreed on all hands that there is no adequate punishment for such a crime provided by the Criminal Code of Nebraska. The same may be said of the criminal laws of almost, if not quite all, the other States of the Union - - at least prior to the Cudahy abduction. Since that abduction, and stimulated thereto by it, many of the State legislatures have passed laws putting kidnapping for purpose of ransom on the same footing as murder, and punishing it accordingly. Because of the acknowledged inadequacy of the punishment provided by the Nebraska Criminal Code, it is popularly thought to make the commission of this outrage cover a multiplicity of crimes and misdemeanors to the end that the punishment may be properly augmented, so as, like the Mikado, to "make the punishment fit the crime." This is thought to be unwise, and may lead to a miscarriage of justice in the end. The information charging Callahan with numerous felonies and misdemeanors, when the trial is called, the prosecution will doubtless be required to electable merely by fine and imprisonment in the county on which class of counts they will rely for conviction and will probably, out of respect to the feelings and wishes of an outraged public desirous of seeing the greatest possible amount of punishment dealt out, select the greater offenses charged, for which the punishment is the most severe. It is thought that these offenses cannot be technically made out, and that the only counts upon which a conviction can be had, having been dismissed, the defendant will escape punishment and go scott-free.

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jail, or both at the discretion of the trial judge.

That an officer was falsely impersonated cannot be denied, if young Cudahy's story is to be believed, and there is no occasion to question its truthfulness, because the man who forced him into the buggy represented that he was the sheriff of an adjoining county, and said he had a warrant for his arrest; but this does not constitute a crime or even a misdemeanor subjecting the party to punishment in Nebraska, because falsely impersonating an officer was not a crime or misdemeanor at common law, and is not made so by their Criminal Code.

The charge of criminal conspiracy is popularly made, but is not included in the counts on which Callahan is held for trial, but it may be contained in Kidnapping, or forcible abduction, was a crime. the one on which he is finally brought to trial. This known to the Jewish law and the civil law, and in offense consists in a combination of two or more both was punishable by death. By the common law persons, by some concerted action, to accomplish a of England, it was made a crime punishable by fine criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a and imprisonment and the pillory. The crime conpurpose, not in itself criminal or unlawful, by crim- | sisted in the forcible abduction or stealing away of inal or unlawful means. There is no question but that a man, woman or child from their own country and there was a conspiracy on the part of some persons to sending them into another country. But the crime

charged against Callahan and his associates does property, but at the same time to leave him as far not fall within the prohibition of the common law, as possible in ignorance of the taker. Taking from and is not reached by the provisions of the Nebraska Criminal Code, which simply provides that "any person who shall kidnap or forcibly or fraudulently carry off or decoy out of the State any person or persons, or shall arrest or imprison any person or persons with the intent to have such person or persons carried out of the State," etc., shall be guilty of the crime of kidnapping and punished as provided.

It is not claimed that young Cudahy was taken out of the State, or that there was any intention to take him out of the State, or to do other than restrain him of his liberty in the house where he was confined, or elsewhere in the vicinity, until such time as a ransom for his release should be paid. This does not constitute the offense of kidnapping, either at common law or under the statute of Nebraska, and for that reason is not punishable as such.

Child-stealing is inhibited by the Nebraska Criminal Code, but to constitute child-stealing, the child abducted must be under the age of ten years, whereas young Cudahy is fifteen years old, and for that reason his abduction does not offend against the section of the Criminal Code prohibiting childstealing.

Letters were sent to the elder Cudahy threatening to do injury to the boy if the ransom was not paid. Sending threatening letters the Criminal Code makes a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than $50 nor more than $500, or imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed ten days, or both. But the missives in question were not sent through the mails, and may not be "letters" within the statute. If it can be shown that Callahan sent the threatening letters, he may be punished under this statute, but otherwise not; for there were no aiders or abettors or accessories in misdemeanors.

By means of these letters the ransom money was extorted from the elder Cudahy; but both at common law and under the Criminal Code of Nebraska the crime of extortion is limited to the acts of persons in office which are done under the color of their office, and this will not include the extortion of the money as ransom for the boy's

return.

It is contended that in procuring the $25,000 ransom money as they did, Callahan and his associates are guilty of grand larceny. It is thought that the essential elements of this crime are wanting, even if we concede all that is claimed by the prosecuting attorney and the police, and that, therefore, a conviction cannot be had on this count. Under the Criminal Code of Nebraska the crime of grand larceny consists in "taking property of any value from the person of another without putting said person in fear by threats or the use of violence." To constitute the statutory crime the taking must be secretely and fraudulently, but not forcibly accomplished, in such a manner as not only to deprive the owner of his

the possession is essential to grand larceny, and that possession must be that of the owner or his agent. It cannot be contended that when the money was deposited by the elder Cudahy at the designated place, which was not on his own premises and not under his control, and he returned to his home in Omaha, that the money was in his possession and control within the meaning of the statute. Neither can it be contended that the owner of the land on which the deposit was secretely made, was the agent of Cudahy and that he had the money in his possession as such agent.

It is true that the possession of an owner may be constructive as well as actual, and he has such constructive possession when he knows the locality of the property, and would be legally entitled to take it into his actual possession whenever he desired, and could maintain an action for trespass for its taking by another. Was Cudahy entitled to retake the money after the deposit? Could he legally do so? Could he have maintained trespass against the owner of the land on which it was deposited had the latter discovered and removed it before the abductors took it away? It is thought not. Had he entered upon the land for the purpose of reclaiming it he would have been technically a trespasser, and liable as such. It cannot be claimed that the money deposited came under the head of "chattels lost on land," and that the owner is entitled to the protection of the principles of that doctrine of the law.

Where possession is obtained by means of a fraudulent trick or device, and with felonious intent to secure temporary possession and then convert to one's own use, this will constitute the crime of larceny under the statute. If the title as well as the possession is surrendered by the owner, no matter by what trick or device the owner is deceived thereto, this will not be larceny, but false pretense; for if the owner consents to the transfer of title, however that transfer is brought about, there can be no larceny. Thus a party who pays money voluntarily to another who has falsely represented himself as an officer having a warrant for the party's arrest for a crime, this does not constitute the offense of either larceny or robbery on the part of the person falsely representing himself to be an officer.

In the Cudahy case the money was not taken from either the person, the possession or the view of the owner, and the possession and title were both voluntarily surrendered by him. At the direction of the abductors, and as a pay and compensation for the return of his son, the elder Cudahy made payment of the money to unknown parties in the manner and at the place designated by them, by depositing it at a lonely place agreed upon, and then going away and leaving it there. He saw no one, he heard no one, he did not and he does not know that there was any one, aside from himself, in the neighbor

hood at the time. When the money was taken from the agreed depositary it was neither in his possession, nor under his control, and,- so far as is known,- not in his view. He had voluntarily deposited according to agreement, for his assent to the proposition of the abductors constituted an agreement between them and him respecting the matter under negotiation, the services to be rendered by them in consideration of the payment of the money, the return of his son. He parted with the title and the possession of his own free will to the abductors, and trusted to their honor to carry out their part of the contract and return the boy. The contract was not a nudum pactum, it was a valid agreement, fully carried out on both sides. Cudahy got what he contracted for and paid for,- the possession of the boy. There is no element of larceny in this transaction, and Callahan cannot be convicted on this count, whether he was the man who went to the appointed depositary and took away the money, or merely afterward shared in the fund.

It is also charged that the manner in which the ransom money was procured constitutes robbery. Now, under the Nebraska statute, robbery is simply larceny accomplished by force, or violence, or putting in fear. Robbery is committed by force; larceny by stealth, and where there is no violence or circumstances of terror resorted to for the purpose of inducing the owner to part with his money for the safety of his person or other property, the crime is larceny; otherwise, if force or fear is used, it is robbery. The force may consist of physical violence, directly applied, or it may be constructive, by threats or otherwise putting in fear the person from whom the property is taken, and thereby overcoming his will. The fraudulent and felonious taking of property by a trick or device unaccompanied by violence or putting in fear, is not robbery.

The fear necessary to constitute robbery, must be such as to create a reasonable apprehension of danger, to the person or the property of the party robbed. If the transaction is attended with such circumstances as in common experience are likely to create an apprehension of danger, and to induce a man to part with his money for the safety of his person or property, he is put in fear. Actual fear need not be precisely and circumspectly shown, for the law in odium spoliatoris will presume fear when there appears to be good grounds therefor.

child delivered money to another upon threat that unless he did so the latter would destroy the child. Hotham, J., said he did not doubt this was sufficient to constitute robbery. In the second case, Eyre, C. J., said: A man may be said to take by violence who deprived the other of the power to resist, by whatever means he did it; and that he saw no sensible distinction between a personal violence to the party himself, and the case put by one of the justices of a man holding another's child over a river and threatening to throw it in unless he gave him money.

The taking must be against the person's will to constitute robbery; if he consents to the taking for any purpose, as for the purpose of prosecuting the robber, the taking will not constitute the crime of robbery. The taking must be from the person or possession or protection, in the presence of the person robbed. Anything taken from the view or protection is constructively from the person. Again, the property must be that of another than the accused, taken with a felonious intent; if he acted under a bona fide impression that the thing taken was his own property, then there is no robbery.

Viewed in any light we may choose, the getting of the ransom money is not robbery. Several of the necessary elements to constitute robbery are wanting. In the first place the money was not taken from the possession or protection or view of the elder Cudahy; it was not taken against his will, for he deposited it at a designated place in pursuance of a contract for the safe delivery of his son; he parted with the possession and the title voluntarily. And, lastly, the abductors had a right, under the circumstances, in view of the negotiations between the parties, to remove the money deposited under the bona fide impression that the thing taken was their own property. It is scarcely too much to say that there is not an element of robbery in the whole transaction. That the money was extorted by

means of threatening letters may be conceded without in any way changing the conclusion arrived at; because it may well be doubted whether this will inject an element of robbery into the transaction, the threat not being to injure the person or property of the elder Cudahy, but of a third person, which is manifestly not sufficient.

Now, as to the possible punishment. There may possibly be a conviction of the parties implicated for Fear of injury to the person or property of the criminal conspiracy at common law, although this party robbed is sufficient to constitute the offense may reasonably be doubted; and if convicted the under proper circumstances, and it is immaterial by punishment would be for a misdemeanor by fine and what means that fear is superinduced. But is fear of imprisonment in the county jail; or they may posinjury to the person of another sufficient to con- sibly be convicted of sending threatening letters, stitute the crime of robbery under any circum-likewise a misdemeanor with like punishment; or stances? There is grave doubt about this. It is they may be convicted of false imprisonment, also a said that the only instances on record put (but not | misdemeanor only punishable by fine and jail sendecided, mere dicta of the court) of robbery where money is obtained from one by threat of injury to be done to another are found in Rex v. Donolly (2 East P. C. 718), and Rex v. Reane (Id. 735). The first case put is where a man walking with a

tence. There can be no conviction and punishment for falsely impersonating an officer, because there is no law in Nebraska State against it; or for kidnapping, or child-stealing, or extortion, because neither of these offenses, as defined by the common

law or the Criminal Code of Nebraska, were committed; neither can there be a conviction under the charge of grand larceny, or of the more heinous crime of robbery, for the reason that the essential elements to constitute these crimes are wanting, and without these a conviction, if by any means procured, could not be sustained. The only offenses of which the abductors of Eddy Cudahy can be convicted are misdemeanors, punishable by fine, or by imprisonment in the county jail, or both, at the discretion of the trial judge.

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between contending litigants. These are matters outside of the range of this discussion, which seeks only to present the principles of the law of negligence, and to show its harmony, if not with the modern ethical ideals, at least with the most advanced ideals of the times in which the principles involved were advanced and applied in the long pilgrimage of the race to its present proud position. The germinal principles of the law of negligence, as administered to-day are found in all branches and in each era of the Aryan race since its first great unconscious ethnic dispersion on the southeast coast of the Caspian sea, and even among the Mongolians, whom we are

* ETHICS OF THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE. taught to look upon with aversion, we find Con

BY THE HON. JOHN WOODWARD.

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fucius saying to his followers: 'What do you say concerning the principle that injury should be recompensed with kindness?" The Master said, "With what, then, will you recompense kindness? Recompense injury with justice, and recompense kindness with kindness." It would be difficult to condense in fewer words more of the principles of ethics and of the law of negligence than are to be found in this admonition of Confucius, and an analysis of the law as we find it to-day will show to what extent the doctrine has been accepted in modern jurisprudence.

I have chosen on this occasion to discuss the ethics of the law of negligence. The oft-repeated and sneering reference to that branch of the legal profession who gain a livelihood in the prosecution of negligence cases as "ambulance chasers," has served to create a popular impression that this line of practice is essentially disreputable, and even the courts, it may be feared, are not free from this prejudice. That there have been abuses in the administration of the law; that witnesses, in the hands of Before entering upon the law of negligence, let unscrupulous lawyers, have been induced to falsify us briefly consider what is demanded by ethics or the facts, and that juries have been swayed by sym- the rules of right living, when we shall be the pathy, prejudice or other improper considerations, better prepared to determine the relation which the there can be no doubt, but it may be fairly ques- law bears to the ideal. If, as suggested by Herbert tioned if these evils are present in a greater degree Spencer in his work on the principles of ethics, in negligence cases, when the whole number is com- pleasures and pains are the ultimate tests of conduct; pared with the number of actions in any other if those things which produce the largest degree of branch of the law, than in actions upon contract, pleasure, either in the individual or in the aggregate or in any of the great variety of actions which en- society, are to be called good, while those which gage the attention of the courts in our complex produce pain, physical or mental, are to be denomisocial organization. Our modern industrial develop-nated bad, it follows that if an individual is deprived ment, involving vast aggregations of population of a limb, thus producing, not only physical sufferwithin limited territory, has brought with it the ing for the person injured, but mental suffering to necessity for rapid transit, and as a large percentage those whose sympathies are aroused, and in many of the negligence cases in the great cities grow out instances entailing a burden upon society by reason of these conditions, there are many who suppose that of the incapacity of the injured individual to care for the law of negligence is a blind legislative groping himself and those dependent upon him, a distinct after an equilibrium between the corporations and ethical wrong has been committed. The mere fact individuals, tinctured with the demagogism incident of the injury, entailing pains in excess of pleasures, to the conflicts between corporate wealth and indi- shows conclusively that the rules of right living, the vidual poverty, when, in fact, the principles of the essence of ethics, have been violated, and the offense law of negligence are older than our own jurispru- is the same whether the injury be the result of accidence, and the action for damages due to the in- dent or design; the loss of the arm or the leg unfits jury of an individual in the borough of Brooklyn the individual for the highest realization and enjoyto-day is merely an application of old rules in har- ment of his faculties, limits his activities, and lessens mony with the suggestion of Lord Holt that "if his capacity for contributing to the sum of happiness, men will multiply injuries, actions must be multi-and to the extent that these have been abridged, the plied too, for every man that is injured ought to have his recompense." We are not concerned, however, with the administration of the law; with the conduct of counsel or with the failures of juries, under all conditions, to nicely adjust the equities as Delivered by the Hon. John Woodward, Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Second District, before the

Law Department of the Brooklyn Institute, March 25, 1901.

injury is an ethical crime, independently of its immediate cause. "Again," says Spencer, in considering this question as presented on a different plane, "let us say that instead of being stopped after passing his mouth, that which he would swallow is stopped before reaching his mouth; so that day after day the man is required to waste his tissues in getting food, and day after day the food he has got to

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